Let spending grow, but slower than the economy itself
Em Brasília, o ministro da Fazenda Dario Durigan colocou em palavras o que muitos economistas já sabem, mas poucos governos conseguem enfrentar: quando os gastos obrigatórios crescem mais rápido do que a economia, o Estado perde a capacidade de investir no próprio futuro. Durigan defende que o caminho para superávits primários sustentáveis passa não por cortes traumáticos, mas por uma reorientação estrutural — gastar com mais inteligência, revisar indexações automáticas e preservar a credibilidade do arcabouço fiscal. É uma aposta na reforma silenciosa em vez do choque, num país onde as promessas do passado pesam sobre as escolhas do presente.
- Os gastos obrigatórios do Brasil — previdência, salários do funcionalismo e compromissos indexados — crescem num ritmo que sufoca o espaço para investimentos produtivos.
- Cada exceção ao arcabouço fiscal enfraquece as regras que deveriam conter o problema, criando um ciclo em que a próxima exceção se torna mais fácil de justificar.
- Durigan propõe que o gasto público cresça abaixo da receita e do PIB, abrindo margem fiscal sem recorrer a medidas de choque que comprometam a estabilidade social.
- A revisão dos mecanismos de indexação e a melhoria da eficiência das políticas sociais são apontadas como caminhos concretos, mas politicamente custosos.
- O sucesso da estratégia depende da capacidade do sistema político de absorver reformas estruturais sem recuar diante das pressões das bases que vivem dessas garantias.
O ministro da Fazenda Dario Durigan concedeu entrevista à CNN Brasil para expor o que considera o nó central da economia brasileira: os gastos obrigatórios crescem rápido demais e consomem o espaço que deveria ser destinado a investimentos capazes de aumentar a produtividade do país.
A lógica apresentada por Durigan é direta: se as despesas compulsórias — previdência, salários do funcionalismo e outros compromissos fixos — continuarem se expandindo no mesmo ritmo da receita e do crescimento econômico, não sobra margem para o tipo de gasto que faz uma economia avançar. A saída que ele propõe é fazer o gasto público crescer, mas de forma mais lenta do que a arrecadação e o PIB. Esse diferencial, mantido ao longo do tempo, permitiria ao Brasil voltar a registrar superávits primários sem recorrer a medidas drásticas.
Mas o ministro reconhece que controlar o teto não basta. É preciso revisar os mecanismos de indexação que amarram automaticamente certas despesas à inflação ou a outros indicadores, independentemente do momento econômico. Também é necessário, segundo ele, que as políticas sociais entreguem mais resultado pelo dinheiro que consomem — não necessariamente gastando menos, mas gastando com mais precisão e menos desperdício.
Durigan também tocou num ponto sensível: as exceções ao arcabouço fiscal. Cada brecha aberta para contornar as regras corrói a credibilidade do sistema e facilita a próxima exceção. O arcabouço só cumpre sua função se de fato disciplinar o comportamento do governo.
O que está em jogo é uma questão estrutural, não conjuntural. Os compromissos de gastos do Estado brasileiro se cristalizaram ao longo de décadas de promessas feitas a aposentados, servidores e populações vulneráveis. Reescrever essas regras significa decepcionar constituencies com poder real. O otimismo de Durigan — de que isso pode ser feito sem traumas — será testado pela capacidade do governo de avançar em eficiência e indexação sem provocar o recuo político que tornaria as reformas inviáveis.
Brazil's finance minister sat down with CNN Brasil this week to lay out what he sees as the country's most pressing economic problem: mandatory spending is growing too fast, and it's crowding out the investments the economy needs to get more productive.
Dario Durigan, who leads the Finance Ministry, made the case plainly. The government cannot keep letting its obligatory expenses—pensions, public sector salaries, and other locked-in commitments—balloon at the same pace as tax revenue and economic growth. If public spending keeps outpacing what the country actually earns, there's no room left for the kind of capital investment that makes an economy hum. The math is simple but the politics are not.
What Durigan is really arguing for is a squeeze: let public spending grow, but make it grow slower than the revenue coming in and slower than the overall economy. Do that, he suggested, and Brazil could return to running primary budget surpluses—the kind of fiscal discipline that reassures investors and stabilizes the currency—without resorting to the kind of shock measures that crater living standards or trigger social upheaval.
But getting there requires more than just spending caps. Durigan acknowledged that the government needs to revisit the indexation mechanisms that automatically tie certain expenses to inflation or other benchmarks. These formulas lock in spending growth whether the economy is booming or struggling. He also conceded that social policies need to work harder for the money they consume—not necessarily spending less, but spending smarter, targeting benefits more precisely, eliminating waste.
There's another layer to this conversation that Durigan touched on: the fiscal framework itself, the set of rules meant to keep the budget from spiraling. The minister admitted that exceptions to these rules—the special carve-outs and emergency measures that have become routine—are not helping. Each exception weakens the framework's credibility and makes the next exception easier to justify. The framework only works if it actually constrains behavior.
What Durigan is describing is a structural problem, not a cyclical one. Brazil's economy is not in crisis because of a temporary downturn; it's struggling because the government's spending commitments have calcified in ways that leave little flexibility for the future. The solution is not a one-time adjustment but a sustained reorientation of how the state allocates resources.
The challenge ahead is whether Brazil's political system can absorb these kinds of reforms without fracturing. Mandatory spending exists because past governments made promises—to retirees, to public employees, to vulnerable populations. Rewriting those commitments means disappointing constituencies with real power. Durigan's framing—that this can be done without traumatic measures—is optimistic. Whether it's realistic depends on whether the government can actually move the needle on efficiency and indexation without triggering the kind of backlash that forces a retreat.
Notable Quotes
The country needs to control mandatory spending growth to open space for investments and raise economic productivity— Finance Minister Dario Durigan
Public spending should grow at a slower pace than revenue and the economy, allowing Brazil to return to primary surpluses without traumatic measures— Finance Minister Dario Durigan
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
When Durigan says mandatory spending needs to be controlled, what does he actually mean? Is he talking about cutting pensions or wages?
Not exactly. He's saying the growth rate of those commitments needs to slow down. The spending doesn't necessarily shrink; it just can't keep accelerating the way it has been. The real target is the indexation formulas that automatically raise payments with inflation.
So he's trying to avoid a direct confrontation with retirees and public employees?
That's part of it. A direct cut would be politically explosive. But if you slow the growth rate, you achieve the same fiscal effect over time without a single dramatic moment of loss.
He mentioned making social policies more efficient. What does that mean in practice?
It means looking at who actually needs the help and making sure the money reaches them. Right now, some benefits go to people who don't need them, or the programs have so much overhead that a small fraction of spending actually helps anyone. Efficiency is the diplomatic word for that kind of targeting.
Why does he keep saying this can happen without traumatic measures?
Because if you don't do it gradually and structurally, you eventually hit a wall where you have to do something traumatic—a currency crisis, a sudden austerity shock, something that hurts everyone at once. He's arguing that controlled, deliberate reform now prevents chaos later.
Is the fiscal framework actually working, or is it just theater?
It's been weakened by exceptions. Every time the government carves out an emergency exemption, it signals that the rules are negotiable. That erodes the framework's power to constrain spending and damages its credibility with investors. Durigan seems to understand that the framework only matters if it actually binds.