In the name of urgency, a government agency moved billions of dollars before it knew what to build, where to build it, or how to sustain what it created. The Government Accountability Office has documented what happens when institutional speed outpaces institutional wisdom: warehouses purchased and abandoned, premiums paid for haste, and tens of millions lost to plans that never matured. The story of ICE's detention expansion is, at its core, an old one — the story of what societies sacrifice when they mistake velocity for vision.
ICE wasted millions in chaotic detention expansion, watchdog finds
A lack of planning led to stops and starts that wasted millions
So ICE had this enormous budget and just started buying things without much of a plan?
That's the core of what the GAO found. Congress gave them $75 billion, $45 billion of it specifically for detention expansion. ICE moved very quickly—they spent $1.07 billion on eleven warehouses in two months, then abandoned that plan.
But why did they abandon it? The report says legal challenges, but I want to know if there were other reasons. And when exactly did they decide to pivot to CoreCivic?
The report mentions legal challenges to the remaining warehouses, though it doesn't spell out all the details. The pivot happened pretty fast—by July they were buying CoreCivic facilities instead.
What about that 11 to 13 percent premium they paid? That seems like a lot.
It was. The GAO attributed it partly to a thirty-day purchase deadline that Kristi Noem imposed. When you're forced to move that fast, you lose negotiating leverage.
But who set that deadline, and was it a formal directive or informal pressure? The source says Noem directed it, but I want to know if that's documented or if it's from reporting.
The Wall Street Journal reported it, according to the source material. So it's attributed reporting, not a direct GAO finding.
And the $20 million loss on the warehouses—is that definitely gone, or could they recover some of it?
The GAO called it unrecoverable costs. But the report also notes that if ICE sells the warehouses for less than purchase price, the losses could be even larger.
So $20 million is the minimum, not the final number.
Right. And that's just the warehouses. There's also the $7.1 million on meals at El Paso that weren't used, the $2.85 million on tents at Guantanamo that housed almost nobody.
Why is the strategic plan not due until 2027? That seems absurdly far away.
That's what the GAO said too. ICE committed to that timeline, but the watchdog said it wasn't soon enough given the pace of spending and the contracts already being awarded.
And how much of that $1.55 billion sitting with Chicago Title Insurance has actually been committed to specific purchases, versus just sitting there waiting?
The source doesn't break that down. It just says $1.55 billion remains for acquiring detention centers as ICE continues its expansion push.
The Pulse
- ICE received $45 billion to expand detention capacity and began spending at a pace that outran any coherent plan, purchasing eleven warehouses in under two months only to abandon the conversion strategy entirely.
- A 30-day acquisition deadline imposed by then-Secretary Kristi Noem forced the agency to pay premiums of 11–13% above market value, and $20 million in costs from the warehouse purchases are now simply gone.
- When the warehouse strategy collapsed, ICE pivoted to buying private prison facilities from CoreCivic — spending over $2 billion with a single vendor whose stock benefited directly from the transactions.
- Spending on facilities that were barely or never used — $7.1 million on meals at an underutilized El Paso site, $2.85 million on tents at Guantanamo that housed a handful of detainees — illustrates the human and fiscal cost of planning done after the fact.
- The GAO has warned that ICE's strategic plan won't arrive until August 2027, yet the agency just awarded another $10 billion in contracts, raising the prospect that oversight will perpetually chase decisions already made.
In the name of urgency, a government agency moved billions of dollars before it knew what to build, where to build it, or how to sustain what it created. The Government Accountability Office has documented what happens when institutional speed outpaces institutional wisdom: warehouses purchased and abandoned, premiums paid for haste, and tens of millions lost to plans that never matured. The story of ICE's detention expansion is, at its core, an old one — the story of what societies sacrifice when they mistake velocity for vision.
On a single January day, ICE moved more money than it had spent on any other day across either of President Trump's terms, funneling billions into escrow with Chicago Title Insurance as part of an unprecedented detention expansion. Congress had appropriated $75 billion to the agency, with $45 billion designated specifically for new detention capacity. What followed became a case study in what the Government Accountability Office calls planning that never kept pace with spending.
Within two months, ICE spent $1.07 billion on eleven warehouses it intended to convert into detention megacenters. Seven are now slated for sale. The agency paid premiums of 11 to 13 percent above market value, driven in part by a directive from then-Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem to acquire new sites within thirty days. When the conversion plan was abandoned, $20 million in costs proved unrecoverable — and potential losses could deepen if the properties sell below purchase price. Another $1.55 billion remains sitting in escrow, waiting for future acquisitions.
With the warehouse strategy abandoned, ICE turned to CoreCivic, the private prison company, spending more than $2 billion acquiring facilities in multiple states. CoreCivic used the proceeds to pay down corporate debt and is already in discussions about selling more properties to the agency. Meanwhile, ICE bypassed standard contracting procedures to create a grant program with Florida as its sole eligible recipient, ultimately paying nearly triple the typical per-bed rate through FEMA reimbursements — a total of $608.4 million for two state-operated facilities, including one called Alligator Alcatraz.
Smaller expenditures told the same story. ICE spent $7.1 million on detainee meals at an El Paso facility it never fully used, and $2.85 million on tents at Guantanamo Bay designed for thirty thousand detainees — a facility that held only a handful. This week, ICE signed new contracts with the same company involved in the warehouse purchases, this time to build a detention center at Guantanamo and other sites, while also awarding contracts that could reach a combined $10 billion for further expansion.
The GAO's core finding is structural: ICE forecasted costs only three years forward, with no plan for sustaining facilities once emergency funding expires in 2029. The agency has committed to producing a strategic plan by August 2027 — a timeline the GAO considers far too late. Both the GAO and the Department of Homeland Security's Inspector General have active reviews underway. The question hanging over all of it is whether any audit will arrive in time to shape decisions that are already, once again, in motion.
On a single day in January, Immigration and Customs Enforcement moved more money than it had spent on any other day during either of President Trump's terms. The agency funneled billions into escrow with Chicago Title Insurance, setting in motion a detention expansion that would become a case study in bureaucratic haste and fiscal mismanagement.
Congress had appropriated $75 billion to ICE, with $45 billion earmarked specifically for expanding detention capacity. Armed with this unprecedented budget, the agency moved fast. Within two months, it spent $1.07 billion purchasing eleven warehouses it intended to convert into detention megacenters. Seven of those warehouses are now slated for sale. The rest of the money—$1.55 billion—remains sitting with Chicago Title Insurance, waiting to be deployed for future acquisitions as ICE pursues its goal of doubling the number of detention beds.
The Government Accountability Office, in a report released Thursday, documented the consequences of this velocity without planning. ICE paid an 11 to 13 percent premium on those warehouse purchases, a markup driven partly by a directive from then-Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem to acquire new detention sites within thirty days. The agency lost $20 million in unrecoverable costs on the warehouses alone—money that evaporated when the conversion plan was abandoned. The potential losses could grow if ICE sells the properties for less than it paid.
When the warehouse strategy collapsed, ICE pivoted. In July, it spent $1.47 billion acquiring two detention facilities from CoreCivic, the private prison company. The following month came another $734 million in purchases from the same vendor for facilities in Kansas and Minnesota. CoreCivic, meanwhile, used the proceeds to pay down its corporate debt. The company is already in talks with ICE about selling more facilities.
The GAO found a pattern of cost-cutting corners and long-term blindness. ICE forecasted expenses for these newly acquired centers only three years into the future, offering no strategy for how to fund them once Congress's allocated money—set to run through 2029—dried up. The agency bypassed standard contract negotiation procedures when dealing with Florida, creating a new grant program with the state as its sole eligible recipient. Through FEMA reimbursements, ICE paid Florida nearly triple its typical per-bed rate for two state-operated facilities, including one known as Alligator Alcatraz. The total bill to FEMA for those Florida beds: $608.4 million.
Other initiatives left deeper scars. ICE spent $7.1 million on detainee meals at a facility in El Paso that it never fully used. At Guantanamo Bay, the agency spent $2.85 million on tents intended to house thirty thousand detainees. The facility held a handful. This week, ICE signed a contract with the same company it had hired to procure warehouses and acquire CoreCivic facilities, this time to construct a new detention center at Guantanamo Bay and other sites.
Heather MacLeod, director of Homeland Security and Justice at the GAO, described the underlying problem plainly: a lack of planning that produced stops and starts, each one costing money. ICE committed to producing a strategic plan by August 31, 2027—a timeline the GAO deemed too distant. Just this week, ICE awarded contracts that could reach a combined $10 billion for further expansion and construction. Another GAO review of ICE spending is currently underway. The Department of Homeland Security's Inspector General is also conducting its own audit into whether ICE made its detention acquisitions in a cost-effective manner, and is examining spending on air charter services and the agency's accounting of emergency funds. The question now is whether any of these reviews will arrive in time to shape decisions already in motion.
Notable Quotes
The lack of planning has really led to stops and starts which have ultimately resulted in waste.— Heather MacLeod, GAO director of Homeland Security and Justice
When DHS only had annual funding, there were long-standing systems and processes in place for oversight. The situation since emergency funding passed is an unprecedented amount of money appropriated outside those processes, trying to be spent very quickly.— Kevin McNellis, policy and budget analyst formerly with the Congressional Budget Office