As ASEAN gathers in Manila, a region long shaped by larger powers faces a quiet question about who should steer its own waters. The Lowy Institute suggests that the answer lies less in choosing between nimble coalitions and the slower consensus of Southeast Asia than in letting each serve the other: small groups can test what works at sea, and ASEAN can give those trials the legitimacy that only broad ownership brings. It is a familiar human pattern, a few trusted hands starting something that the whole household must later be willing to share.
In Manila, the Quad Must Work for ASEAN, Not Around It
Pilot in minilaterals, consolidate in ASEAN.
Mark
Why does a Quad meeting in Manila worry anyone in Southeast Asia?
Mimi
Because ASEAN is the venue, but there's a fear it's just the backdrop. The Quad leaders meet on the sidelines, and the agenda is set elsewhere.
Mark
And the Quad's recent statements don't help?
Mimi
The Atlanta foreign ministers' statement on 31 October left out both ASEAN centrality and the South China Sea. It talked about Hormuz, critical minerals and AI.
Luke
That omission is a fact. Reading it as drift is the author's interpretation, though. One statement is a thin basis for a trend.
Mark
What's the core proposal?
Mimi
Pilot in small groups, consolidate in ASEAN. Trial things like maritime surveillance or coast guard training, then open them up through the ADMM-Plus and East Asia Summit.
Luke
It's a sensible design, but it's an argument, not a record. Nothing here shows ASEAN members would accept Quad-born initiatives.
Mark
What about the survey result on US leadership?
Mimi
ISEAS found regional elites now rank US leadership under Trump as their top concern, above South China Sea behaviour.
Luke
Elites, not publics, and it's one survey. Also, the Squad meeting is only described as possible, and Trump's attendance is stated only in passing.
Mimi
Fair. What's concrete is the September drills off the Philippines with all four Quad navies alongside Southeast Asian ships.
El Pulso
- Chinese coast guard ships firing water cannon at Philippine vessels near Scarborough Shoal has turned grey-zone tension into a daily test of nerve.
- The Quad's latest joint statement left out ASEAN centrality and the South China Sea, and the Manila summit will make that silence hard to ignore.
- Southeast Asian elites now rank US unpredictability above South China Sea aggression as their top worry, sharpening doubts about who sets the agenda.
- Australia is urged to pilot maritime surveillance, coast guard and undersea cable projects in small groups, then carry proven results into ADMM-Plus and the East Asia Summit.
- The outcome is still open: funding and staffing from Australia, Japan and India will show whether these efforts can outlast shifts in Washington's mood.
As ASEAN gathers in Manila, a region long shaped by larger powers faces a quiet question about who should steer its own waters. The Lowy Institute suggests that the answer lies less in choosing between nimble coalitions and the slower consensus of Southeast Asia than in letting each serve the other: small groups can test what works at sea, and ASEAN can give those trials the legitimacy that only broad ownership brings. It is a familiar human pattern, a few trusted hands starting something that the whole household must later be willing to share.
Leaders from ASEAN gather in Manila from 16 to 18 November, hosted by the Philippines, and the Quad's leaders are expected to meet on the sidelines for the first time in more than two years. The Squad of Australia, Japan, the Philippines and the United States may also convene after its defence ministers met in Cebu. Across the region there is unease: many Southeast Asians fear ASEAN is becoming a stage for other powers' agendas, and confidence in Washington has slipped, with US leadership now seen as a bigger concern than aggression in the South China Sea.
The Lowy Institute argues that the choice between fast minilateral groups and the slower, more legitimate ASEAN process is a false one. ASEAN brings everyone to the table and gives initiatives real ownership, but consensus among its members often stalls on hard security questions. Small groups of like-minded partners can act quickly. The proposed path is to pilot cooperation among a few countries, then open proven results, such as tracked vessels or tested procedures at sea, to all members through ASEAN forums.
The urgency is visible at sea. In July, Chinese coast guard ships backed by militia fired water cannon at Philippine vessels near Scarborough Shoal, and Manila hopes to finish a code of conduct this year despite unresolved disputes. Yet the Quad's own focus has drifted: its foreign ministers' statement in Atlanta omitted ASEAN centrality and the South China Sea. A summit in ASEAN's house will expose that gap.
The author offers Australia four priorities: turn surveillance data into real analytical capacity, bring Southeast Asian coast guards into Quad missions, protect undersea cables with repair capacity near chokepoints like the Malacca Strait, and channel successful work back into ASEAN's defence forums. Canberra, as ASEAN's first dialogue partner, is well placed to brief regional capitals before and after Manila. With Washington's mood uncertain, the real test is whether Australia, Japan and India will fund and staff these efforts so they last.
ASEAN leaders gather in Manila from 16 to 18 November for a summit hosted by this year's chair, the Philippines. Washington has signalled that the leaders of the Quad, made up of Australia, India, Japan and the United States, will meet on the sidelines. It would be their first summit in more than two years. The "Squad" of Australia, Japan, the Philippines and the US may also meet, after its defence ministers convened in Cebu late last month.
The Lowy Institute argues that this is a chance for Australia to make fast-moving small groupings and slow-moving ASEAN work together. Southeast Asians are watching with some unease. There is growing concern that ASEAN is becoming the backdrop for other powers' agendas rather than the driver of its own. Confidence in Washington is also slipping. In the latest ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute survey of regional elites, US leadership under Trump, with its punitive tariffs and unpredictable foreign policy, overtook aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea as the region's top geopolitical concern.
The piece says that framing the choice as minilaterals versus ASEAN misses the point. ASEAN's strength is legitimacy: it brings everyone to the table and gives regional initiatives an ownership no outside power can offer. Its weakness is pace. Consensus among 11 members with very different ties to Beijing takes time, and on hard security questions it is often out of reach. Minilaterals are the reverse. A few like-minded countries can deliver quickly but lack broad legitimacy. The proposed answer is a division of labour: pilot in minilaterals, consolidate in ASEAN. Once a trial shows results, such as vessels tracked, crews trained or procedures tested at sea, it can be opened to every member through ASEAN-led forums.
The maritime domain shows why this matters. In July, a dozen Chinese coast guard ships, backed by maritime militia, fired water cannon at Philippine vessels near Scarborough Shoal. Manila wants to conclude a code of conduct this year, but the hardest issues remain unresolved. Against this kind of grey-zone coercion, practical cooperation among a few capable partners can achieve what consensus cannot.
The Quad's own focus, the piece notes, is drifting. Its statements have long affirmed "ASEAN centrality". But the joint statement from its foreign ministers, who met in Atlanta on 31 October, mentioned neither ASEAN centrality nor the South China Sea. It focused on the Strait of Hormuz, critical minerals and artificial intelligence. Holding the leaders' summit in ASEAN's house will put that gap on display.
The author sets out four priorities for Australia. First, turn surveillance into capability. The Quad's maritime domain awareness partnership already provides satellite data and training to help regional agencies track "dark" vessels that switch off their transponders. But recent research points to thin analytical capacity, agencies that do not share information, and too few vessels to respond. Support should shift toward trained analysts, national fusion centres and coordination among navies, coast guards and fisheries agencies.
Second, bring Southeast Asian coast guards on board. The Quad's coast guard observer mission has so far involved only the four Quad countries; officers from the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia should join the next one. Third, protect undersea cables, which can be damaged in ways that are hard to attribute. Australia's Cable Connectivity and Resilience Centre and the Quad's cable work have focused on the Pacific, and should extend to Southeast Asia, with repair capacity near chokepoints such as the Malacca Strait.
Fourth, build a path back to ASEAN's own machinery. The ADMM-Plus already brings ASEAN, all four Quad members and China together. In September, under its maritime security working group co-chaired by the Philippines and Japan, all four Quad navies sailed alongside Southeast Asian ships in drills off the Philippines. Successful Quad initiatives should be channelled into the ADMM-Plus and the East Asia Summit.
Australia, the piece says, is well placed to lead: it was ASEAN's first dialogue partner and sits in both the Quad and the Squad. Canberra should brief Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur and Hanoi before and after Manila. And with Trump arriving after midterm losses that handed Democrats control of Congress, Australia, Japan and India should fund and staff these initiatives so they outlast shifts in Washington's mood. What to watch is whether they do.
Citas Notables
The Quad has spent years saying it supports ASEAN centrality; Manila is the moment to show it by working for ASEAN, not around it.— Lowy Institute analysis
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