The doctor placed three stents and prevented a currency heart attack
En una sala de inversores estadounidenses, el economista Carlos Melconian ofreció un diagnóstico de Argentina que mezcla alivio y advertencia: el dólar podría trepar hasta $2.000 sin desencadenar una catástrofe, pero solo si el gobierno resuelve problemas estructurales que todavía no ha enfrentado. La intervención del Tesoro de Estados Unidos evitó el colapso, dice Melconian, pero detener una hemorragia no es lo mismo que curar al paciente. Argentina sigue en terapia intensiva, con reservas negativas, controles mal administrados y una sociedad que aún desconfía del peso.
- El dólar podría estabilizarse entre $1.500 y $2.000 sin crisis, pero esa calma depende de condiciones políticas y financieras que aún no están garantizadas.
- La decisión de levantar el cepo para personas físicas en septiembre desató una fuga de capitales de proporciones históricas que Melconian califica directamente de mala praxis.
- Sin el respaldo del Tesoro estadounidense, el plan económico del gobierno habría colapsado por completo: la intervención externa fue, según Melconian, la diferencia entre la vida y la muerte del esquema.
- Los problemas sin resolver son concretos y urgentes: reservas negativas, acceso al mercado internacional, tasas de interés, disponibilidad de crédito y ausencia de un programa económico coherente.
- El gobierno debe comunicar con claridad adónde va y romper su dependencia histórica del endeudamiento externo, o el optimismo cauteloso de Melconian para 2026 podría evaporarse.
Carlos Melconian se presentó ante un grupo de inversores inmobiliarios estadounidenses para ofrecer su lectura del momento económico argentino: el dólar podría llegar a $2.000 sin provocar una catástrofe, siempre que ciertas condiciones se mantengan. El gobierno enfrenta cuatro problemas críticos sin resolver, la banda cambiaria podría desaparecer, y la demanda de divisas entre los argentinos comunes debe enfriarse, de una forma u otra.
El economista describió los últimos meses como una experiencia cercana a la muerte evitada gracias a la intervención extranjera. El secretario del Tesoro de Estados Unidos, Scott Bessent, fue quien colocó los stents que impidieron el infarto cambiario. Sin esa asistencia, el plan económico no habría sobrevivido. Pero la rescate fue incompleta: el levantamiento del cepo para personas físicas en septiembre fue, a su juicio, una mala praxis que desató una fuga de capitales sin precedentes. El ministro Caputo atribuyó el problema al riesgo político de la oposición, pero Melconian señaló que la hemorragia había comenzado antes.
El nuevo equilibrio cambiario, sugirió, podría ubicarse entre $1.500 y $2.000, fuera de la banda actual pero estable. Advirtió contra el optimismo fácil: noviembre y diciembre suelen traer mayor dolarización, y el gobierno no debería esperar que el tipo de cambio baje por inercia. Lo que sigue pendiente es extenso: reservas negativas, acceso a mercados internacionales, tasas, crédito y la ausencia de un programa económico real en lugar de movimientos tácticos.
Melconian fue escéptico ante las reformas ambiciosas: los cambios laborales y los recortes impositivos serán modestos. El verdadero desafío es que el gobierno comunique con claridad su rumbo. Se mostró cautelosamente optimista respecto a 2026, pero con una advertencia final: Argentina debe romper su adicción histórica al endeudamiento externo. Los funcionarios son banqueros por formación, y eso no es necesariamente malo, pero esta vez el país no puede volver a la ventanilla de la deuda cada vez que necesite oxígeno.
Carlos Melconian sat before a room of American real estate investors on a Friday afternoon and delivered a diagnosis of Argentina's economic condition that was both reassuring and unsettling. The dollar, he said, could climb to $2,000 without catastrophe—but only if certain things held. The government had four critical problems still unresolved. The currency band itself might disappear. And the appetite for dollars among ordinary Argentines had to cool, one way or another.
Melconian, a prominent economist and consultant, framed the recent months as a near-death experience averted by foreign intervention. U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Bessent, he said, had essentially saved the country from cardiac arrest. "The doctor placed three stents and prevented a currency heart attack," he told the gathering. Without that American assistance, the economic plan would have collapsed entirely. It was not hyperbole, he insisted. The patient would have died.
Yet the rescue was incomplete. The government had lifted capital controls for individuals in September—a decision Melconian called malpractice. The timing was wrong, the execution was wrong, and it had unleashed a capital flight of historic proportions. Finance Minister Luis Caputo had blamed it all on political risk from the opposition, but Melconian knew better. The hemorrhaging had started before September. The underlying problem was deeper: too many Argentines wanted to move their money out of pesos, and the government had given them the chance to do it.
The new equilibrium for the dollar, Melconian suggested, might settle somewhere between $1,500 and $2,000 per peso—outside the current trading band, but stable. This assumed the financial and political conditions held firm. He warned against complacency. November and December typically saw sharp increases in dollarization as Argentines moved money around year-end. The government should not fool itself into thinking the currency would drift downward.
What remained unresolved was stark: the currency market itself, negative foreign reserves, the ability to return to international capital markets, interest rates, and credit availability. The government had not truly stabilized anything yet. It had merely stopped the bleeding. Melconian also noted that with current risk premiums, the finance minister likely had no appetite to seek external financing. The cost was too high.
On the question of reforms, Melconian was skeptical of grand ambitions. The government could pass reforms, but it could not accumulate them all at once. Labor reform and tax cuts would probably be modest. The real challenge was simpler and harder: the government needed an actual economic program, not just a series of tactical moves. President Javier Milei and his team should communicate more clearly about where they stood and where they were headed. Melconian remained cautiously optimistic—2026 was not impossible, he said—but he was watching closely for signs of drift.
One final warning: the government had to break its addiction to debt markets. The finance minister and those around him were bankers by training and temperament, and bankers understood each other. That was not necessarily a problem. But Argentina had spent decades lurching back to the debt window whenever it needed cash. This time, Melconian said, they had to stay away.
Notable Quotes
Lifting capital controls for individuals was malpractice, and demand for foreign currency from savers must decline through either price increases or enforcement.— Carlos Melconian
The government's central challenge is to have an actual economic program and pursue the best possible reforms, not accumulate reforms all at once.— Carlos Melconian
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
When you say the dollar could reach $2,000 without tragedy, what do you mean by tragedy? What would tragedy look like?
Collapse. A run on the banks. Capital controls snapping back into place. The kind of crisis where people can't access their own money. A stable $2,000 peso means the economy is functioning, people are working, the government has a plan. Tragedy is when none of that is true.
You called lifting the capital controls malpractice. But wasn't that supposed to be part of normalizing the economy?
Yes, but timing is everything. You don't open the door when people are already running for the exit. The government waited too long to see the problem, then moved too fast to fix it. By September, the damage was already done.
Bessent's help—was it a loan, a gift, a swap arrangement?
It was structured as a swap, which means it's technically there if needed but not meant to be used. The real value was the signal: the United States was backing Argentina's stabilization. That matters more than the money itself.
You said the government needs an economic program. What does that mean in practical terms?
It means deciding what you're actually trying to do. Are you fighting inflation? Rebuilding reserves? Attracting investment? Right now it feels like they're doing all three at once with no clear priority. You have to choose.
Why are you cautiously optimistic if so much is still broken?
Because the alternative—collapse—didn't happen. The patient is alive. That's not nothing. And there's a window now, maybe through 2026, to actually build something. But windows close fast.