Japan's PM Opposes Iran Strait Fees, Urges Dialogue on Nuclear Deal

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi picked up the phone on Wednesday to speak directly with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. The conversation lasted twenty minutes—their fourth since the United States and Israel struck Iranian targets in late February. What Takaichi wanted to say was straightforward: Japan needs the Strait of Hormuz to remain open, and it cannot tolerate new fees or restrictions on passage through this vital waterway.

The Strait of Hormuz is where roughly a third of the world's seaborne crude oil passes through. For Japan, an island nation dependent on energy imports, the waterway is not abstract geopolitics—it is the difference between heating homes and running factories. Takaichi made this concrete in her call: she urged Pezeshkian to engage in serious dialogue with the international community, particularly with nations that rely on the strait for their survival. The message was diplomatic but firm. Free passage. No additional costs. No transit fees.

But the immediate crisis was not about Iran imposing tolls. It was about the Houthis. The pro-Iran militant group operating out of Yemen has been attacking cargo ships in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, another chokepoint near the Red Sea. These are not isolated incidents—they represent a pattern of disruption that threatens the flow of energy to Japan and much of the world. Takaichi told Pezeshkian that Japan was deeply concerned about the situation from an energy security standpoint. She asked Iran to use its influence to push the Houthis toward restraint, to stop the attacks, to allow commerce to move.

Pezeshkian's response, according to Takaichi's account, was that Iran was already working on the problem. The Iranian president said his government was holding dialogue with Saudi Arabia to address the issue. Whether that dialogue would translate into actual pressure on the Houthis remained unclear. What was clear was that Japan saw Iran as a necessary interlocutor—a power with leverage that could be used to de-escalate the situation.

Takaichi also pressed Pezeshkian on the broader regional picture. She reiterated that easing military tensions and stabilizing the situation should be urgent priorities. More specifically, she called for a swift resolution to the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States. "We strongly hope that a final agreement will be reached, including on Tehran's nuclear issue, at an early time," she said. For Japan, a nuclear deal was not just about preventing conflict—it was about restoring predictability to a region that supplies its energy.

There was one more matter: a Japanese citizen detained by Iranian authorities. The person was believed to be the Tehran bureau chief for NHK, Japan's public broadcaster. He had been released on bail in April, but his case remained unresolved. Takaichi asked Pezeshkian for a swift resolution. The request was polite but pointed—a reminder that Japan's concerns extended beyond shipping lanes and oil supplies to the treatment of its own citizens on Iranian soil.

The call reflected Japan's delicate position in the Middle East. It is not a military power in the region, nor does it have the diplomatic weight of the United States or Europe. What Japan has is dependence—on energy, on stability, on the assumption that the global trading system will continue to function. When that system is threatened, Japan must appeal to reason, to dialogue, to the self-interest of other nations. Takaichi's call to Pezeshkian was an attempt to do exactly that: to remind Iran that its own interests align with keeping the strait open, keeping the Houthis in check, and reaching a nuclear agreement that would ease the pressure on the region.