For the first time since the postwar order was built, the architecture of global trade faces simultaneous pressure from protectionist tariffs, two active wars, and deepening geopolitical fracture — a convergence that the WTO's own chief economist calls the gravest sustained disruption in eight decades. The system has not broken: goods trade grew 4.6 percent last year, and supply chains have bent rather than snapped. Yet much of that resilience rests on a narrow foundation of AI-related technology exports, while the rules and institutions that once gave smaller nations a seat at the table grow
Global Trade Faces Unprecedented Disruption From Wars, Tariffs and Geopolitical Fragmentation
Trust in the US as a trading partner has collapsed.
So we're in the worst period for global trade since the 1940s. What does that actually mean for someone buying things?
It means the prices of goods and energy are volatile, and companies are spending real money to find new suppliers instead of using the ones they've relied on for decades. That cost gets passed along.
But the data shows trade volumes actually grew last year. How serious is this really?
The growth is almost entirely driven by AI chips and semiconductors. Strip that out, and trade would have contracted. It's a narrow story masking broader weakness.
Why is AI trade so dominant right now?
Because the world is racing to build AI infrastructure. Chips are the bottleneck, and Asia controls most of that production. Everyone else is scrambling to keep up.
The source says the EU cut Russian gas from 37 percent to 10 percent. That's a massive shift. But do we know if it's permanent?
Analysts think it is. Once countries build LNG terminals and sign long-term contracts with other suppliers, switching back is expensive and politically difficult. But it's not guaranteed.
What happens if Trump's tariffs stay in place for years?
Companies keep rerouting. US imports from China fell 28 percent last year. Vietnam, Taiwan, Mexico are getting the business instead. The supply chains are fragmenting by geography.
And if the WTO collapses entirely?
The models suggest global GDP could fall 5 to 7 percent by 2050. Smaller countries lose the most because they have less bargaining power in bilateral deals.
Is there any scenario where this gets better?
If countries recommit to multilateral rules, GDP could actually rise 3 percent. But that requires trust in the US as a trading partner, and Sampson says that trust has collapsed. It could take years to rebuild.
O Pulso
- The WTO's chief economist warns that tariffs, two wars, and pandemic aftershocks have combined into the most serious and sustained assault on global trade rules since the system was founded 80 years ago.
- AI-related goods are acting as a statistical life raft — representing only one-sixth of goods trade yet accounting for nearly half of all trade growth, concealing how broadly the rest of the world economy is struggling.
- Energy markets have been permanently redrawn: Europe slashed Russian gas imports from 37 percent to roughly 10 percent, while Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz has pushed Brent crude above $100 a barrel and strained global reserves.
- Trump's country-specific tariffs have eroded the WTO's foundational principle of equal treatment, shrinking the share of global goods traded under multilateral rules from about 80 percent in 2022 to 72 percent today.
- Economists warn that further fragmentation could cost the world economy 5 to 7 percent of GDP by 2050, with the smallest and poorest nations bearing the heaviest losses if multilateral rules collapse entirely.
For the first time since the postwar order was built, the architecture of global trade faces simultaneous pressure from protectionist tariffs, two active wars, and deepening geopolitical fracture — a convergence that the WTO's own chief economist calls the gravest sustained disruption in eight decades. The system has not broken: goods trade grew 4.6 percent last year, and supply chains have bent rather than snapped. Yet much of that resilience rests on a narrow foundation of AI-related technology exports, while the rules and institutions that once gave smaller nations a seat at the table grow visibly thinner. What is being decided now, quietly and without ceremony, is whether the world's commercial order will be rebuilt on multilateral trust or on the law of the strongest.
The world's trading system is enduring its most turbulent period since World War II. A pandemic, two major wars, and a sweeping return to protectionist tariffs have fractured the rules governing global commerce for eight decades. The WTO's chief economist describes the moment as the most serious and sustained disruption since the trading system's creation, with US tariff levels reaching heights not seen in generations.
Yet the system has not collapsed. Goods trade volumes rose 4.6 percent last year and services trade grew by 5.3 percent. The resilience, however, is deceptive. Demand for AI technology and the semiconductors powering it may be masking a broader decline — AI-related goods make up roughly one-sixth of all goods trade but account for nearly half of trade growth. Asian economies have captured most of this boom, while Africa, Latin America, and much of Europe have barely participated.
The wars have redrawn energy maps in ways that may prove permanent. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the EU cut its dependence on Russian pipeline gas from 37 percent to around 10 percent, replacing it with liquefied natural gas from the US, Norway, and elsewhere. Analysts doubt Europe will return to Russian energy even after the war ends. Meanwhile, Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz sent oil above $100 a barrel, forcing nations to release some 300 million barrels from strategic reserves and scramble for alternative supply.
Trump's tariffs have added further strain. US imports from China fell roughly 28 percent, with companies rerouting supply chains through Vietnam, Taiwan, and Mexico. More consequentially, country-specific duties and individual exemptions have eroded the WTO's core principle of equal treatment, shrinking the share of global goods traded under multilateral rules from about 80 percent in 2022 to 72 percent today.
The deeper question is whether the WTO itself will survive. Experts sketch alternatives — bilateral deals, regional blocs, a jungle of country-by-country negotiations — but warn that smaller nations would lose the most. Models suggest further fragmentation could cut global GDP by 5 to 7 percent by 2050, while reinforcing multilateral rules could raise it by roughly 3 percent. For now, globalization has stalled rather than reversed, and whether the current disruptions mark a permanent fracture or merely a reshuffling of partners remains genuinely unresolved.
The world's trading system is navigating its most turbulent stretch since the end of World War II. In the span of just a few years, a pandemic shuttered factories across continents, two major wars disrupted supplies of energy and food, and a return to protectionist tariffs has fractured the rules that governed commerce for eight decades. Robert Staiger, the chief economist at the World Trade Organization, describes what is happening as "the most serious and sustained disruptions since the trading system was created 80 years ago." The tariffs alone have pushed US duties to levels not seen in decades, forcing companies to scramble for new suppliers and new markets.
Yet the global trading system has not collapsed. Last year, goods trade volumes rose 4.6 percent, and services trade grew by 5.3 percent. China remained the world's largest exporter of goods; the United States imported more than any other nation; the European Union held the second position in both categories. The resilience is real, but it is also misleading. Staiger notes that strong demand for artificial intelligence technology and the semiconductors that power it may be "masking some of the drop in world trade that might otherwise be occurring." AI-related goods account for roughly one-sixth of all goods trade globally, yet they represent nearly half of all trade growth. The WTO's March outlook showed that Asian countries have captured most of this boom, while Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and much of Europe have barely participated.
The pandemic accelerated a shift away from China as the world's manufacturing center, but the wars have reshaped energy markets in ways that may prove permanent. When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the European Union was importing 37 percent of its natural gas from Russian pipelines. By late 2024, that figure had fallen to around 10 percent. The EU has replaced Russian pipeline gas with liquefied natural gas from the United States, Norway, Australia, and Kazakhstan. Oil and coal imports from Russia have become negligible. Russia found new buyers—China and India purchased its oil at steep discounts—but analysts doubt the EU will return to Russian energy once the war ends. Camille Reverdy, a fellow at the Brussels think tank Bruegel, put it plainly: "If the alternatives become reliable sources, I don't see it coming back."
When conflict erupted in the Middle East in late February, Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world's most critical chokepoints for oil shipments. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates rerouted some oil through alternative pipelines. The International Energy Agency reported that the world compensated for the missing barrels by increasing production in the United States, Kazakhstan, Brazil, and Venezuela. Several nations also released roughly 300 million barrels from their strategic reserves. Nearly seven months into the conflict, Brent crude has traded above $100 per barrel for much of the war, and analysts are warning of dangerously tight supplies heading into fall and winter.
President Trump's tariff strategy has added another layer of disruption. US imports from China fell by around 28 percent last year, according to the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Imports from the rest of the world climbed by nearly 10 percent, much of it from Vietnam, Taiwan, and Mexico as companies rerouted supply chains away from China. Trump has also broken the WTO's core principle of equal treatment by setting country-specific duties and negotiating individual exemptions. About 72 percent of global goods are still traded under the WTO's rules, down from roughly 80 percent in 2022.
The larger question now is whether the WTO itself will survive. Trump has attacked the Geneva-based institution, and experts have begun sketching alternatives: continuing his country-by-country tariff approach, a web of bilateral and regional trade deals, or a coalition of major trading blocs that could operate on WTO-style rules at a scale the US and China could not ignore. Thomas Sampson, an associate professor at the London School of Economics, warned that Trump's approach—what he calls a "law of the jungle"—would harm smaller countries, who have a "bigger voice" under the current system. He also noted that "trust in the US as a trading partner has collapsed," and it could take years for confidence to return even under a different administration.
The WTO has modeled the economic consequences of different futures. If trade fragments further along geopolitical lines, global GDP could shrink by about 5 percent by 2050. In a scenario where the WTO disappears and only scattered free-trade deals remain, GDP could fall closer to 7 percent, with the smallest and poorest economies suffering the most. Reinforcing multilateral rules, by contrast, could raise global GDP by roughly 3 percent. For now, globalization has stalled—since around 2015, world trade has grown only as fast as the global economy—but it has not reversed. Whether the current disruptions mark the end of an interconnected world, or simply a reshuffling of trading partners, remains an open question.
Citações Notáveis
The most serious and sustained disruptions since the trading system was created 80 years ago.— Robert Staiger, WTO chief economist
The world is certainly not becoming more globalized. But it's still an open question whether we're actually at deglobalization or just shifting around who we trade with.— Thomas Sampson, London School of Economics