In New Delhi this weekend, India hosts the 18th BRICS summit — a gathering that asks an ancient question in modern dress: can a rising power hold the center when the world's great forces pull in opposite directions? With Xi Jinping making his first visit to India since 2019 and Vladimir Putin also in attendance, Prime Minister Modi must demonstrate that his country can deepen ties with Beijing and Moscow without surrendering its relationships with the West, and that BRICS can serve the Global South without becoming an instrument of Chinese ambition. It is the art of balance performed on a narr
India's BRICS balancing act: hosting Xi and Putin while resisting anti-Western tilt
Armed coexistence and managed competition
So India is hosting BRICS this weekend. Why does that matter? It sounds like just another summit.
Because India is trying to do something very difficult—deepen ties with China and Russia while also staying close to the West. BRICS is the stage where that balancing act gets tested.
But what does "deepening ties" actually mean here? Modi just saw Xi and Putin two weeks ago in Kyrgyzstan. Now he's seeing them again in Delhi. Is that deepening, or is it just the normal rhythm of summits?
It's both. The frequency matters because it shows India is prioritizing these relationships. But the real test is what comes out of the meetings—trade deals, security agreements, currency arrangements.
And the trade deficit with China is over $112 billion. That's enormous. Can Modi actually move the needle on that?
That's what everyone will be watching for. But Kantha, a former ambassador to China, said we shouldn't expect a reset. The border is still militarized. The underlying problems haven't gone away.
So the summit is really about managing decline, not achieving breakthrough?
Not decline. It's about finding stability in a relationship that's fundamentally competitive. India needs China to be predictable, not friendly.
What about BRICS itself? Is it actually functioning as a bloc, or is it falling apart?
It's struggling. The group grew from five members to eleven, and now you have Iran and the UAE—countries on opposite sides of regional conflicts. Earlier this year, BRICS foreign ministers couldn't even agree on a statement about the Middle East.
So India's presidency has exposed the limits of the organization. That's not a success.
It's a reality check. India wanted BRICS to be a voice for developing countries reforming global institutions. But you can't do that when members can't agree on basic things.
What's India's actual strategy here? What does Modi want BRICS to become?
India wants it to push for easier cross-border payments and greater use of national currencies in trade. But not as a direct challenge to the dollar or the West—more as a way to create alternatives and resilience.
And that distinction matters because India still depends on Western capital and technology. It can't afford to be seen as leading an anti-Western bloc.
Exactly. That's the "America Plus" strategy—stay close to the West while building relationships with Russia and China.
Can that actually work long-term?
That's the question Modi is facing right now. As great-power rivalry gets more intense, the space for that kind of balancing gets smaller.
Der Puls
- Xi Jinping's first India visit in seven years arrives freighted with a $112 billion trade deficit, militarized borders, and unresolved market disputes — diplomatic warmth masking structural rivalry.
- BRICS itself is fracturing under its own expansion: eleven members now sit at the table, and earlier this year they could not even agree on a joint statement about the Middle East, forcing India to speak alone as chair.
- Iran's expected presence in Delhi will reopen that same fault line, with Tehran and Abu Dhabi — both now BRICS members — pulling the bloc toward opposing sides of regional conflict.
- India is quietly pushing for cross-border payment systems and alternatives to dollar-based trade, carefully avoiding the word 'de-dollarization' while pursuing exactly that resilience.
- Analysts warn that India's 'America Plus' strategy — courting Russia and China while remaining anchored to Western capital and technology — may be approaching the limits of what contradictions can hold.
In New Delhi this weekend, India hosts the 18th BRICS summit — a gathering that asks an ancient question in modern dress: can a rising power hold the center when the world's great forces pull in opposite directions? With Xi Jinping making his first visit to India since 2019 and Vladimir Putin also in attendance, Prime Minister Modi must demonstrate that his country can deepen ties with Beijing and Moscow without surrendering its relationships with the West, and that BRICS can serve the Global South without becoming an instrument of Chinese ambition. It is the art of balance performed on a narrowing ledge.
New Delhi is hosting the 18th BRICS summit this weekend, and the gathering carries weight that extends far beyond diplomatic ceremony. Xi Jinping arrives in India for the first time since 2019, and Vladimir Putin will be there too — both men Modi met just two weeks earlier at a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting in Kyrgyzstan. The compressed timeline signals something deliberate: India is moving quickly to deepen engagement with Beijing and Moscow, even as its relationship with Washington remains strained.
India's year-long BRICS presidency is drawing to a close, and the summit is a test of how much diplomatic room Modi can actually create. The bloc has grown from five members to eleven, adding nations like Egypt, Iran, Indonesia, and the UAE. That expansion has brought new voices but fractured the group's coherence. Earlier this year, BRICS foreign ministers failed to agree on a joint statement about the Middle East crisis, forcing India to issue a unilateral chair's statement. With Iran's president expected in Delhi, that same fault line will likely surface again.
The India-China relationship sits in uneasy middle ground. A 2024 border patrol agreement ended a four-year military standoff, and some travel and pilgrimage links have reopened. But the trade deficit exceeds $112 billion, the border remains heavily militarized, and disputes over market access persist. Former Indian ambassador Ashok Kantha describes it not as a reset but as 'armed coexistence and managed competition' — stabilization that should not be mistaken for fundamental change.
India's broader strategy attempts something that may prove difficult to sustain: deepening ties with Russia and China for strategic reasons while remaining dependent on the West for capital, technology, and security. New Delhi wants BRICS to amplify developing-world concerns and reform global institutions, but not to become a China-led challenge to Western order. It is pushing for greater use of national currencies in trade — carefully avoiding the word 'de-dollarization' — while insisting it seeks only resilience, not rupture.
The deeper challenge is that this balancing act grows harder as great-power rivalry intensifies. A US-China accommodation could leave India exposed. Russia's deepening dependence on China is reshaping Eurasian power in ways that may not favor New Delhi. The Delhi summit will reveal the extent of India's influence as its presidency closes — and whether Modi can advance his country's priorities without letting BRICS become either Beijing's instrument or the West's adversary. That is a narrower path than it was a year ago.
New Delhi is hosting the 18th BRICS summit this weekend, and the gathering carries weight that extends far beyond the usual diplomatic choreography. Chinese President Xi Jinping will arrive in India for the first time since 2019, and Russian President Vladimir Putin will be there too—both men whom Prime Minister Narendra Modi saw just two weeks earlier at a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting in Kyrgyzstan. The compressed timeline itself signals something: India is moving quickly to deepen engagement with both Beijing and Moscow, even as its relationship with Washington remains strained and its own position within BRICS grows more complicated.
India's year-long presidency of BRICS is drawing to a close, and the summit represents a test of how much diplomatic room Modi can actually create for his country in a world where great powers are jostling for advantage. The bloc has grown from its original five members to eleven, adding nations like Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, Egypt, Iran, and the UAE. That expansion has brought new voices to the table, but it has also fractured the group's ability to speak with one voice. Earlier this year, BRICS foreign ministers could not agree on a joint statement about the Middle East crisis, forcing India to issue a unilateral chair's statement instead. With Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian expected in Delhi, that same fault line will likely surface again.
The India-China relationship, meanwhile, sits in an uneasy middle ground. A 2024 border patrol agreement ended a four-year military standoff along their disputed frontier. International flights have resumed. The Kailash Mansarovar pilgrimage has reopened. Some visa restrictions have eased. But the underlying tensions remain sharp. India is reporting a trade deficit with China exceeding $112 billion, and the two countries continue to argue over market access and investment terms. The border itself remains heavily militarized. According to Ashok Kantha, a former Indian ambassador to China, this is not a relationship heading toward reset—it is one of "armed coexistence and managed competition." Modi's visit with Xi will be watched closely for signs of a diplomatic thaw on trade and investment, but Kantha cautioned that stabilization should not be mistaken for fundamental change.
India's broader diplomatic strategy, which analysts call "America Plus," attempts something that may prove impossible to sustain. New Delhi wants to deepen ties with Russia and China for strategic reasons, while remaining dependent on the West for capital, technology, markets, and security. It wants BRICS to give greater weight to developing countries' concerns and to support reform of global institutions like the United Nations, IMF, and World Bank. But it does not want BRICS to become a China-led challenge to Western dominance. India has been pushing for easier cross-border payments between BRICS countries and greater use of national currencies in international trade—what some call de-dollarization, though Indian officials are careful not to frame it that way. They prefer to describe it as seeking resilience and alternatives to dollar-based financial arrangements.
The internal divisions within BRICS, however, may limit how much India can achieve. Members like Iran and the UAE have found themselves on opposing sides of regional conflicts. Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and Egypt all maintain different relationships with the United States and hold different views on conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine. Finding common ground on anything beyond economic governance reform has become difficult. Harsh Pant, vice president for Studies and Foreign Policy at the Observer Research Foundation, noted that such disagreements are likely to become more common as the bloc grows and its members' interests diverge further.
The deeper challenge for Modi is that India's balancing act will become harder as great-power rivalry intensifies. A US-China accommodation could leave India exposed. Russia's growing dependence on China is shifting the balance of power in Eurasia in ways that may not favor New Delhi. A more anti-Western BRICS could put pressure on India over its continuing dependence on Western capital and technology. The Delhi summit will show the extent of India's power as it wraps up its BRICS presidency. The real test is whether Modi can advance India's priorities for BRICS and give his country more room to maneuver internationally, without allowing the grouping to become dominated by Beijing or reduced to an anti-Western platform. That is a narrower path than it was a year ago.
Bemerkenswerte Zitate
It is a relationship of armed coexistence and managed competition. We should not reduce it to a simple 'elephant and dragon' story.— Ashok Kantha, former Indian ambassador to China
India remains dependent on the West for capital, technology, markets and security, while deepening ties with Russia and China for strategic reasons.— C Raja Mohan, strategic affairs analyst and professor at Jindal Global University