Over nine seasons, Manchester City's owners quietly rewrote the rules of financial fair play not by breaking them openly, but by disguising nearly a billion pounds of their own money as commercial sponsorship income. An independent commission has now found the club guilty of all major charges, concluding that the arrangements were not misunderstandings but deliberate fabrications — a 'disguised funding scheme' constructed to make ambition look like legitimacy. The ruling, which uses the word 'sham' eight times, marks one of the most consequential verdicts in the history of English football gov
Manchester City's £920m financial deception: How they fooled Premier League regulators
The owners would pay the vast majority, disguised as sponsorship revenue.
Mark
So the core of this is that Manchester City split sponsorship deals into two parts—one part the sponsor actually paid, and one part the owners paid in secret?
Mimi
Exactly. The sponsor would pay a base fee, and the owners would pay what they called a "tagged sum." But on the financial statements, it all got recorded as if the sponsor paid the whole thing. So regulators saw £949 million in sponsorship revenue when really only £119 million of it came from actual sponsors.
Luke
But wait—wouldn't the sponsors themselves know they weren't paying the full amount? How does that not immediately get flagged?
Mimi
The ruling doesn't spell out how the sponsors were kept quiet or what they understood. That's one of the gaps. What we know is that the owners were paying the vast majority, and the club was presenting it to regulators as legitimate commercial income.
Mark
And when they got close to breaking financial rules, they just... invented new sponsorship deals?
Mimi
In one case, yes. In May 2013, they were £9.9 million short of UEFA compliance with days left in the financial year. They generated modified agreements retroactively—for bonuses on events that had already happened, for a US tour. No new sponsors were even approached.
Luke
That's the part that's almost harder to believe than the main scheme. That's not sophisticated financial engineering. That's just making things up on the spot.
Mimi
And the ruling says the club knew its own financial statements didn't give a true picture. They were "reckless as to whether those annual accounts provided a true and fair view."
Mark
What about the people who signed off on this? Are they named?
Mimi
No. The ruling redacts all the names of individuals involved in approving and executing the schemes. We don't know who knew what or who signed what.
Luke
Which means we also don't know if this was directed from the very top or if it was a department-level operation. That's a significant unknown.
Mark
And the witnesses—the ruling says some of them lied knowingly?
Mimi
Yes. City provided statements from 24 individuals, and the panel found that several key factual witnesses gave evidence "that they knew to be untrue and so had been dishonest." But again, no names.
Luke
So we have a finding that people lied under oath, but we don't know who they are or what they said. That's going to matter when the Independent Football Regulator starts looking at the integrity of directors and owners.
El Pulso
- Manchester City's owners faced a stark choice in 2010: accept the limits of financial fair play or engineer a way around them — and they chose deception, splitting sponsorship contracts so that £830 million of owner funding could masquerade as commercial revenue.
- The scheme required active maintenance, including a last-minute document revision just days before a UEFA deadline to plug a £9.9 million shortfall using retroactive bonuses for events that had already happened.
- Beyond the core sponsorship fraud, the club ran parallel operations — the 'Fordham Arrangement' to inflate image rights income and off-book routing of player and manager contracts through third parties — distorting the financial picture by over £920 million in total.
- When investigators came knocking, City obstructed the process, and the commission found that multiple witnesses gave testimony they knew to be false, raising the prospect of individual accountability beyond the club itself.
- The club's defence — that regulators had simply misread the sponsorship agreements — was dismissed outright as a story 'concocted well after the event,' leaving City facing sanctions while the identities of those who approved the scheme remain redacted from the public record.
Over nine seasons, Manchester City's owners quietly rewrote the rules of financial fair play not by breaking them openly, but by disguising nearly a billion pounds of their own money as commercial sponsorship income. An independent commission has now found the club guilty of all major charges, concluding that the arrangements were not misunderstandings but deliberate fabrications — a 'disguised funding scheme' constructed to make ambition look like legitimacy. The ruling, which uses the word 'sham' eight times, marks one of the most consequential verdicts in the history of English football governance, with questions of individual accountability still unresolved.
When Abu Dhabi United Group acquired Manchester City in 2008, their ambitions quickly outpaced what the club's legitimate revenues could sustain. Projected losses for the 2009-10 season alone threatened to shatter Premier League records, and both UEFA and the Premier League were simultaneously introducing financial fair play rules designed to prevent exactly this kind of spending. Faced with a choice between restraint and concealment, the club chose concealment.
From early 2010, City began entering sponsorship agreements split into two parts: a base fee paid by actual sponsors, and a hidden 'tagged sum' paid by the owners themselves. To any regulator reviewing the accounts, it appeared commercial partners were investing heavily in the club. In reality, of the £949.94 million recorded as sponsorship income between 2009-10 and 2017-18, only £119.25 million came from genuine sponsors. The remaining £830.69 million came from the owners, dressed up as commercial revenue.
The scheme required constant tending. In May 2013, with less than a week before the financial year closed, City found itself £9.9 million short of UEFA compliance. Without contacting sponsors, the club generated backdated contract modifications inflating fees for bonuses on events that had already occurred. The gap was closed.
City also ran parallel operations. The 'Fordham Arrangement' used a third-party front to purchase image rights entitlements at artificially inflated prices, allowing owner funding to enter the books as operating income. Separately, expensive player and manager contracts were routed through third parties and recorded as consultancy fees, concealing the true scale of wage liabilities. Across all schemes, the total distortion reached £920.68 million.
When the Premier League investigation began, the club obstructed it. The commission found that evidence from several key witnesses 'was false in a number of key respects' and that certain individuals had testified knowing their statements to be untrue. City's defence — that regulators had misunderstood the sponsorship arrangements — was rejected as a narrative 'concocted well after the event.'
The 40-page ruling uses the word 'sham' eight times. The names of those who approved and executed the scheme remain redacted, but the newly established Independent Football Regulator will have the power to examine their conduct once the full written reasons are released.
On Tuesday, the Premier League released a 40-page ruling that laid bare how Manchester City had systematically deceived financial regulators across nine seasons. The word "sham" appears eight times in the document—a deliberate choice by the independent commission that found the club guilty of all major charges related to serious breaches of financial rules.
When Abu Dhabi United Group bought Manchester City in 2008, the new owners arrived with ambition that immediately collided with reality. By the 2009-10 season, it became clear that reaching their vision—assembling a championship team with the world's best players—would require spending far beyond what the club's legitimate revenues could support. The projected losses for that single season alone would shatter the previous Premier League record, set by Chelsea in 2006 at £140 million. The owners were determined not to break that record. They also knew large losses would likely continue for at least five more years. This was the moment when both UEFA and the Premier League were introducing financial fair play rules, restrictions designed to prevent exactly this kind of spending. The club faced a choice: either abandon their ambitions or find a way to hide the money.
They chose the latter. In early 2010, Manchester City began entering into sponsorship agreements that bore no relationship to market value. These deals were split into two parts: a base fee that sponsors would actually pay, and a tagged sum that the club's owners would secretly contribute. To any regulator or auditor reviewing the financial statements, it appeared that commercial sponsors were pouring nearly a billion pounds into the club. In reality, the owners were funding the vast majority themselves. The ruling describes this as the "disguised funding scheme," and it became the central mechanism through which City concealed its true financial position. Between 2009-10 and 2017-18, commercial income from sponsors totaled £949.94 million. Of that, only £119.25 million came from actual sponsors. The remaining £830.69 million came directly from the owners, disguised as sponsorship revenue.
But the scheme required constant adjustment. When regulators or auditors asked difficult questions, City would tweak the arrangements to "assist with continued concealment." In May 2013, less than a week before the financial year ended, the club discovered it was £9.9 million short of complying with UEFA's rules. Without even approaching sponsors, City generated modified agreements that retroactively increased sponsorship fees for bonuses on events that had already occurred and for a US tour. The shortfall was plugged.
City also deployed other mechanisms. In 2012, the club launched Project Longbow, a broader effort to boost revenues and reduce losses. While many strands of this initiative were legitimate, one was not: the Fordham Arrangement. This was an agreement with a third party called Fordham that the ruling describes as "little more than a front." The owners would funnel money to Fordham, which would then "purchase" the club's entitlement to benefit from players' image rights at artificially inflated prices. This allowed the club to record owner funding as operating income. The arrangement concealed £24.5 million that was wrongly recorded as operating income and £49.414 million in expenses that were wrongly excluded from the books.
City also moved expensive player and manager contracts off the books entirely by routing payments through third parties—in reality, still funded by the owners but disguised as consultancy agreements. Three separate cases involved payments of £8.866 million, £7.4 million, and £0.5 million handled this way. Each concealed the true extent of the club's wage liabilities.
When the Premier League investigation began, City's response was to obstruct it. The ruling states that "by its conduct the club clearly intended to circumvent the Premier League rules" and "made concerted efforts to stop and frustrate the Premier League investigation." City provided witness statements from 24 individuals, many of whom testified at the hearing. The ruling found that evidence from several key factual witnesses "was false in a number of key respects" and that certain witnesses provided testimony "that they knew to be untrue and so had been dishonest." The club also knew its annual accounts "did not provide a true and fair view of the financial position" and was "reckless as to whether those annual accounts provided a true and fair view."
The total distortion across all schemes: £920.68 million in misstated financial position across nine seasons. City has denied the charges, claiming the Premier League misunderstood the sponsorship agreements. The panel rejected this explanation as "concocted well after the event in an attempt to obscure and conceal the realities of the disguised funding scheme." The names of the individuals involved in approving and executing these arrangements remain redacted from the public ruling, though the newly established Independent Football Regulator will have the power to examine their integrity and honesty when the full written reasons are eventually released.
Citas Notables
The club clearly intended to circumvent the Premier League rules and made concerted efforts to stop and frustrate the Premier League investigation.— Independent commission ruling
The explanation was concocted well after the event in an attempt to obscure and conceal the realities of the disguised funding scheme.— Panel response to City's defense of sponsorship agreements
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