M23 Rebels Build War Economy Through Taxation and Mineral Extraction in Eastern DRC

Millions of civilians in M23-controlled eastern DRC face economic collapse, inability to access banking services, forced labor contributions, and deepening poverty as the rebel group extracts resources through taxation and mineral exploitation.
We are just surviving.
A Goma shop owner describing life under M23 rule, where the airport is closed, banks have shut, and businesses have collapsed.
Mark

So the M23 is essentially running a state now—they have taxes, courts, police. How is that different from any government?

Mimi

The difference is they're extracting from an economy that's already broken. A real state builds infrastructure, creates conditions for growth. The M23 is taking money out of a system with no banks, no functioning businesses, no way for people to earn.

Luke

But they are providing some services, right? The reporting says they run policing, justice, migration, customs. That's not nothing.

Mimi

True, but it's predatory. A shop owner's business failed because of their taxes. A businessman can't negotiate payment terms like he could before. There's no appeal, no flexibility.

Mark

What about the minerals—that seems like real money. Ten million a year from coltan alone?

Mimi

Yes, but it's not staying in the local economy. It's being smuggled to Rwanda, relabeled, and sold to Chinese companies and electronics manufacturers. The Congolese miners make a few dollars a day while the minerals go global.

Luke

The reporting attributes that $10 million figure to UN experts in a 2024 report. That's one estimate. And we should note the M23 also looted $70 million in gold from one mine—but that's a one-time seizure, not recurring revenue.

Mark

So the M23 is dependent on Rwanda. They can't export minerals legally from their territory.

Mimi

Exactly. They need Rwanda as a conduit. And Rwanda benefits—Rwandan traders are replacing Congolese ones, Rwandan goods are replacing local products. It's a symbiotic relationship that's hollowing out the local economy.

Luke

The reporting shows Rwanda facilitates the export and that the US sanctioned Rwandan gold refinery executives. But Rwanda officially denies backing the M23. That gap between what's documented and what's officially acknowledged matters.

Mark

What happens if the economy collapses completely? Can the M23 keep extracting if there's nothing left?

Mimi

That's the trap they're in. They can't squeeze too hard without destroying their own revenue base. But they also can't ease up because they need money to pay fighters and maintain control. It's unsustainable.

  • Every truck, motorbike, and market stall in M23-held territory feeds a taxation machine that has replaced the Congolese state with an apparatus of extraction dressed as governance.
  • The rebels' war economy contains a fatal tension: the harder they squeeze a population already broken by conflict and Kinshasa's banking blockade, the closer they push the economy they depend on toward total collapse.
  • Coltan from the Rubaya mines — essential to global electronics — flows to Rwanda under rebel taxation, is relabeled as Rwandan, and enters international markets, generating nearly $10 million annually for the M23 from levies alone.
  • The seizure of the Twangiza gold mine and the displacement of Congolese traders by Rwandan networks signal that the war economy is not merely sustaining the insurgency — it is reshaping regional commerce in Rwanda's favor.
  • Civilians conscripted for labor, stripped of banking access, and taxed on water and land titles have no recourse — caught between a rebel movement that cannot afford to let the economy die and a distant government that has cut them off financially.

In the territories of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo seized by M23 rebels in 2025, a shadow state has risen from the ruins of legitimate governance — one that sustains itself not through the consent of the governed but through their systematic dispossession. Backed by Rwanda, the insurgents have constructed a parallel economy of checkpoints, mineral seizures, and improvised financial institutions, transforming conflict itself into a revenue model. The minerals that power the world's devices flow outward through this architecture of extraction, rebranded across the border and absorbed into global supply chains, while the millions who live beneath rebel control grow steadily poorer.

In the cities and towns of eastern DRC that fell to M23 rebels in early 2025, a new order has taken hold — not one of liberation, as promised, but of systematic extraction. The Rwanda-backed insurgents have built a functioning parallel state complete with customs posts, courts, migration offices, and taxation — every truck, motorbike taxi, and market stall subject to levies that, individually modest, accumulate into the financial lifeblood of an illegal administration.

The contradiction at the heart of this system is not lost on those living under it. A Goma shop owner captured it plainly: the airport is closed, banks have shuttered on Kinshasa's orders, businesses have collapsed, and people have no money to spend — yet the rebels keep taxing. A drinks factory owner watched his business fail under the combined weight of M23 levies and checkpoint fees from multiple armed groups. Where negotiation with previous authorities was possible, there is now no one to appeal to. In some areas, residents are conscripted outright — unloading trucks, repairing roads, surrendering portions of their harvests.

To fill the banking vacuum, the M23 revived CADECO, a colonial-era financial institution, and established AREFA, a body meant to function as a central bank. Neither has gained public trust. AREFA cannot issue currency or hold meaningful reserves, and most transactions now route expensively through Rwanda — a workaround that enriches Rwandan intermediaries while draining the local economy further.

Mineral wealth forms the second pillar of the rebel economy. The Rubaya coltan mines, among the world's largest, sit within M23 territory. Miners extract coltan for a few dollars a day while the rebels tax each kilogram at checkpoints, collecting an estimated $800,000 monthly. The rebels also seized the Twangiza gold mine in South Kivu, looting an estimated $70 million in gold from its Chinese operator. Once minerals cross into Rwanda, they are mixed with local production and rebranded for export — a laundering of origin that has made Rwanda the world's leading coltan exporter despite negligible domestic deposits. In June 2026, the US sanctioned executives of a Rwandan gold refinery for facilitating this flow with the involvement of Rwandan government forces.

For the millions of civilians caught between Kinshasa's financial blockade and the M23's expanding tax apparatus, none of this wealth offers relief. Their labor and resources are extracted to sustain a war economy that enriches a narrow network of rebels and their Rwandan backers, while the broader population is left to survive on the margins of a conflict with no end in sight.

In the cities and towns of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo that fell under M23 rebel control in early 2025, a new system of governance has taken root—one built not on legitimacy but on extraction. The Rwanda-backed insurgents have methodically constructed what amounts to a parallel state, complete with taxation, customs enforcement, and financial institutions, all designed to extract revenue from a population already hollowed out by war.

The M23 began its current push in 2021 and now controls territory where millions live. Their financing mechanism is straightforward and relentless: every truck passing through a checkpoint pays a fee; every motorbike taxi moving between towns pays a fee; every shop, warehouse, and informal trader pays taxes. Cross-border commerce in fuel, agricultural goods, timber, and manufactured products flowing to and from Rwanda and Uganda generates steady income. Individually modest, these levies accumulate into a predictable revenue stream that allows the rebels to maintain police forces, courts, migration offices, and customs operations—the machinery of a state, albeit an illegal one.

But the system contains a fundamental contradiction. A shop owner in Goma, the largest city in the east, described the paradox plainly: the M23 promised liberation, yet economically conditions have worsened. The airport sits closed. Banks have shut their doors on orders from the government in Kinshasa. Businesses have collapsed. People have no money to spend. Survival, not commerce, has become the baseline. When the rebels tax an economy already crippled by conflict and financial collapse, they risk destroying the very foundation their revenue depends on. A businessman who opened a drinks factory four years earlier watched it fail under the weight of M23 taxes and the cumulative cost of passing through multiple armed-group checkpoints. Under the previous administration, negotiation was possible; now, there is no one to appeal to.

Ordinary civilians bear the direct cost. They pay for water and electricity, for land titles and vehicle records—services either taken over by the M23 or run by private companies that pay the rebels a cut. In some areas, residents are conscripted for labor: unloading trucks, repairing roads, building structures, handing over portions of their harvest. The rebels cannot squeeze too hard without triggering complete economic collapse and losing what little legitimacy they possess, yet they must extract enough to pay fighters and maintain their administration.

To address the banking vacuum, the M23 attempted to revive CADECO, a public financial institution created in 1950. Branches opened in Goma and Bukavu, but they remain disconnected from the national banking system and cannot access SWIFT, the international transfer network. Residents, wary of losing their savings to an entity with no accountability, largely refused to open accounts. Last year, the rebels established AREFA, a financial regulatory body meant to function as a central bank, stabilize exchange rates, and increase the money supply. But unlike a real central bank, AREFA cannot issue currency or hold significant foreign reserves. Most transactions now route through Rwanda—an expensive workaround that benefits Rwandan intermediaries while draining the local economy.

Mineral wealth forms the second pillar of the M23 war economy. The Rubaya mines, among the world's largest sources of coltan, fall within rebel-controlled territory in North Kivu. Coltan is essential to electronics and technology manufactured globally—devices made by companies including Microsoft and Apple depend on it. Congolese miners extract it for a few dollars a day. Since the M23 took control in 2024, miners and traders deemed hostile to the rebels have been systematically sidelined; operating requires the movement's recognition. Coltan shipments are taxed at checkpoints west of Goma, with per-kilogram fees paid at a bank across the border in Rwanda. UN experts estimated in 2024 that the M23 collects around $800,000 monthly—nearly $10 million annually—from coltan levies alone.

The scale of mineral predation extends beyond taxation. Last year, the rebels seized Twangiza Mining, the largest gold mine in South Kivu, operated by a Chinese company. The company estimates the rebels looted gold worth approximately $70 million. Across North and South Kivu, the M23 controls trading and transport corridors linking mining areas to regional markets, creating powerful incentives to sustain the conflict indefinitely.

As rebel control has expanded, Rwandan businesses and networks have become increasingly dominant. In Rubaya, local miners noted that almost all traders now come from Rwanda, displacing Congolese businesspeople who previously dominated the coltan trade. A beer retailer in Goma described how supplies shifted from locally produced drinks to more expensive goods from Rwandan distributors tied to the rebel movement—a change that eliminated the rebates previously offered by Congolese producers. Once minerals cross into Rwanda, they are mixed with local production and rebranded as Rwandan, allowing them to enter global markets. In June 2026, the US government sanctioned executives of a major Rwandan gold refinery for taking gold from DRC with facilitation from Rwandan government forces. Coltan smuggling to Rwanda has reached unprecedented levels; Rwanda has become the world's leading coltan exporter despite minimal domestic production. International mineral traders who previously operated from North and South Kivu have obtained licenses to open offices in Kigali, finding it more advantageous to base operations there and access minerals once they have crossed the border and been relabeled.

For the millions of civilians caught between Kinshasa's financial blockade and the M23's expanding taxation system, the mineral wealth generates no relief. They struggle simply to survive, their labor and resources extracted to sustain a war economy that enriches a small network of rebels and their Rwandan backers while the broader economy deteriorates.

The M23 spoke of liberation, but economically the situation is even worse than before. The airport is closed, there are no banks, businesses have shut, people have no money to buy... we are just surviving.
— A shop owner in Goma
They have methodically consolidated a de facto, deeply illegal, parallel administration.
— Zobel Behalal, Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime
Envie de l'histoire complète ? Lire l'original sur allAfrica.com ↗
Nous contacter FAQ