The path to power runs through convincing these regions their interests lie elsewhere.
In the months before Spain's next general election, the conservative Popular Party has turned its gaze toward Catalonia and the Basque Country — not merely to win votes, but to unravel the regional alliances that sustain the current government. It is an old political instinct made new: rather than building a majority from the ground up, the PP seeks to erode the foundations beneath its opponent. The strategy reminds us that in fragile coalitions, the periphery often holds the center's fate.
- The PP has identified the Sánchez government's most exposed flank — its dependence on Catalan and Basque regional parties — and is pressing hard against it.
- Party leader Feijóo has made repeated trips to Barcelona, directly challenging Junts to reconsider whether propping up what he calls a corrupt administration serves Catalonia's interests.
- The PNV faces the same pressure in the Basque Country, as the PP works to make continued support for Madrid politically costly for regional parties and their voters.
- The underlying logic is destabilizing rather than constructive: if Junts or the PNV withdraw, the government loses its majority and new elections — which the PP believes it can win — become inevitable.
- The campaign's intensity signals that Catalonia and the Basque Country are no longer peripheral to Spanish national politics, but the very terrain on which the next government will be decided.
Spain's Popular Party is making a deliberate push into Catalonia and the Basque Country ahead of the next general election — and the target is not just votes. These are the home territories of Junts and the PNV, the regional parties whose parliamentary support has kept Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez in power. By intensifying their presence there, PP strategists believe they can weaken the coalition from within.
The approach is blunt in its framing. Operating from their Madrid headquarters, party leaders are portraying the Sánchez administration as corrupt and untrustworthy, hoping to exploit a familiar regional grievance: the sense that Madrid governs against local interests. If voters in these territories can be convinced that their parties are enabling a compromised government, the PP reasons, those voters may look for alternatives.
Feijóo has traveled repeatedly to Barcelona to press the case in person, confronting Junts directly with the suggestion that its alliance with Sánchez makes it complicit in what the PP characterizes as institutional corruption. Observers have described it as a sustained operation to make the government's coalition partners' position politically untenable — pressure designed to force a rupture rather than simply win converts.
The deeper calculation is structural. If either Junts or the PNV withdraws its support, the government loses its majority and new elections follow — elections the PP believes it is positioned to win. It is a high-stakes wager that the path back to power runs not through building a new majority, but through dismantling the one that already exists.
Spain's conservative Popular Party is making a calculated push into two of the country's most politically fractious regions—Catalonia and the Basque Country—in the months before the next general election. The move is not accidental. These territories are home to the regional parties that have kept Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez's government afloat: Junts in Catalonia and the PNV in the Basque Country. By intensifying their presence there, PP leadership believes they can peel away votes and weaken the very coalition partners the government depends on.
The strategy is straightforward, if blunt. Party leadership from Madrid, operating out of their headquarters on Génova Street, is framing the Sánchez administration as corrupt and untrustworthy. The message is designed to exploit existing regional skepticism—the idea that Madrid is always working against local interests. If the PP can convince voters in these regions that supporting Sánchez's government means backing a compromised administration, they reason, those voters might look elsewhere. The party sees room to grow in both territories, according to internal assessments.
Party leader Alberto Feijóo has made multiple trips to Barcelona to press the case directly. His visits carry a confrontational edge: he is essentially challenging Junts to reconsider its alliance with Sánchez, suggesting that the party is complicit in propping up what he characterizes as a corrupt government. The framing is not subtle. It is what some observers have called an "operation to wear down" the government's coalition partners—a sustained campaign to make their political position untenable.
The PNV, which holds significant sway in the Basque Country, faces similar pressure. By attacking the government's integrity and suggesting that regional parties are enabling corruption by their continued support, the PP hopes to create political space for itself. The calculation is that if Junts or the PNV withdraw their backing, the government loses its majority and must call new elections—elections the PP believes it can win.
What makes this strategy notable is its focus on coalition vulnerability rather than direct electoral competition. The PP is not simply trying to win more votes in these regions, though that is part of it. They are trying to destabilize the government from the inside by making it politically costly for regional parties to remain allied with Madrid. It is a high-risk approach that assumes regional parties will respond to pressure and that voters will accept the framing of the government as fundamentally compromised.
The intensity of the campaign reflects how central these two regions have become to Spanish electoral politics. Catalonia and the Basque Country are not peripheral to national politics anymore—they are essential to any government's survival. By concentrating resources and attention there, the PP is betting that the path to power runs through convincing these regions that their interests lie elsewhere. Whether that calculation proves correct will become clear as the election approaches.
Notable Quotes
There is room for growth in these territories— PP leadership assessment
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why focus so heavily on these two regions specifically? The PP could campaign anywhere.
Because Junts and the PNV are the only reason Sánchez's government still exists. Without them, there is no majority. The PP understands that winning the election might be less important than making it impossible for the current government to function.
So this is about breaking the coalition rather than building their own support?
It is both. But yes, the coalition is the vulnerability. If you can make it politically toxic for regional parties to stay allied with Madrid, they leave, and the government collapses. Then you get new elections on your terms.
What does the PP gain by calling the government corrupt? That is a broad claim.
It gives regional voters a reason to abandon their current allies. If you can convince Catalan or Basque voters that their regional representatives are enabling corruption by supporting Sánchez, you create political pressure from below. The regional parties feel it, and they reconsider.
Is there evidence the strategy is working?
That is what the coming months will show. But the fact that the PP is investing this heavily suggests they believe there is real opportunity—that voters in these regions are genuinely skeptical of the government and might be persuaded.
What happens if the regional parties do withdraw support?
The government loses its majority. Sánchez would likely call new elections, and the PP would enter them with momentum and a narrative that they forced the government's hand. That is the endgame.