Iraqi PM's Authority Tested as Armed Factions Launch Saudi Oil Pipeline Attacks

Black smoke rose over Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline on September 10 when drones struck from across the Iraqi border. The attack disrupted roughly four percent of the world's daily oil supply and sent Brent crude climbing past $108 a barrel. For Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, the strike arrived at the worst possible moment—just three weeks before the US-led military coalition was scheduled to complete its withdrawal from the country, and at a point when he had staked his credibility on a central promise: bringing the armed factions that operate across Iraq under state control.

No group claimed responsibility for the drones. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella organization of pro-Iranian militias that includes Kataib Hezbollah, publicly denied involvement, calling the operation "an honour that we do not claim." Iraqi security forces moved quickly to investigate. On Saturday, they identified launch traces near the Duwayrij River in Maysan province's al-Tayeb border area and seized a launch platform. Lieutenant General Saad Maan, head of Iraq's Security Media Cell, confirmed the drones had originated from Iraqi soil. A senior Ministry of Interior official told Al Jazeera that a splinter group within the resistance movement was likely responsible—a claim that, if accurate, points to a more troubling reality: armed cells operating outside both state command and even their parent organizations' control. Michael Knights, a research lead at the Washington-based consultancy Horizon Engage, remained skeptical of the splinter group theory, suggesting instead that the attack probably came directly from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or from one of the established armed factions using a front group to create plausible deniability.

Al-Zaidi responded with visible urgency. He dismissed the Maysan operations commander, ordered an investigative committee, sealed numerous border crossings with Iran, and deployed heavily armed troops through Maysan's streets in a show of state force. Yet observers questioned whether these moves amounted to genuine enforcement or theater designed to satisfy Saudi Arabia and the United States. The September attack was not the first drone strike launched from Iraqi territory. In July, drones had struck Saudi oil facilities with reported assistance from Houthi fighters based in Iraq. The US and Saudi Arabia retaliated with airstrikes that killed more than twenty members of Iraq's Popular Mobilisation Forces, including Iranian military advisers. The diplomatic fallout forced al-Zaidi to cancel a planned trip to Riyadh.

The pattern of attacks threatens to unravel the warming relationship between Iraq and Saudi Arabia that has developed over the past decade. Riyadh had frozen ties after Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, but re-engagement began in the mid-2010s as the Islamic State rose. Border crossings reopened in 2020, and the two countries have since discussed investment, electricity connections, and transport links. Saudi Arabia's intelligence chief visited Baghdad in September, and Riyadh has held back from retaliating against the latest attack at al-Zaidi's request. But the factions view his pivot toward Saudi Arabia with alarm. Some have stated that avenging fighters killed in Saudi strikes matters more than economic development. Iran and its associated armed groups fear that closer Iraqi-Saudi ties could reduce Iraq's economic dependence on Tehran and create alternative oil export routes that bypass the Strait of Hormuz. Lahib Higel, deputy director for the Middle East and North Africa at the International Crisis Group, suggested the September strike may have been a message to al-Zaidi himself—a warning against moving too far from Iran's orbit.

Al-Zaidi, a multimillionaire businessman who emerged as a compromise candidate within Iraq's Shia political bloc and is reportedly favored by the US, has attempted to walk a narrow line. He visited Tehran in August and received Iran's Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in the same month. Simultaneously, he has ordered Iraqi banks to enforce US sanctions on Lebanon's Hezbollah, asked parliament to draft legislation placing all weapons under state control, and declared that those refusing to disarm would face treason charges. But enforcement has repeatedly failed. In July, troops sent to search the compound of Harakat al-Nujaba south of Baghdad were turned back by warning shots. In August, counterterrorism forces arrested Abbas al-Yaqoubi, a senior Nujaba intelligence official, only for a judge to release him within forty-eight hours. A Baghdad court did convict a Kataib Hezbollah member to fifteen years in prison for the March kidnapping of US journalist Shelly Kittleson—a verdict that Higel suggested might give low-level fighters pause. But she emphasized the broader picture: "It's not a system that is changing." Three major factions—Kataib Hezbollah, Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada—continue to refuse disarmament, and few observers of Iraqi politics expect the state to force the issue.

Michael Knights framed the problem differently. The question, he argued, is not whether Iraq has the military capacity to confront the armed factions—the Counter Terrorism Service likely possesses the operational capability to eliminate most faction leaders if given political backing from Baghdad, Washington, and the Gulf states. The question is whether anyone has the nerve. That the factions attacked Saudi Arabia, the move most likely to draw renewed US attention to their leadership, and did so anyway, suggested to Knights that they operate without fear. But confidence in US support has eroded. Saudi Arabia's requests for American assistance against the Houthis in Yemen have reportedly gone unanswered. Iraqi officials doubt Washington would intervene if pro-Iranian factions besieged the Green Zone, Iraq's fortified government district. "This is all about confidence and feeling like your partners have your back," Knights said, "and nobody feels like that right now." Higel added that the factions believe time is on their side and can outlast the incoming Trump administration. For al-Zaidi, the calculus has become precarious: appear bold enough to retain Washington and Riyadh's confidence without provoking a backlash severe enough to topple his government. Higel did not rule out the possibility that the factions might move against him directly. "I wouldn't put it past these groups to assassinate a prime minister if it came to it," she said.