Europe's ambition-reality gap fuels far-right rise as voters lose faith in unity

People can picture the Europe they want, but struggle to imagine how to get there
Zerka describes the core problem facing the continent: ambition without a credible path forward.
Mark

So the headline is that Europeans want unity but don't believe it's possible. But what does that actually mean for how they vote?

Mimi

It means the far-right has an opening. If you're in the Uncertain group—and that's nearly a third of Europe—you still believe in the European project emotionally. But you're watching it move slowly, fail to stand up to Trump, struggle with energy and defense. At some point, you stop waiting and start listening to parties that say the whole thing is broken.

Luke

But we should be careful here. The study shows what people say they want and what they think about Europe's performance. It doesn't actually tell us how many of those Uncertain voters will switch to far-right parties. That's the inference the reporting is making, and it might be right, but it's not measured in this data.

Mark

Fair point. So what would actually move the needle for the Uncertain group?

Mimi

Zerka is clear: tangible wins on things people care about. Energy security. Defense capability. Actual solutions to the cost of living crisis. Not grand speeches about European unity. Proof that when Europe acts together, things actually improve.

Luke

And that's the hard part, isn't it? Because those are genuinely difficult problems. The EU can't just will energy independence into existence or make defense spending instantly effective. So there's a real mismatch between what would convince voters and what's actually achievable in the timeframe they're expecting.

Mark

So we're looking at a widening gap, then. The Uncertain stay uncertain, some drift to the Negatives, and the far-right consolidates?

Mimi

Unless something changes, yes. The study was done before von der Leyen's state of the union address, and Zerka said what Europe needs is fewer grand promises and more proof of trajectory. That's the challenge: showing movement, not just ambition.

Luke

One more thing worth noting: the study is based on interviews and media analysis in 15 countries, but only 5,800 interviews across six of them. That's solid research, but it's not a continent-wide census. The patterns are real, but the exact percentages—68% speaking of decline, 74% dissatisfied—those are snapshots, not laws.

  • A continent-wide study of nearly 6,000 people reveals that 73% of Europeans still want deeper unity — yet 74% believe Europe is failing to meet its greatest challenges.
  • The sharpest tension lives not in outright Euroscepticism but in a vast middle: 31% of Europeans remain emotionally pro-European yet have lost faith that institutions can actually deliver.
  • Far-right parties are filling the credibility vacuum — 83% of their voters have already concluded that Europe's best days are behind it, and their pessimism is spreading.
  • Concrete grievances — Europe's slowness, its capitulation on Trump tariffs, its inability to act on climate and cost-of-living crises — are turning abstract disappointment into hardened disillusionment.
  • Researchers warn that EU leaders must stop preaching to true believers and start producing visible results for the persuadable Uncertain, or risk losing them to the politics of decline.

Across six nations and fifteen media landscapes, a new study has found that Europeans have not abandoned their vision of a unified, capable continent — they have simply stopped believing it can be built. The dream endures; it is the path that has gone dark. This 'imagination gap,' as researchers call it, is not a failure of desire but of demonstrated possibility, and it is precisely into that void that narratives of decline and dissolution are quietly settling.

Europeans have not stopped wanting a stronger, more unified continent. They have stopped believing it is possible. That is the central finding of a sweeping new study spanning 5,800 people across France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and the UK, supplemented by media and political analysis across 15 countries. Researchers describe the condition as an 'imagination gap' — the distance between a widely shared vision and a near-total collapse of confidence in reaching it.

The numbers are striking in their contradiction. Seventy-three percent of respondents expressed strong support for European unity, integration, or shared prosperity. Only 13% wanted less Europe or dissolution of the EU. Yet 74% said Europe was handling its major challenges poorly, 56% believed the continent's future was in danger, and 68% described Europe in terms of decline — against just 12% who saw this moment as one of renewal.

Pawel Zerka of the European Council on Foreign Relations, who authored the study, sorted Europeans into four groups. The Positives — 19% — still see crises as catalysts for deeper integration. The Negatives — 39%, and nearly half of voters in France, Germany, and Italy — have concluded Europe's best days are over; 83% of far-right voters fall here. The Disconnected — 12% — treat EU affairs as background noise. And the Uncertain — 31% — hold genuine pro-European values but doubt the bloc's capacity to act.

The grievances named most often were specific: Europe's slowness, its perceived weakness before powerful actors. The recent tariff concessions to Donald Trump became a recurring symbol of humiliation. One German respondent captured the paradox with quiet precision — he felt grateful to live in Europe, named climate change and the far right as its gravest threats, and then said flatly that neither was being addressed, and that he did not expect the Europe he wanted to exist in twenty years.

Zerka's argument is that the Uncertain are the pivotal group — not hardened Eurosceptics, but disillusioned believers. European leaders, he notes, tend to address the already-convinced or retreat before the already-hostile. The Uncertain remain reachable, but only through proof: tangible progress on energy, defense, and the cost of living. Without it, the study suggests, the far-right story of a Europe in irreversible decline will continue to find an audience that was never truly its own.

Europeans want a stronger continent. They want it unified, independent, capable of acting decisively on the world stage. They want peace, prosperity, security. The problem is they no longer believe any of it is possible.

A sweeping study of 5,800 people across France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and the UK, combined with analysis of how Europe is discussed in the media and politics of 15 countries, has documented a continent gripped by what researchers call an "imagination gap." The ambition remains intact—73% of respondents expressed a strong vision for European unity, political integration, peace, or shared prosperity. Only 13% wanted less Europe or dissolution of the EU altogether. But somewhere between the dream and the present moment, belief has collapsed. Seventy-four percent said Europe was handling its major challenges poorly. Fifty-six percent believed the continent's future was in danger. Sixty-eight percent spoke about Europe in terms of decline and loss, compared with just 12% who saw the current moment as a time of awakening and renewal.

Pawel Zerka, a senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations thinktank and author of the study, framed the crisis plainly: people had not stopped wanting a stronger Europe. They had stopped believing it was achievable. The gap was not one of communication or messaging. It was structural. Citizens could picture the Europe they wanted. They could not imagine a credible path from where things stood to where they needed to be.

The study sorted Europeans into four groups. The Positives, making up 19% of respondents, remained staunch believers—viewing current crises as catalysts for deeper integration. The Negatives, 39% of the population, had concluded Europe's best days were behind it. Almost half of voters in France, Germany, and Italy fell into this category, as did 83% of those who had voted for far-right parties like Germany's AfD, France's National Rally, the Dutch PVV, and Reform UK. The Disconnected, 12% of respondents, treated EU integration as distant background noise. And then there were the Uncertain—31% of Europeans who held pro-European values but doubted the continent's capacity to act decisively, protect its citizens, or uphold its principles.

The specific grievances were concrete and repeated. Almost a third of all respondents mentioned Europe's slowness. A young Polish citizen born in the 2000s captured the frustration: the EU discussed endlessly but accomplished nothing. Another recurring complaint, mentioned by 30% of respondents, was the bloc's failure to stand firm against powerful actors. The recent tariff concessions to Donald Trump became a symbol of this perceived weakness—a humiliating retreat.

One German respondent, quoted in the study, articulated the paradox perfectly. He felt regularly relieved to live in Europe, recognizing it as safer, freer, and more democratic than any other region on earth. He identified climate change and far-right parties as the continent's greatest threats. Yet he also said those threats were not being tackled effectively. Elections focused too much on the immediate and too little on the future. When asked what he wanted Europe to look like in 20 years—free, democratic, sustainable, less indebted, politically progressive, peaceful—he was asked if he thought it likely to happen. His answer was no.

Zerka argued that the Uncertain voters held the key to Europe's trajectory. They were not hardened Eurosceptics. They retained emotional attachment to the European project. But they had been alienated by institutional inertia, bureaucratic sluggishness, and perceived geopolitical impotence. Leaders, he noted, tended to preach to the already-convinced Positives or capitulate to the hardened Negatives. The Uncertain remained persuadable—but only if European politicians could demonstrate that collective action actually solved tangible domestic crises: energy security, defense, climate change, the cost of living. Without proof that the European project could deliver on its promises, the study suggested, the far-right narratives of decline would continue to gain ground.

The problem is not that they've stopped wanting a stronger Europe, but that they no longer believe it's achievable.
— Pawel Zerka, European Council on Foreign Relations
The EU fundamentally discusses a lot, but does nothing.
— Young Polish citizen quoted in the study
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