In the quiet formality of a parliamentary hearing room in August 2026, KPMG found itself confronting a question that haunts every institution built on trust: what happens when those entrusted with others' secrets cannot — or will not — account for how those secrets were used? Over two days of testimony, partners claimed forgetfulness, internal lawyers accused colleagues of deliberate deception, and blue-chip clients described being kept in the dark about breaches that shaped their most consequential decisions. The scandal has become a mirror held up to an entire profession, reflecting the dang
KPMG Partners Claim Forgetfulness as Parliamentary Inquiry Exposes Client Leak Scandal
I am still trying to engage with the firm to ascertain why they took that action
Why does it matter that KPMG's own lawyer says his colleagues misled him? Isn't that just internal drama?
Because it means the firm couldn't even investigate itself honestly. If the people being questioned won't tell the truth to their own deputy counsel, there's no mechanism left for accountability. The investigation was broken from the inside.
But Lawry said the document wasn't useful to the Westpac audit. So what's the actual harm?
That's what she said under oath. But the fact that she shared it at all, that Hoggett printed confidential papers and kept them in her locker with instructions not to let people know—that suggests the usefulness claim might be convenient. The real harm is to the clients who didn't know their confidential information was circulating.
Why did it take so long for clients to find out?
KPMG knew about the leaks in late 2024 and early 2025, but didn't tell clients until after the allegations went public in March 2026. That's months of silence while companies like Optus and Dexus couldn't make decisions about whether to keep KPMG as their auditor.
What's the connection between this scandal and the push for reform?
The inquiry exposed that the big four accounting firms have a stranglehold on the market. Companies like Macquarie have no real choice of auditor. That concentration of power, combined with what happened here, is making lawmakers argue for mandatory rotation and more competition.
Is this just about KPMG, or is it a bigger problem?
It's bigger. The PwC scandal in 2023 prompted dozens of reform recommendations that still haven't been implemented. Now KPMG. The pattern suggests the problem is structural, not just about individual firms or bad actors.
What happens to Hoggett and Lawry now?
Hoggett was expelled and is trying to challenge that decision. Lawry kept her job but lost money. The disparity itself raises questions about whether KPMG's response was proportionate or consistent.
Le Pouls
- Two KPMG partners told parliamentary investigators they could not recall leaking confidential Lendlease board documents — until emails surfaced that made those memory lapses impossible to sustain.
- The firm's own deputy counsel testified that colleagues gave 'misleading if not directly deceptive' answers during internal investigations, meaning KPMG's lawyers were stonewalled by KPMG's partners.
- Major clients — Westpac, Optus, Dexus, Macquarie — described being fed information about breaches in slow, incomplete instalments, leaving them unable to make basic decisions about their own auditors.
- A whistleblower vindicated after nearly two years of raising concerns has been joined by many more, with a separate tax-division case settled for roughly $500,000 suggesting the scandal extends well beyond a single incident.
- Lawmakers are now pressing for mandatory audit rotation, stronger regulation, and a reckoning with the big four's near-monopoly over large-company auditing — though dozens of reform recommendations from the 2023 PwC scandal remain unimplemented.
In the quiet formality of a parliamentary hearing room in August 2026, KPMG found itself confronting a question that haunts every institution built on trust: what happens when those entrusted with others' secrets cannot — or will not — account for how those secrets were used? Over two days of testimony, partners claimed forgetfulness, internal lawyers accused colleagues of deliberate deception, and blue-chip clients described being kept in the dark about breaches that shaped their most consequential decisions. The scandal has become a mirror held up to an entire profession, reflecting the dangers of concentrated power, weakened accountability, and the long distance between a firm's stated values and its partners' conduct.
The hearing opened with a simple question and an implausible answer. Kim Lawry, a KPMG partner, could not recall how a photograph of a confidential Lendlease board document came to be on her phone, could not recall knowing it was confidential, and could not recall why anyone might have wanted it while pursuing Westpac's audit contract. Her colleague Eileen Hoggett, the firm's former chief operating officer, offered similarly fractured recollections — until an email was read aloud in which she had suggested showing a colleague 'the printed version in my locker … without letting too many people know,' followed by a smiley emoji.
The contradiction was too stark to ignore. KPMG's deputy chair, Carmel Mortell, told the committee plainly that two people had not told the truth in their interviews. Hoggett was expelled in July after the email surfaced, learning of her termination during a phone call while out walking, with no opportunity to respond. Lawry had $19,000 docked from her bonus but kept her position — a disparity that spoke to the firm's inconsistent reckoning with its own conduct.
The most striking testimony came from James McLelland, KPMG's deputy counsel, who had led an internal investigation in late 2024. He told the committee that his colleagues' answers had been 'misleading if not directly deceptive,' leaving him unable to reach the truth. In emotional terms, he suggested that honest answers at the outset might have changed everything. The firm's own lawyer had been obstructed by the firm's own partners.
For the clients caught in the fallout, the damage was compounded by delay. Westpac's board audit committee chair accused KPMG of drip-feeding information. Optus's chief executive said he received only vague confirmation of confirmed leaks months after the fact. Dexus's chair described a pattern of partial disclosures at successive meetings that left his company unable to decide whether to retain KPMG at all. Macquarie's chair, former Reserve Bank governor Glenn Stevens, warned the bank might have to sever ties partly because so many KPMG staff had departed amid the scandal.
The inquiry also revealed that the problem runs deeper than one episode. Senator Deborah O'Neill, who first raised the allegations publicly in March 2026, told the committee that many more whistleblowers were now coming forward. A separate case from KPMG's tax division, in which a whistleblower was apparently silenced, was settled for roughly $500,000 in late 2024.
The hearings have sharpened calls for structural reform. Stevens noted that large companies effectively have no meaningful auditor choice beyond the big four. Westpac's Ullmer called for mandatory audit rotation every 20 years and mandatory tendering every 10, alongside stronger regulation of partnerships. The Albanese government is weighing its options — but dozens of bipartisan reform recommendations from the 2023 PwC scandal remain unimplemented. The question the inquiry leaves open is whether this moment will finally carry those recommendations into law.
The hearing room fell quiet when Kim Lawry, a partner at KPMG, was asked to explain how a confidential Lendlease board document ended up as a photograph on her phone, shared with colleagues pursuing Westpac's lucrative audit contract. She couldn't recall taking the photo. She couldn't recall knowing it was confidential. She couldn't recall why anyone would have wanted it in the first place. It was, she insisted, not useful or relevant to the Westpac tender anyway.
This was the opening act of a parliamentary inquiry that would expose something far more damaging than a single lapse in judgment. Over two days of testimony in August 2026, KPMG's own leadership would accuse two of its partners of misleading internal investigators. A whistleblower who had raised concerns for nearly two years would be vindicated. And a parade of blue-chip clients—Westpac, Optus, Dexus, Macquarie—would describe a firm that had drip-fed them information about breaches so slowly that they couldn't make basic business decisions.
Lawry's memory gaps were matched by those of Eileen Hoggett, KPMG's former chief operating officer. Hoggett acknowledged that confidential Lendlease documents had been printed and stored in her locker. But she said she didn't recall printing them herself, didn't recall showing them to anyone, and didn't recall using them to win contracts. Then she was read an email from 2023 in which she had suggested showing a colleague "the printed version in my locker … without letting too many people know" followed by a smiley emoji. The contradiction was stark enough that KPMG's deputy chair, Carmel Mortell, would later testify bluntly: "There's two people that … did not tell the truth in their interviews and that is Ms Hoggett and it is Ms Lawry."
Hoggett was expelled in July after the email surfaced. She described learning of her termination during a phone call from the new chief executive, John Sams, while she was out walking—with no chance to respond or defend herself. Lawry, by contrast, had $19,000 docked from her bonus but remained employed, a disparity that underscored the firm's inconsistent handling of the scandal.
The most damning testimony came from James McLelland, KPMG's deputy counsel, who had conducted an initial investigation in late December 2024. He told the committee that his colleagues' answers had been "misleading if not directly deceptive," fundamentally undermining his ability to get to the truth. In emotional testimony, he suggested that if people had simply told him what actually happened, the entire sequence of events might have unfolded differently. The firm's own lawyer had been stonewalled by its own partners.
Meanwhile, the clients who had been harmed were learning about the breaches in fragments. Westpac's board audit committee chair, Michael Ullmer, accused KPMG leadership of "drip feeding" information. Stephen Rue, chief executive of Optus, said he was told about confirmed leaks only on May 29 in "vague" terms during a phone call. Warwick Negus, chair of Dexus, described a frustrating pattern where KPMG executives revealed "a little more" at each meeting, leaving his company unable to make informed decisions about whether to keep the firm as auditor. Glenn Stevens, chair of Macquarie Group and a former Reserve Bank governor, warned that his bank might have to drop KPMG as its incoming auditor partly because so many staff had departed in the scandal's wake.
The inquiry also revealed that this was not an isolated incident. Senator Deborah O'Neill, who had first raised the allegations publicly in March 2026, told the committee that "many, many more" whistleblowers were now coming forward with similar stories. Another senator, Barbara Pocock, raised a separate case from KPMG's tax division in which a whistleblower had been silenced in an apparent attempt to contain allegations of wrongdoing. That claim was settled in late 2024 for roughly $500,000, though the firm's former chief executive, Andrew Yates, said KPMG couldn't find enough information to investigate because most allegations dated back 25 years.
The hearings have crystallized calls for sweeping reform. Stevens pointed out that Macquarie's only auditor options were the big four firms—KPMG, PwC, EY, or Deloitte—a concentration of power that leaves large companies with almost no meaningful choice. Negus noted that Dexus had contracts with all four simultaneously, meaning a change in auditor would force changes across the board. Westpac's Ullmer called for mandatory audit rotation every 20 years and mandatory tendering every 10 years, along with stronger regulation and higher standards for partnerships. The Albanese government is considering regulatory options, though it has yet to implement dozens of bipartisan reform recommendations that emerged from the 2023 PwC scandal. The question now is whether this inquiry will finally move those recommendations from paper to law.
Citations marquantes
There's two people that did not tell the truth in their interviews and that is Ms Hoggett and it is Ms Lawry.— Carmel Mortell, KPMG's deputy chair
It's been very difficult to make decisions because we never really knew whether we had all of the information.— Warwick Negus, chair of Dexus