Japan Braces for a Wounded Trump Turning Toward Diplomatic Wins at Allies' Expense

Japan has no 'plan B' if the alliance unravels.
Analyst Sebastian Maslow on Tokyo's dependence on the US alliance as Trump weighs a possible China deal.
Mark

Why does a midterm loss in America make Tokyo nervous?

Mimi

Because analysts like Sebastian Maslow expect a president weakened at home to turn to foreign policy, where he has more freedom to act. Japan fears he'll want a quick win, and China is the obvious partner for one.

Luke

Worth saying that's a fear, not an event. Nothing in the reporting says a deal is actually in the works.

Mark

What would a deal cost Japan?

Mimi

Maslow argues it could free Xi to press Japan harder, at a time when relations are already badly strained after Prime Minister Takaichi's Taiwan comments and China's rare earth export restrictions.

Luke

And that's one analyst's reading of how Beijing might behave. It's reasoned, but it's a projection.

Mark

What's the Taiwan angle?

Mimi

Margarita Estévez-Abe pointed out that after the May summit with Xi, Trump called US arms sales to Taiwan a good negotiating chip. That's the line Tokyo is watching.

Luke

That's a documented remark, which is firmer ground. But the article doesn't say Trump plans to trade those sales at APEC.

Mark

What did the Motegi-Rubio meeting produce?

Mimi

A pledge to advance security cooperation and keep close communication, with no specifics.

Luke

Which means we don't know what Tokyo learned about the White House mood. The statement is reassuring in tone only.

Mark

Does Japan have alternatives?

Mimi

Partnerships with Australia, the Philippines, NATO and EU states, but Maslow says there's no plan B if the alliance unravels.

  • Japan's foreign minister and Secretary of State Rubio reaffirmed security cooperation in Paris, yet the statement offered no detail to calm nerves in Tokyo.
  • Tokyo fears a politically wounded Trump may chase a quick diplomatic win with China, possibly at Japan's expense, as US-China leaders converge on Shenzhen.
  • Washington has stayed silent as China's rare earth export restrictions pressure Japan after Takaichi's Taiwan remarks, leaving Tokyo to fight its feud alone.
  • Trump's outreach to Moscow and Pyongyang, combined with transactional talk about Taiwan arms sales, is eroding confidence that the alliance will hold.
  • Japan has no ready plan B, so it is bolstering defense spending and diversifying partnerships while the APEC summit on November 18-19 becomes the first test.

Across the long arc of alliances, there are moments when a great power's attention drifts and smaller partners must read the weather with care. In Paris, after the American midterm elections had bruised a president, Japan's foreign minister and the US Secretary of State reaffirmed a security partnership that both still treat as the cornerstone of the Indo-Pacific order. Beneath the polite language lies a quieter fear in Tokyo: that a weakened leader, seeking a triumph abroad, might trade away the interests of distant friends for a deal with Beijing. As leaders gather in Shenzhen, Japan's question is less whether the alliance exists than whether it will be felt as a promise or only as a habit.

On a Monday in Paris, on the margins of a G7 foreign ministers' meeting, Japan's Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi met US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The talk was brief, but Tokyo had good reason to seek it. Trump had just suffered heavy losses in the November 3 midterms, and Japan wanted to read the mood in Washington. Afterward, both sides said they would deepen security cooperation and keep close communication on the Indo-Pacific, though they offered few specifics.

The unease in Tokyo is about timing. Within days, the leaders of the United States, China and Russia may meet at the APEC summit in Shenzhen. Analysts worry that a weakened Trump might seek a diplomatic win that he could present as statesmanship, without weighing the interests of allies in the region. Professor Sebastian Maslow of the University of Tokyo warned that a US-China deal could give Xi Jinping room to press Japan harder, placing Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in a difficult spot amid already strained relations.

Margarita Estévez-Abe of Syracuse University pointed to specific sources of worry. Trump has called US arms sales to Taiwan a useful bargaining chip, and Washington has not backed Japan in its rare earth dispute with China, which followed Takaichi's comments on Taiwan. Beyond China, Trump's outreach to Moscow and Pyongyang unsettles Tokyo, since a rise in threats against Japan would strain trust in the alliance.

Japan's options are limited. Its strategy rests on the US alliance, and autonomous defense remains out of reach in the short term. Tokyo has therefore widened its partnerships with European states, NATO, Australia and the Philippines, and it hopes no major crisis tests Washington before Trump's term ends. Maslow put it bluntly: hope is not a strategy. Japan, he argued, must invest more in defense and economic security. The first signal may come from Shenzhen.

On Monday in Paris, on the sidelines of a G7 foreign ministers' meeting, Japan's Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi sat down with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The meeting was brief by diplomatic standards, but Tokyo had reasons to want it. The White House was still absorbing the results of the November 3 midterm elections, in which President Donald Trump suffered what DW describes as a drubbing, and Japan wanted to gauge the mood.

Afterward, Japan's Foreign Ministry released a statement saying the two sides had agreed to further advance security cooperation to strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-US alliance. They also pledged to maintain close communication on the situation in the Indo-Pacific. The statement gave no further details.

The timing matters. In about a week, the leaders of the United States, China and Russia are expected to meet on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, set for November 18-19 in the Chinese city of Shenzhen. Tokyo's fear is that a weakened Trump may look abroad for a diplomatic quick win, something he can present as evidence of statesmanship, without weighing the interests of Washington's allies in the region.

Sebastian Maslow, a professor of politics at the University of Tokyo, laid out the concern. With Trump becoming a lame duck at home, he said, the president may use his authority to shift his focus to foreign policy. A US deal with China could give President Xi Jinping room to intensify pressure on Japan. With Sino-Japanese relations already severely strained, that would put Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in a difficult position and force her to reassess how she navigates US-China relations.

Margarita Estévez-Abe, an associate professor at Syracuse University's Maxwell School and an expert on Japanese politics, said Japan fears a transactional Trump who treats Taiwan as a bargaining chip. She noted that after the May summit with Xi, Trump described US arms sales to Taiwan as a good negotiating chip with China. She also said Tokyo is frustrated that Trump has not backed it over the rare earth export restrictions China imposed on Japan following Takaichi's comments on Taiwan last year. In her telling, the Trump administration treats the China-Japan feud as Tokyo's problem.

There are worries beyond China. Estévez-Abe said Trump has not damaged the US-Japan alliance the way he has strained NATO, but his outreach to Moscow and Pyongyang concerns Tokyo. The US relies on Japan as its main military base in the Indo-Pacific, so emboldening Russia and North Korea against Japan is not in Washington's interest. Still, she warned, if American softness raises the threat to Japan, Japanese trust in the alliance will erode. Japan can only hope that doesn't happen.

The options are limited. Maslow said Japan's security strategy stresses preserving the status quo, defending the liberal international order and containing China's role in the region, and it treats the US alliance as the cornerstone. Japan, he said, has no plan B if the alliance unravels. Calls for autonomous defense capability exist, but in the short term they are unrealistic given the limits of Japan's defense industry and its lack of key resources, including critical intelligence.

Over the past decade Tokyo has diversified its partnerships. It has stepped up defense cooperation with EU member states and NATO, forged a quasi-alliance with Australia, and joined minilateral frameworks across the Indo-Pacific, including one with the Philippines. Estévez-Abe said Tokyo hopes no major clash erupts during the remaining two years of Trump's term, so that Washington's resolve goes untested until a strategically more amenable administration arrives. Maslow was blunter: hope is not a strategy. He argued Japan must keep working to protect the alliance, with greater defense spending and safeguards for its economic security. The first signal may come in Shenzhen on November 18-19.

Hope is not a strategy.
— Sebastian Maslow, University of Tokyo
Japan fears a transactional Trump who treats Taiwan as a bargaining chip.
— Margarita Estévez-Abe, Syracuse University
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