In the long arc of authoritarian survival, Iran's leadership has arrived at a grim calculation: that the greatest threat to its existence comes not from American warships or airstrikes, but from the quiet fury of its own people. By sustaining external conflict with the United States, Tehran transforms domestic despair into nationalist solidarity, converting economic failure into a story of foreign aggression. This inversion — where war becomes a tool of internal control rather than external defense — reframes the entire U.S.-Iran confrontation as something older and more universal: a governmen
Iran Uses US Conflict to Distract From Internal Unrest, Activist Warns
The real threat to the regime is not the bombs from outside
So the argument here is that Iran's government actually wants this conflict to continue? That seems backwards. Wouldn't they prefer peace?
Not if peace means facing their own population. The regime has suppressed major uprisings with deadly force. Economic collapse, high inflation—these are real problems that can't be blamed on America if there's no conflict happening.
But we should be careful here. Sadeghpour is one analyst making an interpretation. We know Iran attacked ships and bases after peace guarantees were offered, but we don't have direct statements from Iranian leadership saying "we need this conflict to distract from domestic problems." That's inference.
Fair point. But the pattern does seem consistent—they had an off-ramp and didn't take it.
Exactly. And Vance confirmed they're still targeting shipping despite agreements. The regime is choosing confrontation even as its military position weakens. That does suggest something other than rational military calculation is driving the decision.
True. But "something other than rational military calculation" could mean several things. It could be ideological commitment, miscalculation, factional infighting within the regime, or yes, domestic political need. The source material supports the domestic-distraction theory, but it doesn't rule out other explanations.
So what would actually prove Sadeghpour's point?
You'd need to see whether the regime's behavior changes if internal pressure eases, or intensifies if domestic unrest grows. You'd need Iranian officials acknowledging the connection, which they won't. Or you'd need to track whether nationalist messaging spikes during periods of internal dissent.
And we don't have that data in this reporting. What we have is a credible analyst's interpretation of observable behavior—continued escalation despite declining military advantage and available peace terms. That's worth taking seriously, but it's not proof.
El Pulso
- Iran's regime has continued attacking commercial ships and American military bases even after the U.S. offered diplomatic guarantees, suggesting the conflict is being deliberately prolonged for domestic purposes.
- Waves of internal unrest driven by economic collapse, soaring inflation, and religious authoritarianism have left the government visibly besieged from within, responding with lethal crackdowns and mass detentions.
- Vice President Vance confirmed Iran's grip on the Strait of Hormuz is eroding, yet the regime shows no interest in negotiation — a paradox that only resolves if the conflict itself, not victory, is the goal.
- Human rights activist Dr. Majid Sadeghpour argues that peace is existentially dangerous to Tehran because calm would allow Iranians to refocus on overthrowing the regime rather than surviving a foreign threat.
- Analysts and President Trump alike are signaling that the most effective pressure point is not military escalation but support for the Iranian population's own desire for change — a strategy still without a clear mechanism.
In the long arc of authoritarian survival, Iran's leadership has arrived at a grim calculation: that the greatest threat to its existence comes not from American warships or airstrikes, but from the quiet fury of its own people. By sustaining external conflict with the United States, Tehran transforms domestic despair into nationalist solidarity, converting economic failure into a story of foreign aggression. This inversion — where war becomes a tool of internal control rather than external defense — reframes the entire U.S.-Iran confrontation as something older and more universal: a government at war with the people it governs.
According to Dr. Majid Sadeghpour, political director of the Organization of Iranian-American Communities, Iran's leadership has undergone a fundamental shift in how it perceives danger. The regime, he argues, now fears its own population more than American military force — and that fear explains behavior that otherwise seems irrational.
The clearest evidence came when the United States offered Iran diplomatic guarantees, including a pledge not to pursue regime change. Rather than seizing the off-ramp, Tehran responded by attacking commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz and striking American military installations in Jordan and Bahrain. A government primarily worried about American bombs would have de-escalated. Instead, it chose confrontation — because confrontation serves a domestic purpose.
Iran has endured years of internal unrest: economic collapse, punishing inflation, and deep alienation from its theocratic government. The regime's response has been brutal — lethal suppression of protests, arbitrary arrests, mass detentions. These are not the actions of a government secure in its legitimacy. External conflict with the United States allows leaders to redirect public anger outward, frame dissent as wartime disloyalty, and blame foreign aggression for failures of their own making. In this logic, peace becomes the true threat — not because it weakens Iran militarily, but because it removes the nationalist cover the government depends on.
Vice President Vance confirmed that Iran continues targeting commercial shipping despite prior agreements, while noting that Tehran's leverage over the Strait of Hormuz is steadily eroding. Yet even as its military position weakens, the regime refuses to negotiate — a contradiction that resolves only when one understands that the conflict itself, not any prospect of winning it, is what the regime requires.
Sadeghpour's prescription is pointed: effective American strategy should focus on supporting the Iranian people's desire for change rather than pursuing further strikes or waiting at a negotiating table Tehran has no incentive to approach. The regime will prolong conflict indefinitely, he warns, because the alternative — a period of calm in which Iranians can turn their attention to domestic grievances — poses an existential reckoning. President Trump, signaling no appetite for diplomacy, posed the question directly to the Iranian people on social media: when will they rise up? Whether that internal pressure can materialize into something transformative remains the defining uncertainty of the months ahead.
The calculus of survival for Iran's leadership has shifted, according to one prominent human rights observer. The regime, he argues, now fears its own population far more than it fears American bombs. This inversion of threat—where internal discontent poses a greater existential danger than external military pressure—explains why Tehran continues to provoke confrontation in the Strait of Hormuz even after the United States offered diplomatic off-ramps.
Dr. Majid Sadeghpour, a human rights activist and political director of the Organization of Iranian-American Communities, laid out this logic in recent remarks. He pointed to a specific moment that crystallized his argument: the U.S. had extended guarantees to Iran, pledging not to pursue regime change. Yet Tehran responded by attacking commercial vessels and striking American military installations in Jordan and Bahrain. The pattern suggested something counterintuitive. If the regime's primary concern were American military capability, it would have seized the opportunity for de-escalation. Instead, it chose confrontation. "The real threat to the regime is not the bombs from outside, but rather the population uprising," Sadeghpour said.
This assessment rests on recent history. Iran has endured major waves of internal unrest in recent years, driven by economic collapse, soaring inflation, and widespread alienation from the government's strict religious governance. The regime has responded to these challenges with documented brutality—suppressing protests with lethal force, conducting arbitrary arrests, and detaining dissidents. These are not the actions of a government confident in its legitimacy. They are the actions of a government under siege from within.
For a militarized regime that depends on external friction to justify its grip on power, sustained conflict with the United States serves a crucial domestic function. It redirects public anger outward. It allows leaders to frame dissent as disloyalty during wartime. It transforms economic failure into a consequence of foreign aggression rather than regime mismanagement. In this framework, peace becomes dangerous—not because it would weaken Iran militarily, but because it would remove the nationalist cover under which the government operates. "For a regime that's militarized and requires friction, its survival now depends on that friction," Sadeghpour explained.
Vice President JD Vance, speaking Thursday, confirmed that Iran continues to target commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz despite prior agreements not to do so. He suggested the regime's leverage in the region is eroding. "Their control over the Strait of Hormuz is effectively gone, and it's a diminishing asset," Vance said. Yet even as Iran's military position weakens, the regime shows no inclination to negotiate. This apparent contradiction—escalating despite declining capability—makes sense only if the conflict itself, rather than any prospect of military victory, is what the regime needs.
Sadeghpour argued that effective American strategy should reflect this reality. Rather than pursuing further military strikes or waiting for Tehran to come to the negotiating table, the U.S. should focus on supporting the Iranian population's own desire for change. The regime will drag out conflict indefinitely, he suggested, because the alternative—a period of calm in which Iranians can focus on domestic grievances—poses an existential threat. "The regime is thinking about the day, the hour after the exhausted population gets calm, and will immediately look around, 'how am I going to get rid of this regime?'" Sadeghpour said. "That is what the regime is afraid of."
President Trump, for his part, signaled no interest in negotiation. On Wednesday, he wrote on Truth Social that he "couldn't care less" whether Iran signs what he called a "worthless" agreement. Instead, he posed a direct question to the Iranian people: "When are the Iranian people going to rise up and fight?" The statement reflected the emerging consensus among some analysts that the path to change in Iran runs through its own citizens, not through American military pressure or diplomatic channels. Whether that pressure from within can materialize remains an open question—one that will likely define the trajectory of U.S.-Iran relations in the months ahead.
Citas Notables
For a regime that's militarized and requires friction, its survival now depends on that friction.— Dr. Majid Sadeghpour, human rights activist and political director of the Organization of Iranian-American Communities
Their control over the Strait of Hormuz is effectively gone, and it's a diminishing asset.— Vice President JD Vance