Merz's political survival at stake as German voters head to polls amid far-right surge

His presence is required in Berlin after the elections
A government official explained why Merz cancelled his UN address, signaling the urgency of Sunday's vote.
Mark

So Merz is the chancellor, but he's only been in office sixteen months and already his approval rating is at ten percent. What happened?

Mimi

He made promises he couldn't keep. Growth, containing the far right, managing the economy. Instead, energy prices spiked, automakers are struggling against Chinese competition, and housing costs have exploded. People are angry.

Luke

But those aren't entirely his fault, are they? Global energy markets, Chinese competition—those are structural forces.

Mimi

True, but voters don't distinguish between structural forces and leadership failure. They see a chancellor who said he'd fix things and didn't.

Mark

And the AfD—they're winning by talking about the same economic problems?

Mimi

Partly, yes. But also immigration, crime, and opposition to supporting Ukraine. They mobilized people who don't usually vote at all in Saxony-Anhalt.

Luke

So the AfD's victory wasn't just about converting CDU voters—it was about bringing in new voters entirely.

Mimi

Exactly. That's actually more dangerous for the mainstream parties because it expands the electorate in their favor.

Mark

What happens if the CDU crashes in these elections on Sunday?

Mimi

Merz could be replaced by his own party before 2029. One economist put the risk at thirty-five percent now.

Luke

But that's still a prediction, not a certainty. We don't know what the party will actually do.

Mimi

No, we don't. But the pressure is real, and it's building fast.

Mark

And if the CDU falls below five percent in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania?

Mimi

That would be unprecedented since the war. It would be a signal that the party is in genuine crisis.

  • The AfD's stunning near-majority in Saxony-Anhalt — built on mobilizing disaffected non-voters around economic anxiety, crime, and opposition to Ukraine support — gave the far right a momentum that felt less like a surge and more like a tide.
  • Merz's approval rating has cratered to ten percent, a brutal measure of the distance between his promises of economic revival and the soaring energy costs, deindustrialisation, and housing crises that Germans are actually living.
  • In Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the CDU risks falling below the five percent parliamentary threshold — an outcome without postwar precedent that would mark a historic humiliation for the chancellor on his own watch.
  • Berlin's housing emergency has turned the capital into its own battleground, with Die Linke calling for landlord expropriations and the AfD polling strongly even in a city long considered immune to its appeal.
  • Economists now place the risk of a CDU revolt to replace Merz before the 2029 elections at roughly thirty-five percent — up sharply in just ten days — as regional party leaders begin assigning blame and whisper campaigns gather force.
  • Tens of thousands marched in anti-AfD protests after Saxony-Anhalt, but whether civic energy would convert to ballots — or whether Sunday's results would confirm that the center is collapsing — was a question only the evening's exit polls could answer.

Sixteen months into his chancellorship, Friedrich Merz found himself anchored in Berlin on a Sunday that should have seen him at the United Nations, watching as voters in two German states prepared to render a verdict not just on regional governance but on the direction of a democracy under strain. With his approval at ten percent and the far-right AfD riding historic momentum from Saxony-Anhalt, the elections in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania carried the weight of a larger question: whether the political center of Europe's largest economy could hold against forces it had long underestimated. What unfolds in Germany rarely stays in Germany, and the world was watching.

Friedrich Merz spent the last Sunday of September not at the United Nations, where he had been scheduled to speak, but in Berlin — his presence deemed too politically essential to leave the country. Roughly 3.8 million voters in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania were heading to the polls, and the AfD, fresh from its strongest regional performance ever in Saxony-Anhalt, was poised to claim more ground.

The Saxony-Anhalt result had been a shock even by the standards of Germany's turbulent recent politics. The AfD had fallen just short of an absolute majority, having drawn in voters who had previously abstained entirely — channeling their frustrations over the economy, crime, and Germany's military support for Ukraine into a near-governing mandate. Two weeks later, the question was not whether the far right would advance again, but how badly Merz's CDU would bleed in the process.

Merz's standing had eroded dramatically. An approval rating of ten percent reflected a chancellor who had promised economic renewal and AfD containment and delivered neither. Energy prices remained high, key industrial sectors were hollowing out, and a persistent housing crisis had left ordinary Germans angry. Even a meaningful drop in border arrivals had done nothing to soften the AfD's support — its voters' grievances ran deeper than any single statistic could address.

In Berlin, where eighty-five percent of residents rent their homes and advertised rents have nearly doubled since 2014, the housing emergency had become the defining issue. Die Linke was challenging the CDU for first place by demanding the expropriation of corporate landlords. The CDU's candidate, Stefan Evers, had inherited the top spot after his predecessor abandoned his re-election bid following a scandal — he had been photographed playing tennis while large parts of the city sat without power after an arson attack the previous winter.

The more existential threat, however, was unfolding on the Baltic coast. In Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the CDU risked failing to clear the five percent threshold for parliamentary representation — a result without precedent in postwar German history. Regional CDU figures had already begun pointing fingers at Merz, a sign that the internal pressure was no longer merely whispered.

Analysts were beginning to price in the possibility of a leadership change. Berenberg's chief economist estimated the probability of a CDU revolt against Merz before the 2029 general election had risen from twenty to thirty-five percent in just ten days. Merz himself had pushed back, insisting he had been elected for four years and intended to use them. But as the polls closed and exit numbers began to surface, the question was whether his own party would give him the time he was asking for — or whether Sunday's results would make that decision for them.

Friedrich Merz arrived at one of the most precarious moments of his political career on a Sunday in late September, watching as roughly 3.8 million German voters prepared to cast ballots in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. The chancellor, who had held office for just sixteen months, was not in New York addressing the United Nations as originally planned. Instead, he remained in Berlin, his presence deemed essential by government officials as the country's far-right Alternative für Deutschland party—buoyed by a stunning regional victory two weeks earlier—prepared to claim more ground.

The timing was brutal. In Saxony-Anhalt, the AfD had just achieved its strongest performance in any regional election, falling just short of an absolute majority that would have allowed it to govern alone. The party, defined by its anti-immigration stance and alignment with Russia, had mobilized voters who had previously sat out elections entirely, channeling their anxieties about the economy, crime, and Germany's military support for Ukraine into electoral power. Now, as Merz watched the polls open at eight in the morning, the question was not whether the AfD would gain ground again, but how much damage his own party would sustain in the process.

Merz's position had deteriorated sharply. His personal approval rating had collapsed to ten percent—a figure that reflected the gap between his campaign promises and the reality voters were experiencing. He had pledged to restore economic growth to Europe's largest economy and to contain the AfD's rise. Neither had happened. Instead, soaring energy prices, deindustrialisation in critical sectors like automaking, and persistent housing crises had left Germans angry and receptive to the far right's message. Even as border arrivals had declined significantly under his watch, the AfD's voters were unmoved, their concerns rooted in something deeper than immigration statistics alone.

In Berlin, the capital's housing emergency had become a political flashpoint. Roughly eighty-five percent of households rented their homes, and advertised rents had nearly doubled since 2014. The far-left Die Linke party was challenging Merz's CDU for first place by calling for corporate landlord expropriations, while the AfD polled strongly in third or fourth position even in this cosmopolitan city. The CDU's candidate, Stefan Evers, had taken over after the previous mayor, Kai Wegner, abandoned his re-election bid in July following a scandal—he had been caught playing tennis while large sections of Berlin suffered a power blackout triggered by arson the previous winter.

But Berlin's struggles paled beside what was unfolding in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the Baltic coast state where the CDU faced its most existential threat. The AfD and the Social Democrats were locked in a tight race while Merz's party risked falling below the five percent threshold required for parliamentary representation—a result that would be unprecedented in the postwar period and would mark a historic collapse for the chancellor's political standing. Regional CDU leaders had already begun blaming Merz's weakness for their poor positioning, a sign that internal party pressure was building.

Economists and political analysts were beginning to calculate the odds of Merz's survival. Holger Schmieding, chief economist at Berenberg bank, still expected Merz to serve his full four-year term, but he estimated the risk of a CDU revolt—a move to replace him as chancellor before the 2029 general election—had risen from twenty percent to roughly thirty-five percent in the span of ten days. The Saxony-Anhalt shock had concentrated minds within his own party. Some Christian Democrats were already whispering about alternatives, about whether another figure might stanch the bleeding.

Merz had resisted calls to resign. "We as a government were elected for four years, I was elected for four years," he had told an industry group, vowing to use that time to lead Germany out of its difficulties. But as the polling booths closed at six in the evening and exit polls began to emerge, the question was whether his party would grant him the runway he was claiming. The AfD's momentum was undeniable, built on economic grievance and a willingness to mobilize voters whom mainstream parties had written off. Tens of thousands of Germans had taken to the streets in anti-AfD protests after Saxony-Anhalt, hoping to rally support for democratic parties. Whether that energy would translate into votes, or whether Sunday's results would deepen the sense that the political center was collapsing, would become clear within hours.

We as a government were elected for four years, I was elected for four years. And I want to use these four years to lead the country out of this difficult period.
— Friedrich Merz, addressing an industry group
The risk that the CDU may revolt against him and replace the unpopular chancellor seems to have risen from 20% ten days ago to roughly 35% now.
— Holger Schmieding, chief economist at Berenberg bank
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