Jin Keyu's Case for China to Share Industrial Know-How Rather Than Dominate Global Manufacturing

On October 23, 2026, TIME published an argument by the Chinese economist Jin Keyu that China cannot remain the world's factory indefinitely. Three days later, on October 26, the Malaysian commentator Phar Kim Beng answered it in Malay Mail. He called her proposal a strategy that could keep China globally indispensable without requiring it to dominate manufacturing everywhere. What follows is his reading of her case, and the opinions are his.

Jin's central idea is that China should increasingly export industrial knowledge, technological capabilities and productive expertise, not just finished goods. Phar presents this as a sign of industrial maturity, not decline. For more than four decades, he writes, foreign capital, technology and markets helped turn China's large workforce into the most sophisticated manufacturing ecosystem in modern history. China learned from the world, and the next step is helping the world learn from China.

The reason, in his account, is a paradox. The more competitive China's electric vehicles, solar panels, batteries, robotics and advanced machinery become, the stronger the resistance from countries afraid of losing their own industrial capacity. The United States has answered with tariffs, export controls and industrial policy meant to reduce dependence on Chinese production. Europe is increasingly worried about its competitiveness. Developing economies face the prospect of becoming permanent buyers of Chinese technology without the means to make it. China's large merchandise trade surplus shows its manufacturing strength, Phar writes, but also creates political vulnerability. What makes commercial sense in Shenzhen may breed resentment in Brussels, Washington, Jakarta or Brasília.

The alternative he describes is concrete. Instead of only exporting electric vehicles, China would help other countries build their own EV industries. Instead of only selling batteries, it would help with battery production, recycling and research abroad. He points to examples already under way: BYD has pursued local manufacturing in Brazil and Hungary, and in Indonesia Chinese investment has contributed to an integrated battery industry covering nickel processing, battery production and recycling. Such moves would not end geopolitical rivalry, he says, but could soften economic resistance.

For ASEAN, Phar argues, the stakes are particular. The region should not become a marketplace for Chinese industrial surpluses, nor an instrument for American efforts to contain China's technology. He says Jin's approach fits the principles of the 2019 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, provided partnerships strengthen local industry instead of creating new dependency. Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines should seek more than factories: technological capability, stronger local suppliers, trained engineers and routes for domestic firms up the value chain. Malaysia has an established electrical and electronics sector, semiconductor capability and growing digital infrastructure, but he warns that investment without knowledge transfer risks producing industrial enclaves.

He applies the same logic to artificial intelligence. Jin observes, in his telling, that AI's greatest economic significance may lie less in building the most powerful model than in making capable AI affordable, accessible and adaptable. Phar cites Alibaba's Qwen and DeepSeek as imperfect illustrations of that diffusion, while flagging unresolved questions about data governance, cybersecurity and institutional dependence. Countries, he says, must keep control over their data and critical infrastructure so that diffusion does not become digital colonialism.

His deeper point is about balancing behaviour: when one country becomes overwhelmingly indispensable, others look for alternatives even if they are less efficient. He cites US efforts to diversify supply chains and similar European policy. China, he writes, should not confuse economic indispensability with geopolitical security. He adds that rhetoric about South-South cooperation will not suffice. Beijing would need to support local research institutions, joint technology development and vocational training, and also address its own imbalances, since technology diffusion cannot replace stronger household consumption and domestic reform.

He also has advice for Washington: it cannot expect developing countries to shun affordable, adaptable Chinese technology, and should offer credible alternatives and compete through innovation, not restrictions alone. For ASEAN he suggests using the ASEAN Plus Three framework with China, Japan and South Korea. His closing test is whether, by 2050, China's contribution is measured by how many countries can produce and innovate because of partnerships with it, not by how many vehicles, batteries or robots it exports. Whether Beijing responds to the idea is the thing to watch.