India has crossed a quiet but consequential threshold — shifting from a buyer of Israeli weapons to a manufacturer within Israel's military supply chain, even as the death toll in Gaza surpasses 70,000. The transformation reflects not merely a commercial calculation but an ideological convergence between Hindu nationalism and Israeli statecraft, one that has so far shielded New Delhi from the moral reckonings that have unsettled Western governments. In choosing this alignment, India is wagering its regional relationships, its energy security, and its long-held identity as a voice of the non-al
India deepens weapons ties with Israel despite Gaza crisis
Over 70,000 Palestinians killed in Gaza, including many children; tens of thousands displaced by Assam floods; thousands of Indian workers replacing Palestinians barred from Israel.
India has quietly become something it was not before: a manufacturer of weapons for Israel.
Mark
Why hasn't this become a major political issue in India the way it has in the West?
Mimi
Because the people who support Modi's government see Israel differently than Western publics do. To them, Israel isn't a colonial occupier—it's a nation that knows how to survive in a hostile region. That resonates.
Mark
But 70,000 dead Palestinians. Doesn't that register?
Mimi
It does for some. The human rights groups, the left parties, students—they care deeply. But they're not the government's base. And the courts won't intervene. So there's no political mechanism to translate moral concern into policy change.
Mark
What about India's own interests? Is this actually good for India?
Mimi
That's the question keeping foreign policy experts awake. India needs stability in the Gulf for energy and for its diaspora. The Israel-Iran conflict threatens both. Modi is betting that staying close to Israel is worth the risk. But if the region destabilizes further, that bet could look very different.
Mark
So India is choosing a relationship with Israel over stability in its own neighborhood?
Mimi
Not consciously. But yes, in effect. The weapons exports, the workers, the diplomatic warmth—they all signal where New Delhi's priorities lie. And there's no domestic cost to that choice, which makes it easier to sustain.
Mark
Could this change?
Mimi
Only if either the political base shifts or the costs become undeniable. Right now, neither is happening.
Der Puls
- Amnesty International has traced hundreds of thousands of Indian-made military components — drone warheads, artillery casings, small arms parts — flowing to Israeli suppliers as the Gaza death toll climbed past 70,000.
- State-owned Indian enterprises are at the center of the supply chain, marking a structural shift from India as weapons buyer to India as weapons maker within Israel's military-industrial network.
- An ideological kinship between Hindu nationalism and Zionism has effectively neutralized domestic opposition, leaving human rights petitions dismissed by courts and parliamentary questions deflected by ministers citing 'national interest.'
- Over 20,000 Indian workers have simultaneously moved into Israel to fill roles vacated by Palestinians barred from entry, deepening the human entanglement beyond the military dimension.
- India's Gulf relationships — underpinning energy security and the livelihoods of millions of Indian workers abroad — now face mounting strain as the Israel-Iran conflict escalates and West Asian partners grow restive.
India has crossed a quiet but consequential threshold — shifting from a buyer of Israeli weapons to a manufacturer within Israel's military supply chain, even as the death toll in Gaza surpasses 70,000. The transformation reflects not merely a commercial calculation but an ideological convergence between Hindu nationalism and Israeli statecraft, one that has so far shielded New Delhi from the moral reckonings that have unsettled Western governments. In choosing this alignment, India is wagering its regional relationships, its energy security, and its long-held identity as a voice of the non-aligned world against the gravity of a deepening bilateral bond.
An Amnesty International investigation published this summer revealed that India has quietly transformed its relationship with Israel's military — no longer merely a customer, but a manufacturer. Between October 2023 and November 2025, hundreds of thousands of components flowed from Indian state-owned factories to Israeli military suppliers: drone warheads, artillery shell casings, small arms parts, vehicle components. The companies involved include Munitions India Limited and Advanced Weapons and Equipment India Limited. The exports accelerated in lockstep with Israel's campaign in Gaza, which has killed more than 70,000 Palestinians.
The political architecture enabling this shift is rooted in ideology as much as strategy. Prime Minister Modi has cultivated an unusually close personal bond with Netanyahu — visiting Israel in 2017 as the first Indian premier to do so, and returning earlier this year just before Israeli and American strikes on Iran. Hindu nationalist circles have long viewed Israel as a model: a nation-state willing to use force to hold its position in a volatile region. This ideological affinity has insulated Modi's government from the domestic pressure that has constrained Western allies, with polling showing Indian public opinion toward Israel remaining more favorable than in Europe or the United States.
When parliament asked about weapons exports, External Affairs Minister Jaishankar declined to share details, citing national interest. A legal petition to suspend military exports was dismissed by the Supreme Court as a matter of executive discretion. Opposition parties, trade unions, and human rights groups have raised objections, but no sustained public movement has emerged. Foreign policy debate in India, observers note, has been progressively stripped of moral weight.
Beyond weapons, more than 20,000 Indian workers have relocated to Israel since late 2023, filling construction and caregiving roles left by Palestinians barred from entry — deepening the entanglement in human terms. The risks of this alignment are real: India's energy security and the welfare of millions of workers in the Gulf depend on stability in a region now convulsed by the Israel-Iran conflict. Analysts argue India must restore balance to its West Asia policy before the costs of its silence become impossible to ignore.
India has quietly become something it was not before: a manufacturer of weapons for Israel. An investigation by Amnesty International, released this summer, traced hundreds of thousands of military components flowing from Indian factories to Israeli military suppliers between October 2023 and November 2025. The shipments included drone warheads, artillery shell casings, small arms parts, and components for military vehicles. State-owned Indian enterprises—Munitions India Limited, India Optel Limited, and Advanced Weapons and Equipment India Limited—were among the suppliers. This represents a fundamental shift. For decades, India bought Israeli weapons. Now it makes them.
The timing is stark. These exports accelerated as Israel's military campaign in Gaza unfolded, a campaign that has killed more than 70,000 Palestinians, many of them children, and left the territory devastated. Multiple international bodies have concluded that Israel committed genocide. The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on charges of war crimes. Yet India's weapons continued to flow.
Why? The answer lies partly in ideology and partly in statecraft. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has cultivated a personal relationship with Netanyahu that goes beyond typical diplomatic courtesy. In 2017, Modi became the first Indian prime minister to visit Israel. Earlier this year, he returned just 48 hours before Israel and the United States launched attacks on Iran. Photographs of Modi embracing Netanyahu on the tarmac circulated globally. When the U.S. vice-president, JD Vance, suggested in July that Israel had lost its allies, Netanyahu responded by naming India—a country of 1.4 billion people where, he said, Israel enjoyed tremendous support.
That support is rooted in a convergence of worldviews. Hindu nationalist circles in India have long admired Israel as a model: a nation-state asserting itself in a volatile region, willing to use force to maintain its position. The author Pankaj Mishra documented this affinity in a 2017 essay, noting that high-caste Hindus of his grandfather's generation saw Israel as a template for how to handle Muslims through overwhelming military power. This ideological alignment—what observers call a confluence between Hindutva and Zionism—has insulated Modi's government from the kind of domestic political backlash that has constrained Western allies. A Pew Research survey from June found that 32 percent of Indians view Israel favorably, compared to 28 percent unfavorably. In the United States and Europe, support for Israel has declined sharply since the war began.
When pressed on weapons exports, India's government has offered little transparency. In 2024, when asked in parliament about military supplies to Israel, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar said the information was not in the public domain and that exports were guided by national interest. A Foreign Ministry spokesperson later stated that exports are governed by national law and international obligations. The Indian Supreme Court offered no remedy. In 2024, a group of civil servants, activists, and academics petitioned the court to suspend military exports to Israel. The court dismissed the case, ruling that such matters fell within executive discretion.
The pushback has come from the margins: human rights activists, student bodies, trade unions, left-leaning parties, and the Congress opposition. But there has been no sustained public outcry, no mass mobilization, no political cost to the government. Stanly Johny, an Indian foreign policy expert, attributes this silence to the fact that foreign policy debates in India are increasingly stripped of moral concern. The weapons are not the only thing India has sent. More than 20,000 Indian workers have moved to Israel since November 2023, many in construction and caregiving roles, replacing Palestinians barred from entering after October 7.
Yet this deepening alignment carries risks. India's energy security depends on stability in the Gulf, home to millions of Indian workers and a vast diaspora. The escalating conflict between Israel and Iran threatens that stability and could have cascading economic consequences. Johny argues that while India must maintain its relationship with Israel, it needs to restore balance to its approach to West Asia and forcefully defend its own interests. For now, the weapons continue to ship, the workers continue to arrive, and the government continues to say very little about any of it.
Bemerkenswerte Zitate
There is a clear ideological confluence between Hindutva and Zionism. In rightwing circles, Israel is increasingly seen as a bulwark against the expansion of Islam.— Stanly Johny, Indian foreign policy expert
We have some other friends, like a small country called India. It has 1.4bn people, and boy, do we have tremendous support there.— Benjamin Netanyahu, responding to U.S. criticism of Israel's isolation
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