In the shadow of collapsing institutions and accelerating crises, a new strain of authoritarian thought has taken root at the intersection of apocalyptic ideology and technological power. Two recent books attempt to name what is happening: that fascism has not simply returned from the twentieth century, but has mutated, fusing with end-times worldviews and Silicon Valley ambition to justify the concentration of power among those who believe the world must burn before it can be remade. The deeper question both books circle but do not fully answer is not who holds this vision, but how it travels
How Tech Giants and Apocalyptic Ideology Are Fueling Modern Fascism
The world must burn so the chosen few can escape to something better.
So these books are saying fascism is back, but it looks different now. What's actually new about it?
It's not just the aesthetics. Klein and Taylor argue that modern fascism is built on the assumption that collapse is inevitable and even desirable. The old fascism wanted to restore a mythical past. This one wants to accelerate toward an apocalypse so the chosen few can escape or rebuild.
But how much of that is actually new ideology versus just repackaging? Apocalyptic thinking has been around for centuries. What's the evidence that tech billionaires are consciously organizing around this, versus just being ruthless capitalists who happen to use apocalyptic language?
That's fair. Durán's book does show concrete examples—Thiel's influence on Vance, the money flowing into elections, the stated goals of figures like Srinivasan. But you're right that the books don't always prove intention versus coincidence.
The books mention that these ideologies spread through technology—algorithms, social media, data systems. But they also say the books focus too much on powerful men. How do ordinary people actually get pulled into this?
That's the gap both books acknowledge. They show the infrastructure and the elites, but they don't fully explain the mechanism by which someone scrolling TikTok ends up believing in the Great Replacement or that democracy is doomed.
And here's another thing: if end times fascism requires believing the world is collapsing, but people also need to believe they can survive and thrive in that collapse, aren't those beliefs in tension? How do you get someone to accept both?
You make them feel like they're part of the chosen group. That's where the religious language comes in—the elect, the saved, the ones who will inherit the new world.
So the books are arguing that technology is the tool that makes this possible at scale. It's not just ideology; it's infrastructure.
Exactly. Palantir doesn't just believe in deportation; it builds the systems that make deportation efficient. The technology operationalizes the ideology.
But the books don't really explain how that works in detail. They name the problem but don't fully diagnose the mechanism. And they're both written by people who are clearly opposed to these movements, so there's no attempt to understand what makes these ideas appealing to their believers.
Is that a problem? Should a book about fascism try to be sympathetic to fascists?
Not sympathetic. But understanding. If you want to counter something, you need to know why people believe it, not just that they do.
O Pulso
- A Palantir recruitment ad declaring 'we build to dominate' crystallized a growing alarm: the language of fascism has returned, but wearing the clothes of tech disruption and civilizational inevitability.
- Klein and Taylor argue that 'end times fascism' treats systemic collapse not as a crisis to solve but as a necessary purge — a logic they trace from Gaza to AI bunkers to elite prepper compounds.
- Durán maps a tight oligarchic network — Thiel, Musk, Vance, Andreessen — using AI, crypto, and captured local elections to privatize public power and hollow out democratic institutions from within.
- Both books struggle with the same blind spot: by centering charismatic founders and dramatic events, they leave unanswered how fascist energies spread through ordinary people via algorithmic feeds, manosphere pipelines, and manufactured mythologies.
- The counter-vision offered is quiet but deliberate — Klein and Taylor call it 'hereness,' the refusal to abandon broken reality, championing grassroots organizing and sanctuary movements as the slow antidote to apocalyptic escape.
In the shadow of collapsing institutions and accelerating crises, a new strain of authoritarian thought has taken root at the intersection of apocalyptic ideology and technological power. Two recent books attempt to name what is happening: that fascism has not simply returned from the twentieth century, but has mutated, fusing with end-times worldviews and Silicon Valley ambition to justify the concentration of power among those who believe the world must burn before it can be remade. The deeper question both books circle but do not fully answer is not who holds this vision, but how it travels — from the boardroom to the algorithm, from elite fantasy to ordinary belief.
A recruitment advertisement for Palantir recently declared that 'a moment of reckoning has arrived for the West' and that the company builds 'to dominate.' That collision between technological ambition and the language of dominance has pushed a single word back into urgent circulation: fascism.
Two new books take up the diagnosis from different angles. Naomi Klein and Astra Taylor's 'End Times Fascism' argues that the ideology has evolved by fusing with apocalyptic worldviews — a logic that treats institutional and environmental collapse not as problems to solve but as necessary preconditions for a new order. They trace this across messianic nationalism, Silicon Valley's AI accelerationism, and the elite prepper impulse to bunker against a future the wealthy themselves have helped to accelerate. Their counter-argument is grounded and deliberate: the world is not doomed, and the choice to stay, engage, and do the slow work of repair — what they call 'hereness' — is itself a political act. They point to grassroots organizing and faith communities offering sanctuary as evidence that another path exists.
Gil Durán's 'The Nerd Reich' takes a more forensic approach, tracing Silicon Valley fascism to its intellectual roots in a 1997 book that imagined the information age as liberation from state control. He identifies Peter Thiel as the connective tissue between business, politics, and religion, and extends the circle to include Elon Musk, JD Vance, Sam Altman, and Marc Andreessen — figures who, in Durán's account, are bundling AI, cryptocurrency, and social media toward authoritarian ends that serve a small, interconnected oligarchy. His insider knowledge of San Francisco politics is sharp: he documents how tech money flipped local elections and names the ideologues quietly remaking the state as a startup.
Both books share a structural limitation. By focusing on powerful individuals — the swaggering founder, the deep-pocketed politician — they leave the harder question unaddressed: how do these fascist energies spread among ordinary people? Technology, the books suggest but do not fully develop, operates in three ways: it augments ideology into operational reality, it alienates by creating vacuums that powerful mythologies rush to fill, and it manipulates through algorithmic environments that gradually normalize extreme positions. Understanding fascism today may require less attention to the men at the top and more to the systems that carry their visions downward into everyday life.
A recruitment advertisement for Palantir, a Silicon Valley data firm that works with intelligence agencies, military units, and corporations, recently declared: "A moment of reckoning has arrived for the West." The language was stark. "On the factory floor, in the operating room, across the battlefield," it continued, "we build to dominate." This collision between cutting-edge technology and unvarnished talk of dominance has prompted a reckoning of its own. In newsrooms, on television, and in political discourse, a single word has surfaced with new urgency: fascism.
Two recent books attempt to diagnose what this means for our moment. Naomi Klein and filmmaker Astra Taylor's "End Times Fascism and the Fight for the Living World" and journalist Gil Durán's "The Nerd Reich: Silicon Valley Fascism and the War on Democracy" both argue that fascism has not simply returned unchanged from the twentieth century. Instead, it has evolved, fusing with apocalyptic ideology and technological systems in ways that demand new language to describe.
Klein and Taylor locate the core of this evolution in what they call "end times fascism"—a worldview that takes collapse as inevitable and responds to that inevitability with deliberate cruelty. The premise is straightforward: our economic, institutional, and environmental systems are failing. Housing is unaffordable. The cost of living surges. Ecosystems are degrading. Planetary boundaries are being breached. But rather than treating these crises as problems to solve, end times fascism treats them as labor pains. Dysfunction becomes necessary. The world must burn so that something glorious can be built from the ashes—or so that the chosen few can escape to something better. The authors trace this logic across three domains. First, they examine messianic nationalism, following the Zionist project through to what they describe as genocidal reset in Gaza, where one society's future is constructed on another's destruction. Second, they unpack Silicon Valley's faith in artificial superintelligence and the claims of existential risk that justify massive investment and concentrate power among the already powerful. Third, they document the "prepper" impulse among elites—the drive to bunker against the future, to establish separate tech infrastructures, ethnostates, and literal bunkers where the wealthy can ride out the apocalypse they have accelerated.
Klein and Taylor's counter-argument is deceptively simple: the world is not doomed. They champion what they call "hereness"—the choice to stay, to engage with broken reality, to do the slow and messy work of improvement rather than abandonment. They hold up Zohran Mamdani, the progressive mayor of New York City, as an exemplar of this stance, a leader who has built power through grassroots organizing and celebration of the city's diverse communities and cultures. The book is careful to distinguish between mainstream religious teaching—which emphasizes love of neighbor, including the migrant—and the weaponized fundamentalism that cherry-picks scripture to justify exclusion and violence. Churches and faith organizations in Minnesota, for instance, mobilized against Immigration and Customs Enforcement deportations, offering aid and sanctuary. The authors praise Klein and Taylor for this precision, though they note a structural limitation: the book remains focused on powerful individuals and dramatic events rather than systemic analysis. Donald Trump appears repeatedly as a common thread. Yet if end times fascism depends on such men, what happens when they leave the stage? The book's claim that the ideology will persist becomes harder to sustain.
Durán's "Nerd Reich" takes a different angle, centering Silicon Valley itself. He traces the intellectual roots of tech fascism to "The Sovereign Individual," a 1997 prediction book by former Times editor William Rees-Mogg and financial advisor James Dale Davidson, which imagined the information age as a liberation from state control. Durán identifies Peter Thiel—PayPal co-founder and Palantir backer—as the lynchpin connecting business, politics, and religion into what he calls a "terrifying bundle of power." But Durán's circle extends far beyond Thiel. It includes Elon Musk, Vice President JD Vance, OpenAI CEO Sam Altman, cryptocurrency entrepreneur Balaji Srinivasan (who advocates for Silicon Valley's "ultimate exit" from the United States), and venture capitalist Marc Andreessen, who champions the acceleration of "techno-capital" while dismissing democracy. For Durán, tech fascism bundles powerful technologies—artificial intelligence, cryptocurrency, social media—toward authoritarian ends that benefit a small, interconnected oligarchy. It seeks to privatize what is public and eliminate democratic institutions.
Durán's strength lies in his insider knowledge of San Francisco politics. He documents how tech money flooded local elections to flip the city council from progressive to conservative. He names names: Garry Tan of Y Combinator, Sam Bankman-Fried and his fraudulent FTX exchange, Curtis Yarvin and his illiberal ideas about remaking the state as a startup. Yet this journalistic approach fragments the narrative. Chapters become a whirlwind of vignettes—gossip, backstory, psychedelic use—without a clear throughline connecting them. The reader must assemble meaning from scattered pieces.
Both books risk a common pitfall: they focus on the Big Man, the swaggering founder or deep-pocketed politician who can impose his vision through sheer resources. This makes for compelling storytelling. But it leaves crucial questions unanswered. Where did these fascist energies originate? How do they spread among ordinary people? How are they packaged and narrated to make them compelling? The answer lies in understanding technology not as a neutral tool but as a system that operates in three ways. First, it augments fascist visions, turning ideology into operational reality—Palantir's data systems enabling ICE deportations, for instance. Second, it alienates, creating a vacuum of meaning that powerful mythologies rush to fill. The Great Replacement Theory translates complex economic and climate anxieties into a single scapegoat: the migrant. Third, it manipulates, creating environments where desire and fascist ideology reinforce each other over time. Manosphere influencers package misogyny and xenophobia into viral content. Ex-radicals describe a pipeline effect where algorithmic feeds gradually nudged them toward more extreme positions. Together, these mechanisms explain how fascism moves from the boardroom to the feed, from elite vision to everyday belief.
Citações Notáveis
End times fascism is a fascism embedded in an understanding that something immense is ending, and it responds to this discomfiting truth with unabashed cruelty.— Naomi Klein and Astra Taylor, 'End Times Fascism and the Fight for the Living World'
Tech fascism bundles powerful technologies like AI, crypto and social media towards authoritarian goals that benefit a small, interconnected group of oligarchs.— Gil Durán, 'The Nerd Reich: Silicon Valley Fascism and the War on Democracy'