On the twenty-fifth anniversary of September 11, Britain's MI5 Director General Ken McCallum offered a warning aimed not at the past but at the horizon: the gravest error an intelligence service can make is to perfect its defenses against a threat that has already passed. Writing in the Independent, McCallum argued that the fragmentation of modern infrastructure across private hands, combined with state-backed sabotage and persistent extremism, has created a security landscape that no single institution can navigate alone. His message was less a commemoration than a call to humility — an ackno
MI5 Chief Warns Next Major Attack May Already Be in Preparation
The next shock may already be taking shape somewhere we are not yet looking
Mark
So McCallum is saying the next attack won't look like 9/11. But how would he know that? Isn't that just a guess dressed up as wisdom?
Mimi
It's not really a guess—it's pattern recognition. Every major attack has surprised people partly because they prepared for the previous one. The point is that adversaries adapt. If we're locked into defending against hijacked planes, someone else is thinking about cyberattacks or something we haven't named yet.
Luke
But here's the thing: McCallum doesn't actually name what the next threat is. He says it's already in preparation somewhere we're not looking. That's unfalsifiable. How do we know if he's right or just being dramatic?
Mimi
That's fair. He's not claiming to know the specific threat. He's saying the structure of how we defend has to change. The private sector owns critical infrastructure now, and there's no clear chain of command if something goes wrong.
Mark
So the real problem is coordination? Not the threat itself, but that nobody knows who's supposed to respond?
Mimi
Exactly. He's saying we could have the best intelligence in the world, but if a cyberattack hits a power station and nobody knows whether the government or the company is supposed to fix it, we've failed anyway.
Luke
The Manchester plot he mentions—that was foiled, right? So the system worked there. What's the evidence that the current setup is actually broken?
Mimi
The Manchester case shows we can catch some plots. But McCallum's point is broader: we're good at catching things that look like things we've seen before. The danger is the thing that doesn't fit the pattern.
Mark
And the private sector piece—is that really a new problem, or has it always been this way?
Luke
It's gotten worse. Twenty-five years ago, more infrastructure was government-run. Now it's mostly private. But McCallum doesn't give numbers on how much of critical infrastructure is private versus public, so we don't really know the scale of the vulnerability.
Mimi
True, but the principle is clear: if you don't know who's responsible, you can't prepare. That's not speculation—that's just logic.
Mark
So what does he want to happen? What's the actual ask?
Mimi
Governments, businesses, and universities need to sit down now and figure out who does what in a crisis. Not after it happens. Before.
Der Puls
- The very thoroughness with which Western agencies prepared for another 9/11-style attack may have created a blind spot for the fundamentally different threats now taking shape.
- A recently foiled Islamist plot targeting Manchester's Jewish community with mass gun violence confirms that familiar dangers have not vanished — they persist alongside newer, harder-to-map ones.
- State-sponsored actors are increasingly using criminal intermediaries and cyberattacks to strike at power grids, water systems, and communications networks that are largely owned and operated by private companies.
- This privatization of critical infrastructure has fractured accountability — in a crisis, no one may know who owns the vulnerable system, who holds authority to act, or who should make the first call.
- McCallum is urging governments, businesses, and universities to map these gaps and establish crisis protocols now, before the next strategic shock forces those questions to be answered under fire.
On the twenty-fifth anniversary of September 11, Britain's MI5 Director General Ken McCallum offered a warning aimed not at the past but at the horizon: the gravest error an intelligence service can make is to perfect its defenses against a threat that has already passed. Writing in the Independent, McCallum argued that the fragmentation of modern infrastructure across private hands, combined with state-backed sabotage and persistent extremism, has created a security landscape that no single institution can navigate alone. His message was less a commemoration than a call to humility — an acknowledgment that the lessons we believe we have learned may be precisely the ones that leave us exposed.
On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the September 11 attacks, MI5 Director General Ken McCallum chose to look forward rather than back. Writing in the Independent, he argued that the greatest danger facing intelligence agencies today is the temptation to defend brilliantly against the last catastrophe while remaining blind to the next one. The 9/11 hijackings shaped Western security thinking for a generation — but that very focus, McCallum warned, could become a liability.
The threat landscape has fractured considerably since 2001. Al Qaeda has weakened but not disappeared, and the appetite for mass casualty attacks persists among various militant groups. McCallum cited a recently foiled plot in Manchester — an Islamist plan to kill hundreds through gun attacks on the Jewish community — as evidence that familiar dangers remain real. But they are no longer the only danger, or perhaps even the primary one.
State-backed aggression has emerged as a parallel concern of growing seriousness. Hostile governments now conduct sabotage through criminal intermediaries and launch cyberattacks against critical infrastructure. The structural shift since 2001 is significant: power grids, communications networks, and data systems are increasingly owned and operated by private companies rather than governments. This distribution of responsibility creates dangerous gaps. When a crisis strikes, no one may know who owns the vulnerable system, who has authority to act, or who was supposed to make the first call.
McCallum's central argument was that this fragmentation demands a new kind of readiness — one built before catastrophe arrives. Governments, businesses, and academic institutions must collaborate now to map vulnerabilities and establish clear lines of responsibility. Remembering the victims of September 11 matters, he suggested, but remembrance alone is insufficient. What they deserve, alongside annual reflection, is preparation agile enough to meet threats that do not yet have a recognizable shape.
On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the September 11 attacks, Britain's intelligence chief offered a warning that looked not backward but forward: the next catastrophic strike may already be underway in places security agencies are not yet watching. Ken McCallum, director general of MI5, made the case in a Friday commentary that the fundamental mistake intelligence services could make is to prepare too thoroughly for yesterday's attack while remaining blind to tomorrow's.
McCallum's argument rested on a simple but unsettling premise. The 9/11 hijackings—planes turned into weapons, thousands killed in coordinated assaults on symbolic targets—shaped how Western security agencies thought about mass casualty terrorism for a quarter century. But that very focus, he suggested, could become a liability. "We know that the next strategic shock will, by definition, not resemble the last one," he wrote in the Independent. The comfortable assumption that we have learned the lessons of 2001 masks a harder truth: we may be defending brilliantly against the last war while the next one takes shape elsewhere.
The threat landscape has fractured in ways that complicate the old playbook. Al Qaeda, though weakened from its peak, has not disappeared, and the appetite among various militant groups for mass casualty attacks remains intact. McCallum pointed to a concrete recent example: a foiled Islamist plot in Manchester that aimed to kill hundreds through gun attacks on the Jewish community. These threats persist and demand vigilance. But they are no longer the only danger, or perhaps even the primary one.
State-backed aggression has emerged as a parallel and growing concern. Hostile governments now conduct sabotage through criminal intermediaries and launch cyberattacks against critical infrastructure—power stations, water systems, communications networks. The difference between 2001 and 2026 is structural: many of the systems that keep modern societies functioning are no longer owned or operated by governments alone. Private companies run power grids, manage data, control communications. This distribution of responsibility creates what McCallum called a dangerous gap in preparation. When a crisis hits, nobody may know who owns the vulnerable system, who has the authority to act, or even who should be making the first call.
McCallum's core argument was that this fragmentation demands a different kind of readiness. Governments, private businesses, and academic institutions must work together now—not after the next attack—to map vulnerabilities and establish who does what when crisis arrives. The cost of waiting until catastrophe strikes to answer these questions would be measured in lives. "We cannot wait for the next shock to discover who owns the vulnerability, who has the authority to act, or who was supposed to pick up the phone," he wrote.
The commentary carried an implicit rebuke of complacency. Remembering 9/11 matters, McCallum suggested, but remembrance alone is not enough. The victims of that day and the victims of whatever comes next deserve more than annual reflection. They deserve preparation that adapts to threats that do not yet have a clear shape, resilience built before the crisis, and the willingness to change course before the next strategic shock arrives. The challenge for intelligence agencies and the governments they serve is to remain vigilant against known threats while staying alert to dangers that may not yet be visible.
Bemerkenswerte Zitate
We know that the next strategic shock will, by definition, not resemble the last one. That is perhaps the most important lesson of all.— Ken McCallum, MI5 Director General
We cannot wait for the next shock to discover who owns the vulnerability, who has the authority to act, or who was supposed to pick up the phone.— Ken McCallum, MI5 Director General
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