Europe must assume responsibility, but that responsibility has a cost
Europe must develop integrated forces and critical military enablers currently dependent on US support, including ISR, strategic transport, and long-range strike capabilities. The shift reflects Washington's strategic reorientation toward China competition, with debate over whether secondary theaters like Ukraine distract from Indo-Pacific deterrence.
- NATO Ankara summit focuses on converting military spending into real capabilities, not just budget increases
- Europe depends heavily on US for critical enablers: command systems, intelligence, strategic airlift, air defense, long-range strike
- Transition timeline points to end of decade; US strategic focus is Indo-Pacific competition with China
- European militaries lack integration for large-scale high-intensity operations; organized primarily along national lines
- Expanding European military personnel to replace withdrawing US troops requires significant societal commitment
NATO's Ankara summit will focus on converting increased military spending into real capabilities, enabling Europe to assume greater defense responsibility while the US pivots toward Indo-Pacific priorities.
The NATO summit in Ankara will not be about how much Europe spends on defense. It will be about what Europe actually builds with the money it spends—and whether European societies are willing to pay the price for it.
For years, the conversation inside NATO has circled around a single metric: military budgets. How much does each country contribute? Who meets the two percent threshold? But that debate has shifted. Washington's message, delivered consistently from the Pentagon to military commanders deployed across Europe to NATO representatives, has become clearer and more pointed: Europe needs to take primary responsibility for its own conventional defense. The United States will remain the guarantor of strategic deterrence, particularly nuclear deterrence. But the day-to-day work of defending the continent—the forces, the capabilities, the readiness—that belongs to Europe now.
This is not a sudden demand. It reflects a deeper strategic reorientation that has been building for years. China is the priority for American national security strategy. The Indo-Pacific is the primary theater. Debates have raged in Washington about whether involvement in what officials call "secondary theaters"—Ukraine, Iran, other regional conflicts—diverts resources and attention from the competition with Beijing. Some in the current administration argued that supporting Kyiv was a strategic distraction. Others countered that American credibility globally, and therefore deterrence against China, depends on following through on commitments. The same argument has resurfaced over recent military operations against Iran. But the underlying logic remains: Europe must shoulder more of its own defense so America can focus on Asia.
Yet converting budget increases into actual military capability is far more complex than simply spending more money. Luis Simón, director of the Elcano Institute's Brussels office, identified two fundamental obstacles. First is force structure. European armies remain organized primarily along national lines, lacking the integration necessary to conduct large-scale, high-intensity operations together. Building truly joint land, air, and naval forces capable of fighting effectively at scale is not a budgeting problem—it is a structural one that will take years to solve.
Second are what experts call critical enablers: the essential capabilities that modern warfare demands and that Europe still depends on America to provide. These include command and control systems, intelligence and surveillance, strategic airlift, air defense, electronic warfare, and long-range strike capabilities. Europe has a high degree of dependence on the United States in these areas. The Ukraine war has shown that some gaps can be filled with commercial satellites and drones, but that approach carries greater risks and higher social costs in terms of casualties and attrition.
There is also a dimension that military experts rarely discuss openly: the human cost. Ruth Ferrero, a security expert at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, raised a question that is only beginning to surface in European political debate. If the United States is withdrawing troops—withdrawing human capital—then European troops must replace them. That means expanding military personnel significantly. It means asking European societies to accept greater defense spending, more military personnel, and the real possibility of higher casualties in future conflicts. It means a fundamental shift in how Europeans think about their relationship with America and their own security.
The Ankara summit will also place unprecedented emphasis on the defense industry. NATO's Industrial Forum, running parallel to the summit, signals that defense manufacturing is no longer a peripheral concern but central to alliance planning. The question is how to accelerate the conversion of budget commitments into concrete military capabilities and how to coordinate between NATO, the European Union, and strategic industrial partners like Ukraine, Japan, and South Korea. But building a genuine European defense industrial policy faces real obstacles. NATO lacks the instruments to develop a common industrial strategy. Many decisions will remain with individual states and EU institutions. Recent failures, like the collapse of the Franco-German FCAS fighter program, illustrate how difficult this coordination can be.
The debate over new spending targets—references to 3.5 percent of GDP for defense and 1.5 percent for security-related investments—will be present in Ankara. But that is not the real conversation. The real conversation is about force structure, industrial capacity, and critical capabilities. If Europe must assume functions currently performed by the United States, it will face higher economic, operational, and industrial costs. Military leaders understand this. Political leaders understand this. But European societies have not yet fully grasped what it means: that assuming responsibility for your own security has a price, in money and in personnel and in political commitment. The next decade will test whether Europe is willing to pay it.
Notable Quotes
Primary and principal responsibility does not mean exclusive responsibility— Luis Simón, Elcano Institute
Military experts normally do not mention the human cost when discussing capabilities— Ruth Ferrero, Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Assuming responsibility has advantages, but it carries a cost— Félix Arteaga, Elcano Institute
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why does NATO suddenly care about what Europe actually builds, rather than just how much it spends?
Because Washington realized that more money doesn't automatically create more capability. You can double a budget and still have forces that can't operate together or lack the advanced systems needed for modern warfare. The real constraint isn't cash—it's integration, industrial capacity, and critical technologies Europe doesn't have.
So this is really about America stepping back from Europe?
Not stepping back entirely. America stays as the nuclear guarantor, the strategic backstop. But yes, it's saying: you handle your own conventional defense. And that's a much bigger ask than it sounds, because it means Europe has to build capabilities it's never built before.
What's the hardest part of that transition?
Probably the human part. If American troops leave, European troops have to replace them. That means larger militaries, more personnel, more risk of casualties. European societies have gotten used to American security as a given. Asking them to accept that their own soldiers will bear more of the burden—that's a conversation most European governments haven't really started.
Is there a timeline for this?
The roadmap points to the end of this decade as the horizon for a complete transition. But there's uncertainty because the signals from Washington keep shifting, especially from the White House. That makes it hard for European allies to plan with confidence.
What about the defense industry? Can Europe actually build what it needs?
That's the open question. Europe has the industrial base, but it's fragmented. Countries protect their own companies. The EU and NATO don't have real tools to coordinate a common strategy. The FCAS failure shows how easily these projects collapse when countries disagree.
So what happens if Europe can't make this transition work?
Then the alliance becomes unstable. America gets frustrated that Europe isn't pulling its weight. Europe feels abandoned. And both sides lose credibility with their other partners—especially in Asia, where China is watching to see if the West can actually hold together.