For the second time in a generation, Europe's ambition to forge a common sword has splintered against the ancient rivalries of national pride and industrial interest. The collapse in June of the Franco-German Future Combat Air System — after eight years of negotiation — leaves the continent fractured at precisely the moment when sixth-generation air power is being decided, with the UK-Italy-Japan Tempest programme advancing, France charting a solitary course, and Germany searching for a door that may already be closing. The deeper wound is economic: fighter jets require orders in the hundreds
Europe's fighter jet ambitions fracture as France, Germany abandon joint venture
There's no order book for it. You need an order book to make these economical.
So the France-Germany partnership just fell apart. What was it supposed to be?
A single next-generation fighter jet built together, sharing costs and technology. They'd been trying since 2018. The idea was that no European country could afford to build one alone and stay competitive with the US and China.
What went wrong?
Dassault and Airbus couldn't agree on who would lead. France also wanted a smaller jet that could land on aircraft carriers. Germany doesn't have carriers, so that wasn't a priority for them. Then Safran, the French engine maker, pulled out of the joint engine programme with Germany's MTU.
So it wasn't one thing—it was a cascade. And the workshare argument is the same one that killed the last European fighter partnership in the 1980s.
Exactly. France walked away then too and built the Rafale. The other four countries are still building the Eurofighter Typhoon.
What happens now?
France says it will build its own next-generation jet, possibly with partners. Germany is in a bind—it can't afford to go alone, so it's probably going to have to ask to join the Tempest programme, which is being built by the UK, Italy, and Japan.
But that's not a done deal. Tempest partners have already fought about workshare. Adding Germany means reopening those fights.
Right. And Germany would likely be a secondary partner, not a core one. That means fewer manufacturing jobs, which is politically difficult.
How many fighter jets could Europe end up with?
Theoretically three—Tempest, a French jet, and a German one. But industry people say that's economically impossible. You need orders for around 600 aircraft to justify development costs. France has 228 Rafale fighters.
So the math doesn't work for multiple European programmes competing against each other.
No. And it's happened before. That's what worries people.
What's the timeline?
France wants a demonstrator flying by 2031. Tempest is aiming for 2035. The question is whether Germany and France can agree to something before then, or whether Europe ends up fragmenting again.
And if it fragments?
Then Europe repeats the 1980s—multiple expensive programmes that all have to compete for the same limited export orders. Nobody wins.
El Pulso
- Eight years of Franco-German diplomacy collapsed in June when Macron and Merz abandoned their joint fighter programme, with engine maker Safran severing its last industrial tie to Germany just days ago.
- The rupture was driven by irreconcilable demands — France needed a carrier-capable jet, Germany did not, and both Dassault and Airbus refused to cede industrial leadership to the other.
- Europe now faces the alarming prospect of three separate sixth-generation programmes emerging — Tempest, a French jet, and potentially a German one — none of which can generate the 600-plus orders needed to be economically viable.
- Germany's options are narrowing fast: building its own fighter would be ruinously expensive, while joining Tempest as a secondary partner risks the political humiliation of receiving fewer manufacturing jobs than core members UK, Italy, and Japan.
- France is weighing a 'Rafale plus' upgrade path that could fly a demonstrator by 2031, but analysts question whether an evolved existing design can match the true stealth and autonomy of genuine sixth-generation rivals.
- Industry voices are blunt — 'there's no order book for it' — and the Tempest partners have deliberately structured their joint venture to prevent the workshare disputes that just destroyed the Franco-German effort, making Germany's entry complicated.
For the second time in a generation, Europe's ambition to forge a common sword has splintered against the ancient rivalries of national pride and industrial interest. The collapse in June of the Franco-German Future Combat Air System — after eight years of negotiation — leaves the continent fractured at precisely the moment when sixth-generation air power is being decided, with the UK-Italy-Japan Tempest programme advancing, France charting a solitary course, and Germany searching for a door that may already be closing. The deeper wound is economic: fighter jets require orders in the hundreds to justify their existence, and no single European nation commands that scale alone. History, which watched France walk away from a similar partnership in the 1980s to build the Rafale while others built the Typhoon, offers a cautionary mirror that few in Brussels or Berlin seem willing to look into.
Europe's dream of a unified twenty-first-century fighter jet has fractured into competing national ambitions, undoing nearly a decade of diplomatic effort. The collapse came in June when Germany's Friedrich Merz and France's Emmanuel Macron abandoned the Future Combat Air System after eight years of negotiation. The final blow arrived last week when Safran, France's engine maker, ended its joint development agreement with Germany's MTU Aero Engines.
The partnership was meant to embody a grander vision — one articulated by Mario Draghi — that Europe could only compete with the United States and China by pooling defence resources rather than building separate versions of the same weapons. Instead, it became a case study in why that vision remains elusive. France's Dassault and Germany's Airbus could not agree on who would lead the programme, and France's need for a carrier-capable jet found no echo in a Germany that operates no carriers.
The wreckage leaves Europe awkwardly positioned as the world races toward sixth-generation air power. The UK, Italy, and Japan are advancing the Tempest programme, designed around artificial intelligence, advanced stealth, and swarms of autonomous drones. The United States is developing the F47. France has signalled it will proceed alone, with Dassault's chief executive suggesting a demonstrator could fly as early as 2031. Germany faces an uncomfortable choice: build its own jet at enormous cost, or seek entry into Tempest as a secondary partner — a status that offers future products but fewer of the manufacturing jobs that make such partnerships politically palatable at home.
The economics make fragmentation particularly dangerous. A viable programme typically requires orders for around 600 aircraft. France's entire Rafale fleet numbers 228. No single European air force approaches the volumes needed to sustain an independent programme, yet the continent may be drifting toward three competing ones. Industry consultants are unsparing: without an order book, none of these jets can be made economical.
Germany's path into Tempest is not straightforward. The programme's partners established a joint venture called Edgewing specifically to resolve workshare disputes before development began — its chief executive described it as 'having all our fights at the start.' Reopening those settled arrangements to accommodate Germany risks introducing the very delays that have plagued every previous European collaboration. Airbus has signalled it would only join a programme where it could secure significant work and leadership — a condition the existing partners may be unwilling to grant.
The precedent is sobering. In the early 1980s, a similar coalition attempted a fourth-generation fighter together. France eventually walked away and built the Rafale. The remaining four nations produced the Eurofighter Typhoon, which first flew thirty years ago and is still being developed. As defence executives return from summer holidays and the calendar presses toward decisions that cannot be deferred, Europe confronts the possibility of repeating that fragmentation — this time in a technological era where the costs, and the consequences, are considerably higher.
Europe's ambition to build a unified fighter jet for the twenty-first century has fractured into competing national projects, undoing years of diplomatic effort and raising the prospect of wasteful duplication across the continent. The collapse came in June when Germany's Friedrich Merz and France's Emmanuel Macron abandoned their joint future combat air system after eight years of negotiation, a failure that has left defence planners scrambling to salvage what they can from the wreckage.
The partnership had been meant to embody a larger vision. Mario Draghi, the former European Central Bank president and Italian prime minister, had argued that Europe could only compete economically with the United States and China if its nations stopped building separate versions of the same weapons and instead pooled resources and technology. The fighter jet programme was supposed to be the proof of concept. Instead, it became a case study in why that vision remains elusive. The immediate cause was a dispute between France's Dassault Aviation and Germany's Airbus Defence and Space over who would lead the programme. France also wanted a smaller jet capable of operating from its aircraft carriers—a requirement Germany, which has no carriers, did not share. The final blow came last week when Safran, France's engine maker, announced it was ending its joint engine development with Germany's MTU Aero Engines.
The wreckage leaves Europe in an awkward position as the world's militaries race to develop sixth-generation fighters. The UK, Italy, and Japan are moving forward with the Tempest programme, a jet designed to incorporate artificial intelligence, advanced stealth, and swarms of autonomous drones. The United States is developing the F47, named after Donald Trump, the current president. France has signalled it will proceed alone, with Dassault's chief executive, Éric Trappier, saying a next-generation combat jet could be built solely in France or with other partners, with a demonstrator flying as early as 2031. Germany, meanwhile, faces an uncomfortable choice: build its own fighter at enormous cost, or seek admission to the Tempest programme as a secondary partner.
The economics of fighter jet development make fragmentation particularly dangerous. A successful programme typically requires orders for around 600 aircraft to justify the development costs. France operates 228 Rafale fighters. No single European air force comes close to the order volumes needed to sustain an independent programme. A European defence executive recently acknowledged that Europe could theoretically end up with three separate fighter jets—the Tempest, a French jet, and a German one—but called the prospect "not ideal." Industry consultants are blunter. "There's no order book for it," one UK-based consultant said. "You need an order book to make these economical." Even two European fighters seems unlikely given the strained economics.
France's path forward is uncertain. Dassault could develop what some analysts describe as a "Rafale plus"—an upgraded version with newer radar, weapons, and digital systems—but without a complete redesign it would struggle to match the stealth capabilities of true sixth-generation jets. A Rafale upgrade already in development for the early 2030s will be able to work alongside stealth drones, which may be sufficient for France's needs. But whether a crewed fighter will remain relevant by 2035, when these jets are expected to enter service, remains an open question across all air forces. The emerging consensus is that crewed fighters will survive, but surrounded by swarms of autonomous "loyal wingmen" drones that can be sent into danger while the crewed jet remains at a distance.
Germany's options are narrowing. Joining the Tempest programme as a full core partner would require reopening negotiations with the UK, Italy, and Japan—a process that could introduce delays. Canada joined Tempest at the Farnborough airshow in July, but only as an observer, a status that offers access to future products but not the politically valuable manufacturing jobs that come with core partnership. Saudi Arabia is also pushing to join, though its lack of technological contribution and human rights record make it a controversial candidate. Some Tempest partners are open to Germany. Leonardo, Italy's lead defence company, said Germany would be a "positive element" and "the strongest financial partner in Europe," though adding another core member carries the risk of delays. Rolls-Royce, which is building the Tempest's engines, suggested Germany's involvement would not harm the programme, though it stopped short of committing to sharing work with MTU.
Airbus Defence and Space, Germany's lead contractor, has signalled it would only join a programme where it could secure "a significant portion of the work and the leadership." That condition may prove difficult to meet. The Tempest partners set up a joint venture called Edgewing specifically to avoid the workshare disputes that destroyed the France-Germany partnership. Marco Zoff, Edgewing's chief executive, described the arrangement as "having all our fights at the start," clearing the way for rapid development toward a 2035 operational date. Reopening those negotiations risks repeating the delays that plagued earlier European efforts.
The pattern is not new. In the early 1980s, European nations attempted to build a fourth-generation fighter together. France, Italy, Spain, West Germany, and Britain joined forces, but disputes over workshare and design capabilities eventually fractured the partnership. France walked away and built the Rafale independently. The other four nations continued with the Eurofighter Typhoon, which first flew thirty years ago and is still in development. Kevin Craven, chief executive of ADS, the UK aerospace and defence lobby group, acknowledged the stakes. "Very expensive platforms require collaboration," he said. "There's a realisation across Europe and Nato" of that necessity. Yet as summer ends and defence executives return from holiday, the clock is ticking. Without rapid agreement on a unified approach, Europe risks repeating the mistakes of the past—building multiple competing fighters that must all compete for export orders, a fragmentation that Mario Draghi warned against and that no one in the industry believes serves Europe's interests.
Citas Notables
A next-generation combat jet could be developed solely in France or in cooperation with other partners, with a demonstrator flying as early as 2031.— Éric Trappier, chief executive of Dassault Aviation
Very expensive platforms require collaboration. There's a realisation across Europe and Nato that the very expensive platforms require collaboration.— Kevin Craven, chief executive of ADS, the UK aerospace and defence lobby group