Israeli ex-negotiator: Gaza war could have ended a year sooner with hostages freed

Hostages died in captivity during the prolonged conflict; thousands of lives could have been saved on both sides with an earlier ceasefire agreement.
We missed it, actually. The war was too long.
Retired General Nitzan Alon, Israel's former hostage negotiator, on whether an earlier ceasefire was possible.
Mark

So Alon is saying the deal was there to be made a year earlier. What evidence does he actually have for that?

Mimi

He was the army's chief negotiator at the start. He's saying based on his direct involvement in those early conversations, a ceasefire was achievable. Qatar's prime minister backs this up—he says they approached Israel on day one with a Hamas proposal for a limited ceasefire and hostage release, and Israel declined to engage.

Luke

But we should be careful here. Alon is making a counterfactual claim—what could have happened. We don't have the full record of those negotiations, and we don't know what Israel's strategic calculus was at each stage. Qatar's account is one side's version of events.

Mimi

That's fair. But the October 2025 deal did happen, and it did secure what Netanyahu said was impossible—a ceasefire without total victory. So Alon's point is that if it was achievable then, why not earlier?

Mark

And the human cost he's pointing to—hostages who died in captivity?

Mimi

Yes. He's saying some of the people who came back in October 2025 came back dead. If a deal had been possible a year sooner, those people might have lived.

Luke

Again, we should note: we don't have a list of names or confirmed numbers of hostages who died in captivity versus those released alive. Alon is asserting this happened, but the source material doesn't give us the specifics.

Mark

So this is partly about the war's length, but also about Netanyahu's stated requirement for total victory.

Mimi

Exactly. Alon is saying that requirement was unnecessary—that the October 2025 ceasefire, which Netanyahu eventually accepted, actually achieved the strategic goals without total victory. So the prolongation wasn't strategically necessary.

Luke

Though we should note Netanyahu would likely argue the military degradation of Hamas that occurred over those months was itself strategically necessary to achieve the ceasefire terms that eventually emerged.

Mark

And this is coming out weeks before an election?

Mimi

Yes, though analysts say it probably won't shift the outcome. The anger over the October 7 attack itself is already baked into the polls.

  • Major General Nitzan Alon was Israel's chief hostage negotiator at the start of the Gaza war
  • October 2025 prisoner exchange freed 20 Israeli captives and nearly 2,000 Palestinians
  • Qatar says it approached Israel on day one after October 7, 2023 with a Hamas ceasefire proposal that Israel declined
  • Israel's October 27 legislative election is less than a month away

Major General Nitzan Alon, Israel's former hostage negotiator, says a ceasefire deal could have been reached 'maybe a year earlier' without compromising strategic goals. The October 2025 prisoner exchange released 20 Israeli captives and nearly 2,000 Palestinians, but Alon suggests some hostages died in captivity who could have been saved.

A retired Israeli general claims a hostage deal was achievable a year earlier than October 2025, potentially saving thousands of lives. He criticizes PM Netanyahu's 'total victory' stance as unnecessary prolonging of the conflict.

Major General Nitzan Alon spent the opening months of the Gaza war as Israel's chief negotiator for hostage releases. What he saw in those early conversations, he now says, was a path to ending the conflict that his government chose not to take. Speaking at a Washington Institute for Near East Policy event on Friday marking three years since the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack, Alon made a stark claim: a deal to free all Israeli captives could have been reached roughly a year before it actually was, in October 2025, without sacrificing any of Israel's core military objectives.

"I think that we could have gotten to this point much earlier, maybe a year earlier or so, without any major implication on the other strategic goals of the war," Alon said. "We missed it, actually. The war was too long." He was direct about what that delay cost. Some of the hostages who eventually came home in the October 2025 prisoner exchange—which freed 20 Israeli captives and nearly 2,000 Palestinians held in Israeli jails—did not come home alive. They died in captivity during months when, in Alon's assessment, a ceasefire was negotiable.

The retired general took aim at Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's insistence on achieving "total victory" before any deal could be struck. Alon called this framing false. The October 2025 ceasefire, he argued, was itself a strategic success—it has substantially degraded Hamas's military capacity—and it could have been secured much sooner. "We could have and we should have shortened the war, brought all the hostages back, maybe a year earlier, and moved forward and maybe saved thousands of lives on both sides," he told the panel.

Alon's assessment aligns with what other Israeli officials have begun saying publicly. Former diplomat Alan Pinkas told Al Jazeera on Friday that a settlement was possible almost immediately after the October 2023 attack. "A deal was possible very soon after the Hamas attack in October 2023," Pinkas said. "It took almost two years before the hostages were returned, so it's not just a missed opportunity, it's tragic." That timeline is corroborated by Qatar's Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani, who said this week that Israeli officials rejected a Hamas proposal for a limited ceasefire and hostage release on the first day after the attacks. Doha had reached out to Israeli leadership immediately with a clear message: Hamas was willing to open a window for civilians and captives to leave. The Israelis, according to Al Thani, were not interested in engaging with the idea.

Alon also criticized Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, saying in July that Smotrich had opposed various agreements proposed at different stages and therefore could not claim credit for the eventual hostage return. The comments come less than a month before Israel's October 27 legislative election, though analysts suggest they are unlikely to shift the outcome. Polls already reflect deep public anger over the Netanyahu government's failure to prevent the October 7 attack in the first place—a fury that has been further stoked by reports, including one from the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, suggesting that Israeli leadership had advance warning of a possible attack. Netanyahu has threatened to sue over that reporting, calling it fabricated and false. What remains clear is that the question of whether the war could have ended sooner, and at what cost in lives, will shadow Israeli politics as voters head to the polls.

A deal was possible very soon after the Hamas attack in October 2023. It took almost two years before the hostages were returned, so it's not just a missed opportunity, it's tragic.
— Former Israeli diplomat Alan Pinkas
We could have and we should have shortened the war, brought all the hostages back, maybe a year earlier, and moved forward and maybe saved thousands of lives on both sides.
— Major General Nitzan Alon
Quieres la nota completa? Lee el original en Al Jazeera ↗
Contáctanos FAQ