Drones rusos a reacción de 600 km/h desbordan defensas ucranias en nueva escalada

A comercial center in Krivói Rog was struck twice on August 21st. The first drone hit the warehouses. Minutes later, a second aircraft found its target. Sixteen people died in the rubble. The weapon that delivered this blow was not a conventional missile or a traditional drone—it was something faster, harder to stop, and increasingly difficult for Ukraine to counter.

These are the Geran 5 drones, Russian-made aircraft powered by jet engines that travel at speeds up to 600 kilometers per hour. Each carries a 90-kilogram explosive payload. According to Ukraine's Air Force, four out of every ten of these weapons reach their targets successfully. The gap in Ukraine's defenses has become impossible to ignore. The speed alone—triple that of earlier drone models—has fundamentally altered the calculus of air defense. Where Ukrainian interceptors once achieved a 90 percent success rate against slower, piston-engine drones, they now manage barely 60 percent against these jet-powered variants. Even mobile artillery units, which could once spot and neutralize slower drones from several kilometers away, struggle with machines moving at this velocity.

Russia is producing these weapons at an industrial scale that reflects confidence in their effectiveness. The factories in Alabuga, in the Tatarstan economic zone, are churning out approximately 3,000 of these drones each month. The acceleration is stark: in June, Russian forces launched 350 jet-powered attack drones. By July, that number had climbed to 1,500. In August, it reached 2,800. According to data compiled by Reuters from Ukrainian military figures, the central region around Kiev—the capital itself—absorbed the heaviest concentration of these attacks last month, with 478 strikes recorded. After four and a half years of war, Kiev now faces an intensity of drone bombardment that mirrors conditions in active combat zones along the eastern front.

The technical sophistication of these weapons reflects years of refinement. Ukrainian military analyst Oleksandr Kovalenko notes that the first of these kamikaze drones appeared in Ukrainian territory in January 2024. Over two years, they were modernized continuously, adapted to counter Ukrainian defenses, and refined for mass production. The Geran 5 incorporates a tubular fuselage similar to cruise missiles, straight wings rather than the delta designs of earlier models, and improved targeting systems enhanced by artificial intelligence. It includes electronic warfare capabilities designed to defeat jamming. The most advanced versions can travel approximately 1,000 kilometers.

Yet the weapon's effectiveness masks a structural vulnerability: cost. Each Geran 5 runs between 90,000 and 130,000 euros to produce—substantially more than the earlier Shahed-based drones. This price point constrains how rapidly Russia can scale production, even with factories operating at full capacity. The Kremlin had reportedly aimed to make jet-powered drones constitute 50 percent of its total drone inventory, according to statements made in June by General Oleksander Sirski, then commander of Ukraine's Armed Forces. If achieved, this shift would allow Russia to reserve its most expensive weapons—cruise missiles like the Kh-101 and Kalibr, each costing around two million euros—for more strategically complex targets, while using the cheaper jet drones for sustained pressure against cities and civilian infrastructure.

Ukraine's response has been constrained by both resources and time. Effective interception of these aircraft requires short-range missiles, portable air defense systems, or dedicated air combat platforms. These systems exist, but in insufficient quantities to cover Ukraine's entire airspace. Maksym Zhorin, a prominent Ukrainian military commander and deputy leader of the 3rd Assault Brigade, stated publicly last Friday that Ukraine had lost the initiative. "We have neither these drones nor the means to counter them," he wrote. President Volodymyr Zelensky has announced that 60 domestic companies are working urgently to develop interceptors capable of tracking and destroying these aircraft. Kovalenko frames the challenge plainly: Russia accelerated production of these drones faster than Ukraine could develop countermeasures. "This does not mean the problem cannot be solved," he said, "but it will take time, and Russia is exploiting the window while Ukraine lacks sufficient counter-measures."

The drones themselves carry another complication. Ukrainian military intelligence has dismantled captured Geran 5 units and found their components scattered across the globe. The turboreactor motor is Chinese-made, produced by Telefly. Nine components originate from the United States, including some manufactured by Texas Instruments. A satellite navigation receiver board was made in Germany. These foreign parts, incorporated into Russian weapons systems despite international sanctions, underscore how the conflict has become entangled with global supply chains and the difficulty of enforcing technological isolation in a connected world.