At the narrow mouth of the Red Sea, where just twenty miles of water carry a tenth of the world's energy, a second front is opening in humanity's oldest contest between power and commerce. The Houthis, having already weaponized the Strait of Hormuz through their Iranian patrons, now hold the Bab el Mandeb strait in reserve — a loaded instrument of economic coercion. As the Trump administration negotiates with Tehran while simultaneously positioning Marines in the region, the world watches a familiar drama unfold: the fragility of global prosperity measured in miles of open water and the willin
Iran's Houthis could target second oil chokepoint, threatening global energy markets
Their military trigger finger was ready if the conflict escalated.
So we're looking at two chokepoints now instead of one? Hormuz is already effectively closed?
Hormuz is under such severe threat that shipping has already shifted. The Bab el Mandeb became the workaround. But if the Houthis move on it—and they've done it before—there's nowhere left to go.
Wait. When you say Hormuz is "effectively closed," what does that mean exactly? Are ships actually unable to pass, or are insurance costs so high that companies won't send them?
It's the threat that's doing the work. Iran hasn't physically blocked it, but the threat is credible enough that major shipping companies are routing around it.
And the Houthis have a history of actually following through?
They attacked ships in the Bab el Mandeb for two years straight. They only stopped last year as part of a ceasefire. But their leader just said this month that they're ready to escalate if the conflict does.
So they paused, not stopped. That's an important distinction. Do we know why they paused? Was it their choice or Iran's?
The ceasefire was agreed to, but the reporting doesn't specify who initiated it or what the terms were. What we know is they never disarmed—they just stopped shooting.
If they do resume, what's the actual economic impact?
Analysts say even a small resumption—a few missiles, a few drones—could make it impossible to offload tankers. That takes the daily disruption from ten million barrels to fifteen to seventeen million barrels. Oil prices spike from around ninety to one hundred dollars to one hundred fifty.
Those are estimates from one analyst, right? Gregory Brew at Eurasia Group?
Yes. It's his projection of what happens if the Houthis "decide to get off the sidelines." Other analysts might model it differently.
So the Trump administration is negotiating with Iran while also sending Marines. That seems contradictory.
It is. Trump says he wants a deal to avoid striking Iranian energy infrastructure. But thousands of Marines are shipping out, and the deadline for a possible assault is approaching.
Has Iran given any indication they're actually interested in a deal?
Not really. The last rounds of talks happened while the U.S. and Israel were planning to assassinate the Supreme Leader. It's hard to negotiate in good faith under those circumstances.
So we might be headed for escalation anyway?
That's the fear. And if it happens, the Houthis are the obvious next move for Iran. They've already proven they can do it.
El Pulso
- With Hormuz already under threat, the Bab el Mandeb has become the last viable artery for Middle Eastern oil reaching global markets — and the Houthis have already proven they can seal it.
- A resumption of drone and missile attacks on tankers could push daily supply disruptions from ten million to seventeen million barrels, sending crude prices from $90-100 to $150 per barrel or beyond.
- The shock would not stop at fuel pumps — wheat, coffee, electronics, and clothing moving through the strait to Africa, Europe, and Asia would all be caught in the disruption.
- Major shipping giants MSC and Maersk have already rerouted away from the strait, signaling that the private sector is not waiting for diplomacy to resolve what military posture has not.
- The Trump administration is simultaneously negotiating with Tehran and deploying Marines, but Iran has learned that chokepoint closures grant it enormous leverage — a lesson unlikely to encourage concessions.
- Analysts and former officials warn the Houthis have never truly stood down, only paused — and that if talks collapse or strikes begin, the strait's fragile quiet will not hold.
At the narrow mouth of the Red Sea, where just twenty miles of water carry a tenth of the world's energy, a second front is opening in humanity's oldest contest between power and commerce. The Houthis, having already weaponized the Strait of Hormuz through their Iranian patrons, now hold the Bab el Mandeb strait in reserve — a loaded instrument of economic coercion. As the Trump administration negotiates with Tehran while simultaneously positioning Marines in the region, the world watches a familiar drama unfold: the fragility of global prosperity measured in miles of open water and the willingness of armed actors to close them.
A waterway barely twenty miles across at its widest point has become one of the most consequential stretches of water on Earth. The Bab el Mandeb strait, wedged between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, carries roughly ten percent of the world's oil and natural gas — and it is now the second chokepoint being drawn into a confrontation between Iran, its proxies, and the West.
The Houthis are no strangers to this geography. For two years, from 2023 to 2025, they attacked commercial vessels moving through the strait with drones and missiles, effectively shutting it to traffic before agreeing to a ceasefire. That ceasefire, analysts warn, was never a surrender — only a pause. This month, the group's leader made clear that restraint remains conditional on how the broader conflict develops. Switzerland's MSC and Denmark's Maersk, the world's two largest shipping companies, have already begun routing around the strait entirely.
The strategic logic is stark. With the Strait of Hormuz under Iranian pressure, the Bab el Mandeb has become the alternative route for Middle Eastern oil reaching global markets. A renewed Houthi campaign there could push daily disruptions from ten million barrels to between fifteen and seventeen million, sending crude prices — currently in the $90-100 range — past $150 per barrel. The consequences would extend well beyond energy: the strait also carries electronics, grain, clothing, and coffee to markets across three continents.
Former IDF Iran analyst Danny Citrinowicz anticipates the Houthis will eventually move on the strait and simultaneously target Saudi Arabia's Yanbu port on the Red Sea, where the kingdom has built pipeline capacity to ship millions of barrels daily while bypassing Hormuz. Noam Raydan of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy agrees: the maritime campaign never truly ended.
What remains unresolved is whether ongoing U.S.-Iran negotiations will produce a genuine off-ramp. The Trump administration is simultaneously pursuing talks and deploying Marines to the region, while Trump has suggested he prefers a deal over striking Iranian energy infrastructure. Yet Iran has absorbed a crucial lesson in recent months: closing chokepoints generates enormous economic pressure. That leverage is unlikely to make Tehran eager to yield. Former NSC director for Iran Nate Swanson has expressed surprise the Bab el Mandeb has not already been targeted — but notes that if diplomacy falters, the calculus could shift rapidly. The question is no longer one of capability. It is one of timing.
A narrow waterway off Yemen's coast has become the second front in a brewing confrontation over global energy supplies. The Bab el Mandeb strait, situated between Yemen and the Horn of Africa and measuring just twenty miles across at its widest point, carries roughly ten percent of the world's oil and natural gas. It is the fourth-largest shipping chokepoint on Earth, and it is now squarely in the crosshairs of the Houthis, the Iran-backed rebel group that has already demonstrated its willingness to weaponize maritime commerce.
For two years, from 2023 to 2025, the Houthis attacked vessels moving through the strait with drones and missiles, effectively closing it to commercial traffic. They agreed to a ceasefire last year, but the group has never truly stepped back. This month, their leader signaled that restraint remains conditional, warning that their military trigger finger was ready if the conflict escalated. The world's two largest shipping companies—Switzerland's MSC and Denmark's Maersk—have already begun routing around the strait entirely, a precaution born from genuine fear of renewed attacks.
The strategic calculus is straightforward and alarming. With the Strait of Hormuz effectively shut down by Iranian threats, the Bab el Mandeb has become the alternative lifeline for Middle Eastern oil reaching global markets. If the Houthis resume their campaign there, the disruption would be catastrophic. Analysts estimate that even a modest resumption of attacks—a handful of missiles, a few drone strikes—could make offloading tankers impossible. That would push daily disruption from the current ten million barrels to somewhere between fifteen and seventeen million barrels. Crude prices, now hovering between ninety and one hundred dollars per barrel, would spike to one hundred fifty dollars or higher. The consequences would ripple far beyond energy: the strait also moves electronics, clothing, furniture, wheat, corn, and coffee to markets across Africa, Europe, and Asia.
Danny Citrinowicz, a former top Iran researcher for the Israeli Defense Forces, has little doubt about what comes next. He expects the Houthis will eventually move on the strait and simultaneously target Saudi Arabia's Yanbu port on the Red Sea, where the kingdom has built pipeline capacity to ship three to five million barrels daily while bypassing Hormuz. Noam Raydan, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, echoes the concern: the Houthis never truly stopped their maritime campaign, only paused it. If the war escalates, they will resume.
What remains unclear is whether the Trump administration's ongoing negotiations with Iran will produce a genuine off-ramp or merely delay the inevitable. The White House is simultaneously pursuing talks and deploying thousands of Marines to the region, with an initial wave expected to arrive around the deadline for a possible U.S. assault on Iranian energy infrastructure. Trump has suggested he wants to avoid striking Iran's oil facilities if a deal can be reached, claiming the U.S. is in a strong bargaining position. Yet the regime has learned something crucial over the past months: by closing Hormuz, it can exert enormous pressure on the global economy. That knowledge is unlikely to make Iranian leaders eager to capitulate.
Nate Swanson, who served as director for Iran on the White House National Security Council until 2025, has expressed surprise that Iran has not already moved to close the Bab el Mandeb strait. The reasons remain opaque—strategic patience, diminished capabilities, or perhaps some undisclosed arrangement with Saudi Arabia. But if negotiations falter or if Trump follows through on threats to attack Iranian energy infrastructure, the calculus could shift rapidly. Closing the strait would represent the next level of economic leverage for a regime that has already demonstrated it understands how to weaponize chokepoints. The question is not whether the Houthis are capable of doing it. The question is whether the current diplomatic moment will hold long enough to prevent them from trying.
Citas Notables
I have no doubt in my mind that eventually the Houthis will enter and they will do two things — first, block the Bab el Mandeb strait, and second, try to prevent the Saudis from having tankers in Yanbu port taking oil.— Danny Citrinowicz, former top Iran researcher for the Israeli Defense Forces
If the Houthis decide to get involved and resume their maritime campaign, even in a small way with a couple missiles or drones, offloading tankers becomes impossible, and disruption jumps from 10 million to 15-17 million barrels daily.— Gregory Brew, Iran analyst at Eurasia Group (paraphrased)