Reserves signal stability; dollar credit unlocks it.
Domingo Cavallo, el arquitecto de la convertibilidad argentina en los años noventa, ha vuelto a tomar la palabra para señalar lo que considera las piezas ausentes en la estrategia antiinflacionaria de Javier Milei. Su diagnóstico descansa en una lógica antigua pero persistente: que la estabilidad monetaria no se decreta, sino que se construye acumulando reservas, liberando el crédito en dólares y eliminando toda restricción al movimiento de capitales. En su visión, estas tres condiciones forman un ciclo virtuoso que, de completarse, podría disipar el fantasma de la devaluación y devolver confianza a una economía que lleva décadas buscando un ancla.
- La inflación argentina sigue resistiendo a pesar de los ajustes del gobierno de Milei, y Cavallo advierte que el plan tiene dos eslabones críticos aún sin cerrar.
- El Banco Central comenzó a comprar dólares en abril y eso redujo el riesgo país, pero Cavallo insiste en que la acumulación de reservas es condición necesaria, no suficiente.
- Los argentinos empezaron a depositar dólares en los bancos al relajarse el cepo, pero las instituciones financieras no están prestando esos fondos con la velocidad que la economía real necesita.
- Cavallo choca con el FMI, que advierte sobre los riesgos del crédito en dólares, y propone en cambio seguir los modelos de Perú y Uruguay, donde ese esquema funcionó sin desestabilizar el sistema.
- Mientras persista cualquier restricción cambiaria, el mercado seguirá anticipando una devaluación brusca, convirtiendo esa expectativa en una profecía que se cumple a sí misma.
Domingo Cavallo, quien condujo la economía argentina durante la convertibilidad de los noventa, ha presentado un diagnóstico de dos condiciones que considera indispensables para que el plan de Milei logre bajar la inflación y reactivar el crecimiento. En su lectura, el gobierno ya dio el paso más importante —la decisión del Banco Central de acumular reservas comprando dólares desde abril— pero eso no alcanza.
La acumulación de reservas opera como señal de estabilidad ante los mercados internacionales: reduce la percepción de riesgo país y, con ella, el costo de financiamiento tanto para el sector privado como para el Estado. Cavallo la considera la herramienta más eficaz disponible para sostener la confianza. Pero su segunda condición apunta a un problema diferente: los dólares que los argentinos comenzaron a depositar en los bancos —a medida que el cepo se fue aflojando— no están llegando a las empresas y familias que necesitan crédito para invertir o sostener su capital de trabajo. Los bancos, restringidos en su capacidad de prestar esos depósitos, mantienen el capital inmovilizado.
Frente a las advertencias del FMI sobre los riesgos del crédito en dólares, Cavallo responde que el organismo exagera y señala los casos de Perú y Uruguay como evidencia de que ese esquema puede funcionar sin desestabilizar el sistema, siempre que los préstamos se dirijan a deudores solventes. El punto de partida, subraya, es que los depósitos ya existen: son ahorros reales que emergieron cuando los argentinos recuperaron algo de confianza en el sistema.
Detrás de ambas condiciones late una tercera exigencia que Cavallo repite con creciente insistencia: la eliminación total del cepo cambiario. Mientras subsista cualquier restricción al movimiento de capitales, el mercado seguirá albergando expectativas de devaluación, y esas expectativas se vuelven autorrealizables. Solo con controles completamente eliminados, reservas adecuadas y crédito en dólares fluyendo libremente podría cerrarse el ciclo virtuoso que, en su visión, alejaría definitivamente el fantasma de un salto cambiario y permitiría que la economía real vuelva a crecer.
Domingo Cavallo, who once steered Argentina's economy through the convertibility plan of the 1990s, has laid out a two-part prescription for what he sees as the missing pieces in Javier Milei's anti-inflation strategy. Speaking recently, the former Economy Minister argued that the government has already made one crucial move—the central bank's decision to accumulate foreign reserves through dollar purchases—but that two conditions must now be met if the plan is to succeed in bringing down prices and reviving domestic demand.
Cavallo credits the central bank's dollar-buying campaign, which began in April, as the single most important macroeconomic decision the government has made. The logic is straightforward: as the central bank builds reserves, it signals stability to international markets, which in turn lowers Argentina's country risk premium. When that risk perception falls, the cost of borrowing drops for both private companies and the state itself. Cavallo sees reserve accumulation as the most effective tool available to continue chipping away at market anxiety and anchoring economic stability.
But reserves alone are not enough. The second condition, in Cavallo's view, is a faster expansion of dollar-denominated credit flowing through the banking system. As the government has gradually loosened its currency controls—the cepo cambiario that has long restricted capital movement—Argentines have begun depositing dollars in banks rather than hoarding them at home. The problem, Cavallo argues, is that banks are not lending out these deposits aggressively enough. If financial institutions face heavy restrictions on what they can do with the dollars their customers deposit, those savings never reach the companies and families that need financing for equipment, working capital, and investment. The government's economic team is betting on dollar credit as the vehicle to unlock this trapped capital.
Cavallo's position puts him at odds with warnings from the International Monetary Fund about the risks of dollar lending. He argues instead that the IMF's concerns are overblown, and that Argentina should follow the model of neighboring countries like Peru and Uruguay, where dollar credit has been deployed to solvent borrowers without destabilizing the system. The key, he suggests, is that the deposits exist—they are real savings that have materialized as Argentines gain confidence in the currency system. The question is whether banks will be permitted to lend them.
Underlying both conditions is a third demand that Cavallo has repeated with increasing insistence: the complete elimination of all currency controls. As long as any restrictions remain on the movement of capital, he argues, the market will harbor expectations of a sudden devaluation. Those expectations themselves become self-fulfilling, creating the very instability the government is trying to prevent. A truly dollarized or bimonetary economy—where the dollar functions with the same freedom as the peso—requires that all capital controls vanish. Only then can the dollar serve its full economic purpose.
Cavallo's vision is of a virtuous cycle: adequate reserves plus unrestricted capital movement plus expanded dollar credit would together eliminate the specter of currency collapse. Without the fear of a sudden jump in the exchange rate, financial stability strengthens, inflation expectations moderate, and the real economy can begin to grow again. It is a diagnosis rooted in his own experience managing Argentina's currency regime, and it reflects a particular faith in the stabilizing power of reserves and the liberalizing power of removing restrictions. Whether the Milei government will move as far and as fast as Cavallo recommends remains an open question.
Notable Quotes
The central bank's purchase of foreign currency was the best macroeconomic decision the government has made since April.— Domingo Cavallo
If banks face strong limitations on lending the dollar deposits they receive from customers, the channeling of those savings toward business working capital and investment becomes severely restricted.— Domingo Cavallo
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
You're saying the central bank buying dollars was the right move, but that it's not enough on its own. Why does reserve accumulation matter so much if the real problem is inflation?
Because inflation expectations are anchored in currency risk. When markets think the peso might collapse, they demand higher interest rates and higher prices to protect themselves. Reserves signal that the government can defend the currency. That signal alone brings down the cost of money.
And the dollar credit piece—that's about getting the savings that already exist into the hands of people who will actually spend or invest them?
Exactly. Argentines have dollars now. They're not under the mattress anymore. But if banks can't lend those dollars out, the money just sits there. It doesn't create jobs or growth. You need the credit to flow.
The IMF is worried about dollar lending. What's their concern, and why does Cavallo think they're wrong?
The Fund worries that if too much credit is extended in dollars, and the peso weakens, borrowers who earn in pesos can't repay. But Cavallo points to Peru and Uruguay—they've done this successfully. He thinks the IMF is being overly cautious, and that Argentina's real problem is the opposite: too little credit, not too much.
So the third piece—eliminating the cepo completely—that's not just about freedom. It's about belief.
Right. As long as any controls exist, people assume they'll get tighter. That assumption creates the devaluation risk the government is trying to prevent. You have to remove the controls entirely to remove the expectation.