European spy chiefs warn Russia planning escalated NATO tests within months

Every fire needs investigating as potential terror attack
Czech intelligence chief describes how Russian sabotage stretches European security services to their limits.
Mark

So we have one intelligence chief saying an attack could come in months, but the Baltic countries are telling everyone to calm down. How do we square that?

Mimi

The Czechs are looking at the broader picture of Russian capabilities and intentions. The Balts are living on the border and thinking about what panic actually does to their societies—it damages confidence, it hurts the economy, it's exactly what Moscow wants.

Luke

But we should be clear: Koudelka didn't say an attack will happen in months. He said it's possible and could happen in that timeframe. Those are different things. And neither he nor Mežviets would say what intelligence they're actually basing this on.

Mark

Why wouldn't they say?

Mimi

Sources, methods, ongoing operations. You can't reveal how you know something without potentially burning the people or systems that told you.

Luke

True, but it also means we're asking people to trust warnings without being able to verify the underlying facts. That's a harder ask after 2022, when the US warned about invasion and was right, but also when intelligence agencies have gotten things wrong before.

Mark

What about this shift toward specific targets—defense industry, Ukraine support infrastructure? That seems concrete.

Mimi

It is. Mežviets is describing a real change in Russian behavior. They're moving from random attacks designed to create fear to targeted strikes on things that actually matter to the war effort. That's more sophisticated, more dangerous.

Luke

And it's also harder to attribute. A fire at a railway yard could be sabotage or could be an accident. The intelligence services have to investigate everything now, which is exhausting and exactly what Russia wants.

Mark

So Russia wins either way—either the attack happens, or the fear of it happening paralyzes the system.

Mimi

That's the logic of what Koudelka called "escalate to de-escalate." Push hard enough and Europe gets tired, pulls back support for Ukraine, fractures.

Luke

The one thing we don't know is whether Russia actually has concrete plans to attack NATO or whether this is all part of the psychological operation. Mežviets said it's still an open question. That matters.

  • Czech intelligence chief Michal Koudelka placed a stark timeline on the table — a Russian attack on NATO territory could come in 'months, not years,' through drones, missiles, or limited border incursions.
  • France's Macron convened an emergency meeting of party leaders in Paris, signaling that the intelligence picture had reached a threshold serious enough to demand political mobilization ahead of the UN General Assembly.
  • The Baltic states — the nations most exposed — broke from the alarm, warning that amplified public fear could fracture their economies and hand Moscow exactly the psychological victory it seeks.
  • Russian sabotage is shifting from random disruption toward precision: railway lines, defense factories, and infrastructure tied to western support for Ukraine — maximizing both material and psychological damage in a single strike.
  • European intelligence services are being stretched thin, forced to treat every fire and malfunction as a potential act of war — a resource drain that Koudelka described as, in itself, a successful outcome for Moscow.

Across Europe this week, intelligence chiefs offered a sobering assessment: the continent may be entering a period in which Russia tests the limits of collective defense not through open war, but through drones, sabotage, and the slow erosion of certainty. The warnings carry the weight of a lesson already learned — that dismissing such signals has consequences — yet the nations closest to Russia's borders counsel that fear itself can become a weapon in the Kremlin's hands. What emerges is a portrait of an alliance trying to hold two truths at once: the threat is real, and panic serves the adversary.

Three European intelligence chiefs spoke to reporters this week in separate interviews, and together their words sketched a continent bracing for a threat it cannot fully see. Poland's prime minister Donald Tusk opened the conversation before parliament, warning that Russian drones or missiles could strike NATO territory within months — a test, his assessments suggested, of whether Article 5 meant anything in practice.

Czech intelligence chief Michal Koudelka was the most precise. Speaking from BIS headquarters in Prague, he outlined the possibilities: drone incursions, small-scale border violations, false-flag operations, sweeping influence campaigns. A Russian attack, he said, could come in 'months, not years.' Emmanuel Macron called Tusk's warnings 'sound and well-documented' and summoned French political leaders to an emergency Paris meeting as the UN General Assembly convened and Ukraine launched one of its largest air strikes of the war against Russian territory.

The Baltic intelligence chiefs, however, offered a different register. Latvia's Normunds Mežviets said his country saw no signs of an imminent attack, even as he acknowledged Moscow was preparing for more decisive action in Europe. Estonia's Jonatan Vseviov went further, warning against social media panic and promising that if a genuine threat materialized, the public would be told plainly. The Balts found themselves in an ironic position: having spent years urging western Europe to take Russia seriously and being ignored, they were now urging the newly alarmed west to keep its nerve.

What all three chiefs agreed on was that Russia's sabotage campaign across Europe would intensify. Sweden's Thomas Nilsson called an armed drone incident at Leipzig airport a 'gamechanger' — a sign that attacks were moving from nuisance toward potential mass casualties. Mežviets described a strategic shift in Russian targeting: away from random disruption and toward infrastructure directly tied to western support for Ukraine, achieving both material damage and psychological effect simultaneously. Koudelka noted the secondary toll — every fire, every malfunction now demands investigation as a possible act of war, draining the very resources needed to counter the threat. Nilsson saw the broader design clearly: sow division within NATO, reduce support for Ukraine, and keep the alliance locked in consultation without action. On the question of negotiations, he was blunt — Moscow, he assessed, still believed it could win, and was performing diplomacy rather than practicing it.

Three European intelligence chiefs sat down with reporters this past week in separate interviews across the continent, and what they had to say painted a picture of a continent bracing for something it cannot quite see coming. The warnings began with Poland's prime minister, Donald Tusk, standing before parliament to lay out what his country's intelligence assessments were telling him: Russia might be preparing to strike NATO territory with drones or missiles in the coming months. The goal, according to those assessments, would be to test whether Article 5—the alliance's collective defense clause—was anything more than words on paper.

Michal Koudelka, who runs the Czech Republic's BIS security service, was the most direct about the timeline. In a rare interview at the agency's Prague headquarters, he said a Russian attack could materialize in "months, not years." He laid out the possibilities: increased drone activity, a small-scale invasion of NATO territory that borders Russia, false-flag provocations, a massive influence campaign. All of it, he suggested, was possible. But he also noted that people across Europe were working hard to prevent exactly that scenario from unfolding.

Emmanuel Macron, France's president, called Tusk's warnings "sound and well-documented." On Friday, he summoned party leaders and 2027 presidential candidates to an emergency meeting in Paris to discuss, among other things, the growing intelligence picture of Russian threat. The timing was pointed: the UN General Assembly was about to convene in New York, and the war in Ukraine was intensifying on both sides, with Kyiv launching one of its biggest air attacks of the war just days before—hundreds of drones and missiles striking Moscow and other Russian regions in the early hours of Sunday.

But the intelligence leaders from the three Baltic countries—Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania—which actually border Russian territory, took a different tone. Normunds Mežviets, director general of Latvia's VDD state security service, said his country did not see indications of an imminent attack. Yes, there were signs that Moscow was preparing for more decisive action in Europe, he acknowledged. But it remained unclear whether those preparations represented concrete plans or simply part of a broader strategy to spread fear and uncertainty across western society. Jonatan Vseviov, Estonia's foreign ministry secretary general, went further, decrying what he called "panic on social media" about a possible attack. "If there is reason to fear an attack, rest assured: we will make that clear," he wrote. "Until then, keep calm, carry on and support Ukraine."

The Balts found themselves in an unusual position. For years they had warned western Europe about the Russian threat and been largely ignored. Now, with the west finally awake to the danger, they were urging restraint in public messaging. They feared that talk of an imminent invasion could damage their own economies and societies—and, more strategically, could play directly into what the Kremlin wanted: panic, uncertainty, fracture. Mežviets acknowledged the shift had been real. "Before 2022, we constantly warned our western European partners about the threat from Russia, but most of the time our voices were not listened to," he said. "In 2022, the approach changed. They said it turns out the Balts and the Poles had been right."

Neither Mežviets nor Koudelka would say what specific intelligence had prompted these warnings, or whether a surprise visit by CIA director John Ratcliffe to Moscow last month—with a stop in Riga—was partly an effort to warn the Kremlin about the costs of attacking NATO. The Kremlin's spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, dismissed the rumors. "It has nothing to do with reality and nothing to do with the intentions of the Russian Federation," he said. But Europe remembered 2022, when US officials repeatedly warned Russia was preparing to invade Ukraine and the Kremlin repeatedly denied it. The full-scale war that followed was now approaching its fifth winter.

What all three intelligence chiefs agreed on was that Russia's campaign of sabotage across Europe would intensify in the coming months. Thomas Nilsson, head of Sweden's military intelligence and security service, called the recent armed drone incident at Leipzig airport a "gamechanger." German authorities had attributed it to Russian intelligence. "To have an armed UAV drone sent in to a busy airport in the middle of Europe," Nilsson said, "if you have attacks that could result in losses of life or losses of very critical infrastructure that have a huge implication for society, I think that is a gamechanger." Mežviets described a shift in Russian targeting: away from randomized attacks meant simply to sow panic, toward specific targets linked to western support for Ukraine—railway infrastructure, defense industry facilities. "If you do this then the psy-op effect is reached anyway, so you get both things in one," he said. Koudelka added another dimension: the sabotage campaign was stretching the resources of European intelligence services. Every fire, every malfunction now had to be investigated as a potential terror attack. "That is a good result for them," he said. Nilsson saw multiple goals behind the intensification: reducing support for Ukraine, introducing splits within NATO, alarming European populations. "I think Moscow would love NATO to have endless discussion about Article 4 consultations, but coming up with no actions," he said. As for serious negotiations, Nilsson saw little evidence the Kremlin was interested. "My assessment is that they are still thinking that they could achieve their strategic objectives, so they are just playing negotiation theatre," he said.

It's possible. It could involve a limited incursion, false-flag provocations, a massive influence campaign.
— Michal Koudelka, Czech BIS security service
If there is reason to fear an attack, rest assured: we will make that clear. Until then, keep calm, carry on and support Ukraine.
— Jonatan Vseviov, Estonia's foreign ministry secretary general
My assessment is that they are still thinking that they could achieve their strategic objectives, so they are just playing negotiation theatre.
— Thomas Nilsson, Swedish military intelligence and security service
Envie de l'histoire complète ? Lire l'original sur The Guardian ↗
Nous contacter FAQ