We will not accept any more tax increases
Em meio a um prazo imposto pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal, o presidente Lula convocou líderes governamentais para tentar desfazer um impasse que coloca em risco a continuidade de um programa de alívio fiscal para setores econômicos e municípios. A tensão revela uma tensão mais profunda e recorrente na democracia brasileira: a dificuldade de conciliar responsabilidade fiscal com resistência política a novos tributos. O que está em jogo não é apenas uma data no calendário, mas a capacidade do governo de construir consenso num Congresso fragmentado e ciumento de suas prerrogativas.
- O STF fixou 19 de julho como prazo-limite para que governo e Congresso cheguem a um acordo sobre a desoneração, sob risco de setores inteiros voltarem a pagar a carga tributária plena de forma abrupta.
- A proposta do governo de elevar a CSLL dos bancos foi rejeitada por unanimidade pelos líderes do Senado, que declararam não aceitar nenhum novo aumento de impostos — deixando as duas partes sem terreno comum.
- O Senado apresentou alternativas próprias, mas o Planalto as considera insuficientes para gerar a receita necessária, aprofundando o impasse em vez de resolvê-lo.
- A Câmara já entrou em recesso e só retorna em agosto, tornando impossível a aprovação de qualquer texto nesta semana e forçando o governo a pedir ao STF uma prorrogação de um a dois meses.
- A reunião de Lula na manhã de segunda-feira tinha como missão real não apenas buscar um acordo, mas definir com clareza o que o governo pretende negociar durante o tempo extra que precisará solicitar.
Na manhã de 15 de julho de 2024, o presidente Lula reuniu seus líderes governamentais no Palácio do Planalto para enfrentar um impasse com prazo marcado: o STF havia determinado que governo e Congresso chegassem a um acordo sobre a desoneração fiscal até 19 de julho. Sem solução, setores econômicos e municípios seriam abruptamente submetidos à carga tributária plena — um choque que o governo queria evitar a todo custo.
O nó central era financeiro. Para estender o programa de alívio fiscal gradual até 2028, o governo propôs elevar em um ponto percentual a alíquota da CSLL sobre os bancos. A resposta do Senado foi unânime e categórica: nenhum novo imposto seria aceito. Otto Alencar, líder do PSD — maior bancada da Casa —, foi direto ao ponto. O governo, por sua vez, rejeitou as alternativas apresentadas pelo presidente do Senado, Rodrigo Pacheco, em 25 de junho, por considerá-las desprovidas de mecanismos concretos para gerar receita suficiente.
Os senadores queriam agir rápido e planejavam votar ainda naquela semana um projeto redigido por Jaques Wagner, líder do governo no Senado. Mas a velocidade não era o problema — era a substância. Nenhum dos lados havia encontrado um ponto de equilíbrio. Havia ainda uma complicação adicional: a Câmara já estava em recesso e só retornaria em agosto, o que tornava inviável a apreciação de qualquer texto aprovado pelo Senado naquele momento.
O caminho mais provável que se desenhava era um pedido de prorrogação ao STF — de um a dois meses — para que os dois poderes tivessem tempo hábil de agir. Mas antes disso, Lula precisava alinhar seu próprio governo sobre o que, afinal, se pretendia negociar com esse tempo extra. Era esse o verdadeiro trabalho da manhã de segunda-feira.
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva called an emergency meeting with his government leaders for Monday morning, July 15, 2024, at the Palácio do Planalto. The gathering had one urgent item on the agenda: breaking a deadlock over tax relief measures that the Supreme Court had ordered resolved by July 19. Without a deal by that date, entire economic sectors and municipalities would face a sudden return to full taxation—a shock the government wanted to avoid.
The dispute centered on how to pay for extending a gradual tax relief program through 2028. The government had proposed raising the corporate tax rate on banks by one percentage point, a move that would have generated the necessary revenue. The Senate's party leaders rejected it unanimously. "We will not accept any more tax increases," said Otto Alencar, the PSD senator from Bahia and his party's leader in the upper chamber—a party that commands the largest bloc of votes there. The government, in turn, had dismissed the alternative proposals the Senate president, Rodrigo Pacheco, had put forward on June 25, arguing they lacked the concrete mechanisms to raise enough money.
Senators wanted to move fast. They planned to vote on a bill drafted by Jaques Wagner, the government's leader in the Senate, by Wednesday of that week. But the real obstacle was not speed—it was substance. Neither side had found ground to stand on. The government needed revenue; the Senate refused to raise taxes. The Senate offered alternatives; the government found them insufficient. Lula's Monday meeting was meant to find a way through.
There was another complication. The Senate also wanted to slow down consideration of a separate tax reform bill that had just passed the Chamber of Deputies. That measure included a new value-added tax structure, but senators said forty-five days was too tight a window to properly analyze it alongside the tax relief question. They wanted to focus the week on tax relief alone. The government agreed on the substance of the relief bill, but the two chambers were out of sync. The Chamber had already begun its recess; deputies would not return until August. This meant that even if the Senate passed a bill that week, the Chamber could not act on it immediately.
The practical upshot was clear: the government would need to ask the Supreme Court for an extension—probably one or two months—to give both chambers time to work. The July 19 deadline, in other words, was likely to move. But first, Lula had to get his own government and the Senate on the same page about what they were actually asking for an extension to accomplish. That was the real work of Monday morning.
Notable Quotes
We will not accept any more tax increases— Otto Alencar, PSD senator from Bahia and party leader in the Senate
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why does the Supreme Court have the power to set a deadline for Congress on a tax question in the first place?
Because the original tax relief was temporary by design, and when it was set to expire, the Court stepped in to prevent a sudden shock to the economy. The Court essentially said: you have until July 19 to agree on how to extend this, or it ends. It's a way of forcing a decision.
But if both sides agree they need more time, why not just ask for it?
They do need to ask. The government can petition the Court for an extension. But first they have to show they're actually negotiating in good faith—that they've tried to reach a deal and genuinely need more time. That's what Monday's meeting is about.
So the Senate doesn't want new taxes, the government needs new taxes to pay for the extension. How do they get out of that?
That's the real question. Either someone gives ground, or they find a revenue source that doesn't look like a tax increase—maybe spending cuts, maybe reclassifying existing revenue. But so far, the government's proposals have all looked like taxes to the Senate.
What happens if they can't agree even with an extension?
Then the relief expires, and sectors and municipalities get hit with full taxation all at once. It's economically disruptive and politically painful. Neither side wants that, which is why they'll keep negotiating.
Is this about ideology or just arithmetic?
Both. The Senate is ideologically opposed to raising taxes, especially on business. But it's also arithmetic—they genuinely believe the government's proposals won't generate enough revenue anyway, so why take the political hit?