Lula distances PT from past scandals, excludes Dilma and convicted allies from future government

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is running ahead in the polls, and he wants voters to forget what came before. In an interview last week, the former president made clear that if he wins a third term, certain figures from the Workers' Party's past will not be invited back into government. Dilma Rousseff, whose presidency left Brazil in recession and ended in impeachment, will stay on the sidelines. José Dirceu, the former chief of staff convicted twice in the Lava-Jato investigation for money laundering and corruption tied to inflated construction contracts with Petrobras, will have no role. José Genoino, the ex-deputy and former party president sentenced for vote-buying in the mensalão scandal, will not serve either. Lula's message was deliberate: this is a different PT, unburdened by the ethical failures and economic mismanagement that defined the party's recent history.

Lula himself had been ensnared in that history. Two convictions from Lava-Jato—one involving a beachfront apartment in Guarujá, another a rural property in Atibaia—were annulled by Brazil's Supreme Court, restoring his political rights and clearing his path to run again. But the damage to the party's reputation remained. When asked about Dilma specifically, Lula spoke with measured respect. She had technical competence, he said, but it made no sense for a former president to serve as an aide in another administration. There were younger people now, he suggested. The country had moved on, and so should the party.

Political analysts see the calculation clearly. Leandro Consentino, a political scientist at Insper, noted that anti-PT sentiment, ignited by years of scandals and deepened by Dilma's failed economic stewardship, weighs heavily against Lula. The question, Consentino said, is whether voters will buy this rebranded version—a PT 2.0. Ricardo Ribeiro, a partner at Ponteio Política, highlighted the bind the party faces: they cannot entirely abandon Dilma's defense or reverse their claim that she was the victim of a coup, yet they must push her into the background because she remains unpopular and her tenure left economic indicators in ruins. She will be a footnote in the campaign, not a centerpiece.

Lula's strategy extends beyond simply cutting ties with the past. He has chosen Geraldo Alckmin, the former governor of São Paulo, as his running mate—a man who spent decades on the opposite side of the political spectrum and who once accused Lula of having "broken Brazil." When pressed on this apparent contradiction, Lula invoked his previous vice president, José de Alencar, a figure from outside the Workers' Party whom he credited with strengthening the ticket. A PT vice, he argued, would add nothing. Alckmin, by contrast, brings credibility with the business sector and the ability to negotiate with Congress—assets the campaign needs.

The PT's leadership approved a sweeping alliance strategy that abandons ideological boundaries. Parties that voted to impeach Dilma in 2016—the MDB, the PSD, the PSDB—are now welcome partners in state-level coalitions. The party has formalized a federation with the Communist Party and the Greens, binding them together for at least four years. The Socialist Party of Brazil will support Lula without joining the federation. The PSOL is expected to follow suit, though it wants to negotiate specific platform points, including the reversal of labor and pension reforms. In the Northeast, even members of the Centrão—parties that form Bolsonaro's congressional base—are cutting deals with the PT. The vice governor of Bahia, from the Progressive Party, has broken with his own party to endorse Lula. A faction of the MDB, despite fielding Senator Simone Tebet as a presidential candidate, is quietly mobilizing support for Lula in at least thirteen state chapters, concentrated in the Northeast but extending to other regions.

The PT's resolution, approved this week, frames Bolsonaro as "the principal virus circulating in Brazilian politics" since 2018. The language is stark and unifying: "Whoever was not with us before is more than welcome to participate in this movement that will return the presidency to the Brazilian people." It is a call for democratic unity against what the party sees as an existential threat. Alckmin, in his own statement upon joining the PSB, echoed this framing, calling the moment "exceptional" and the threat to democracy real. The irony is sharp—the man who once accused Lula of destroying Brazil now speaks of Lula as the people's hope.

Yet the strategy carries risk. By distancing himself from Dilma and the party's convicted figures, Lula signals that the PT's recent past was a mistake. But he cannot fully repudiate it without appearing to betray his own allies and the millions who voted for those governments. The party must defend Dilma's tenure as legitimate while simultaneously treating her as a liability. It is a delicate balance, and whether voters accept it remains uncertain. Lula leads in the polls, but the election is months away, and the weight of history—the recession, the scandals, the convictions—has not disappeared. It has only been set aside.