Malaysia's balancing act between US and China faces mounting pressure

Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has built his foreign policy on a simple promise: Malaysia will not be forced to choose between the United States and China. But in late August, two sets of remarks suggested that promise is becoming harder to keep.

On August 16, Anwar told Al Jazeera that he saw Taiwan as part of China, without qualification. More pointedly, he suggested that force might be justified if a province tried to break away, comparing it to how any nation would act to protect its unity. Beijing's state media seized on the comments as validation of its position. Taiwan's Foreign Ministry responded differently, warning that Anwar's "one-sided support for China" could damage Taiwanese business confidence in Malaysia—a concern with real weight, given Malaysia's role in the global semiconductor supply chain.

Two days later, Anwar shifted focus to a different threat. He called for Malaysia to strengthen its defenses in Sabah, citing the expansion of US military facilities on the nearby Philippine island of Balabac, roughly 50 kilometers away. The Philippines has been upgrading these sites as part of an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with Washington that allows American forces to access facilities, build infrastructure, and store equipment. Balabac was one of four new locations added to the arrangement in 2023. Taken together, Anwar's statements seemed to paint a picture of Malaysia growing closer to Beijing while growing wary of American military presence in the region.

Yet Malaysia experts caution against reading these comments as evidence of a fundamental strategic shift. Ngeow Chow Bing, director of the Institute of China Studies at Universiti Malaya, told Deutsche Welle that Malaysia maintains strong relations with the United States and Western countries—ties that may simply be less visible than Anwar's increasingly warm public statements toward China. "The space for maintaining its traditional balancing act between China and the US is narrower than before, but that space remains," Bing said. Anwar himself walked back the Taiwan remarks after they aired, telling Malaysian media that Kuala Lumpur still wanted a peaceful resolution to cross-strait tensions and that Malaysia's position had not changed. Malaysia has formally recognized the "One China" policy since establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1974, though Chinese state media characterized Anwar's comments as a reaffirmation of that principle—a characterization Malaysian analysts disputed.

Anwar's concerns about Sabah are rooted in older, more concrete tensions. The Philippines has maintained a territorial claim over Sabah since Malaysia's formation in 1963, a claim Kuala Lumpur rejects entirely. In August, Malaysia lodged a fresh objection with the United Nations over a Philippine submission regarding its continental shelf. Chee Meng Tan, an assistant professor at the University of Nottingham Malaysia, noted that any government would react to a neighbor claiming part of its territory while building a military base twenty minutes offshore. Importantly, Anwar called for Malaysia to strengthen its own defenses, not to seek Chinese military support, and he took care to say that relations with Manila remained good.

But Anwar operates under domestic political pressure that colors his public statements. His Pakatan Harapan coalition has suffered three consecutive setbacks in state elections, intensifying tensions within his governing alliance and raising speculation about a snap general election. Khoo Ying Hooi, an associate professor of international relations at Universiti Malaya, observed that Anwar's rhetoric "has sometimes been more accommodating towards Beijing than necessary," which can create a perception of tilt even when Malaysia's wider strategic behavior remains hedged and pragmatic.

The deeper problem is structural. Malaysia's long-standing strategy of balancing between Washington and Beijing is becoming more difficult as China's economic and military weight grows and the United States takes an increasingly transactional approach to foreign relations. The space for ambiguity is narrowing. Anwar is expected to visit China in late September—his first trip there in more than a year—to attend the Global Digital Trade Expo in Hangzhou and meet with Chinese Premier Li Qiang as Malaysia seeks to deepen economic ties with its largest trading partner. Yet closer relations with Beijing do not erase Malaysia's dependence on Western markets, investment, and technology, or its own disputes with China. Despite warm political ties, Malaysia continues to reject Chinese maritime claims in the South China Sea that overlap with waters it considers its own. In February, Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan reiterated that Malaysia would not recognize Chinese claims conflicting with its maritime boundaries, and Anwar has recently insisted that Malaysian oil and gas exploration will continue in those waters despite Beijing's objections.

For Malaysia to keep balancing, it must remain valuable to both powers. China wants friendly neighbors to trade with; America needs Malaysian factories, where a significant share of the world's semiconductor chips are tested and packaged. Neither power gains from pushing Malaysia toward the other. But as the rivalry between Washington and Beijing intensifies, that mutual interest may not be enough to preserve the middle ground Anwar has promised to defend.