Iranian President Proposes Seven-Day Strait of Hormuz Reopening in CBS Interview

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian arrived in New York in late September 2026 as the first foreign leader to visit the United States during an active war—a fact that hung over every word of his interview with CBS News. He came bearing a proposal: reopen the Strait of Hormuz within seven days if the United States agreed to a framework based on a memorandum of understanding both he and President Trump had signed in June. Once that passage reopened, he said, talks could begin about ending the war itself, and possibly about Iran's nuclear program.

The proposal was rooted in what Pezeshkian described as a betrayal. In June, both presidents had signed an MOU. The understanding was supposed to govern which shipping routes vessels could take through the strait, with coordination between Iran and Oman determining safe passage. But the agreement fractured almost immediately. Ships began taking routes outside the agreed corridor without coordinating with Iranian authorities. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps fired on some of these vessels. The U.S. and Israel responded with military strikes. What might have been resolved through a month of patient dialogue, Pezeshkian argued, instead became a full breakdown.

When pressed on whether Iran's military would honor any new agreement, Pezeshkian insisted it would—but only if the United States did the same. The real problem, he said, was not Iran's commitment but America's pattern of abandonment. He pointed to the 2015 nuclear deal, the JCPOA, which the U.S. had negotiated for months and then torn up. He pointed to talks that resumed after that, only to be interrupted by military strikes. He pointed to the assassination of Iran's Supreme Leader in the middle of negotiations, along with numerous commanders and scientists. Around 168 schoolchildren were killed in one U.S.-Israeli airstrike on a school in Minab. How, he asked, could trust be rebuilt when the other side kept killing Iranian officials while claiming to negotiate?

On the nuclear question, Pezeshkian said Iran would accept IAEA inspectors under the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Iran had signed. He noted that Iran currently held 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent. But he also pushed back against the premise that Iran was secretly building weapons. Developing nuclear weapons, he said, was forbidden by Islamic law—haram—not merely by legal agreement. Even if some individuals wanted to pursue that path, religious doctrine prevented it. The U.S., he argued, was not genuinely interested in resolving the nuclear issue; it was interested in overthrowing Iran's government. Israel had said so openly.

On the question of meeting Trump directly, Pezeshkian declined. The atmosphere of distrust was too thick. Every time Iran had sat down to negotiate, the U.S. had struck. How could he trust that another meeting would not end in assassination? He had met twice with Iran's new Supreme Leader, who had recovered from injuries sustained in the strikes that killed his father and family. Pezeshkian, speaking as a physician, confirmed the Supreme Leader was in good health. But the security situation remained dire. The new Supreme Leader had not been seen publicly since taking power in March, and Pezeshkian explained that the constant threat of targeted killing made public appearances impossible.

On the broader human cost of the conflict, Pezeshkian was direct. Sanctions had blocked access to food and medication, harming the sick, the elderly, the poor. He called this a war crime. He acknowledged that Iran's own security forces had killed protesters during recent unrest, and he had apologized for those deaths. But he argued that armed instigators had mixed in with genuine demonstrators, that some of those killed were security personnel, not civilians. The U.S., he said, had armed these instigators and then condemned Iran for responding.

When asked about two Americans detained in Iran, including journalist Reza Valizadeh held in Evin prison, Pezeshkian rejected the suggestion that releasing them would be a gesture of goodwill. Iran had already released prisoners the U.S. had requested. The U.S. had promised to return frozen Iranian assets held in South Korea and Qatar. Iran had done its part; the U.S. had not. Testing goodwill, he said, had already been tried and had failed. The U.S. got what it wanted and then did not follow through. As for threats against Trump and his family reportedly coming from Iran, Pezeshkian said these reflected the deep anger of millions of people in the region who saw the Supreme Leader as a spiritual figure, not merely a political one. The government itself did not want war. But it would not be bullied into submission, and it would defend itself if struck.

As the interview ended, Pezeshkian returned to his core message: Iran had put things in writing. It had signed agreements. It had made commitments. Let the U.S. implement what it had agreed to. Let it stop the strikes, stop the sanctions, stop the assassinations. Then trust could be restored, and real negotiations could begin.