Kurdish autonomy ends; Druze remain Syria's holdout against central rule

Syria's Kurdish minority, after nearly fourteen years of governing their own territory in the country's northeast, agreed this week to dissolve their autonomous region and fold their military forces into the central government's army. The decision marks the end of an experiment that began during the Syrian civil war, when Kurdish fighters consolidated control over a large swath of land rich in oil. Kurdish leader Mazloum Abdi framed the shift simply: circumstances had changed. The Syrian Democratic Forces, the armed wing that had maintained order in the region, will now be absorbed into the national military structure, and the territory they administered will return to Damascus's control.

This collapse of Kurdish autonomy leaves Syria's Druze minority in Sweida province as the sole remaining group refusing to accept central government authority. The reversal carries weight beyond the Kurds themselves. Just months earlier, in early 2025, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, the Druze leader, had been in regular contact with Abdi, coordinating what both men envisioned as a decentralized Syria carved into autonomous zones—one for the Alawite minority on the coast, another for the Kurds in the northeast, and a third for the Druze in the south. That vision, analysts now say, has become impossible. With the Kurds capitulating, the entire architecture of a fragmented Syrian state has collapsed.

The rupture between the Druze and Damascus runs deep, rooted in violence that erupted in July 2025. Fighting broke out between Druze residents and Bedouin locals in Sweida, and when government forces arrived to restore order, they too were accused of attacking Druze communities. A United Nations investigation documented over 1,700 deaths from the clashes. The toll shattered whatever trust the Druze had begun to rebuild with Syria's new government, which took power after the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. Even Druze who had initially supported reunification began questioning whether autonomy might offer better protection. Lubna al-Basit, an activist in Sweida, told reporters that trust had eroded completely. Before any political solution could be discussed, she said, the government needed to be held accountable for what happened.

Yet the Druze position remains paradoxical. Sweida receives electricity, water, salaries, pensions, and public services from Damascus—a lifeline the province cannot replace on its own. Government forces cannot enter the territory, but the central government continues to fund it. This dependency constrains al-Hijri's options even as he asserts Druze independence. Earlier this week, he declared the Druze an inseparable part of Israel, a rhetorical move that some analysts interpret as a response to the Kurdish capitulation, an attempt to shore up external backing now that the regional alliance has fractured. But annexation by Israel faces formidable obstacles: geography, demographics, and the simple fact that Sweida remains economically tethered to Syria.

A roadmap to repair relations, brokered by Jordanian and American negotiators in September 2025, was rejected by al-Hijri's faction. The central government has made little effort to prosecute those responsible for the July violence. By June, the UN's special envoy reported no progress. The Syrian government, according to researchers at the Syrian Center for Security and Defense Studies, has chosen a patient strategy: avoid large-scale military confrontation, which would only deepen the rift and invite foreign interference, while betting that economic recovery elsewhere in Syria and the administrative failures of al-Hijri's rule in Sweida will eventually force reconciliation.

Within Sweida itself, al-Hijri maintains tight control. He commands armed militias, receives financial support and military advisers from Israel, and has forced out, abducted, or killed opponents. Druze civil servants have been prevented from working with Damascus ministries. A popular uprising against his authority appears unlikely given the concentration of force in his hands. Experts believe that whatever happens next in Sweida will not be decided by al-Hijri or even by the Druze themselves, but by the calculations of external powers. Throughout 2025, Syria and Israel engaged in talks, mediated by the United States, aimed at reviving a 1974 disengagement agreement. Those negotiations collapsed late last year. The United States has stated its preference for a unified Syria; Israel has argued that a divided Syria poses less threat. If and when a new security agreement emerges between Damascus and Jerusalem, analysts suggest, the fate of Sweida will follow—determined not by local politics but by the terms that external actors negotiate.