Even in countries that moved ahead with fiscal expansion, there are no packages that throw all the cost onto public debt.
Quando Joe Biden apresentou sua agenda econômica trilionária, economistas brasileiros que haviam passado anos à margem do debate enxergaram nela um espelho de suas próprias convicções: o Estado como agente ativo do desenvolvimento, da infraestrutura e da redução das desigualdades. Um grupo de vinte pesquisadores reuniu essas reflexões no livro 'Bidenomics nos Trópicos', examinando se o Brasil poderia trilhar caminho semelhante. A pergunta que persiste, porém, não é apenas se os recursos existem, mas se há vontade política e capacidade institucional para empregá-los com sabedoria.
- A vitória de Biden reacendeu o debate desenvolvimentista no Brasil após cinco anos de ostracismo, oferecendo um modelo concreto de intervenção estatal em escala.
- Vinte economistas se uniram para escrever um livro que é, ao mesmo tempo, diagnóstico das carências brasileiras em saúde, educação e infraestrutura e manifesto por uma política industrial ousada.
- Os obstáculos são concretos e pesados: a dívida pública supera 80% do PIB, a reforma tributária enfrenta resistência feroz no Congresso e o ambiente econômico permanece instável.
- Uma reforma fiscal progressiva poderia gerar até 153 bilhões de reais, mas o sistema tributário brasileiro é muito mais complexo e politicamente refratário do que o americano.
- O livro evita confrontar o legado dos anos Dilma — justamente o período em que políticas desenvolvimentistas semelhantes contribuíram para a pior recessão da história recente do país.
- A questão central não é se o dinheiro pode ser encontrado em teoria, mas se o Estado brasileiro tem competência e integridade institucional para gastá-lo bem.
Quando Joe Biden começou a desdobrar sua agenda econômica trilionária, economistas desenvolvimentistas brasileiros — marginalizados desde o fim do governo Dilma Rousseff em 2016 — sentiram que suas ideias voltavam à cena. No modelo americano, eles reconheceram o argumento que sempre defenderam: o Estado deve coordenar investimentos, construir infraestrutura e combater a desigualdade, em vez de apostar que cortes de impostos para o capital produzirão prosperidade por gotejamento.
A agenda de Biden se desdobrou em três frentes: um pacote de US$ 1,9 trilhão para recuperação pós-pandemia, um plano de US$ 2 trilhões para infraestrutura e tecnologia ao longo de uma década, e US$ 1,8 trilhão em programas sociais financiados por impostos sobre corporações e altas rendas. O que chamou a atenção dos brasileiros foi menos a escala do que a filosofia: tributar os ricos para financiar bens públicos e reconstruir a capacidade industrial americana.
André Roncaglia, da Unifesp, e Nelson Barbosa, da FGV e ex-ministro de Dilma, reuniram vinte pesquisadores para escrever 'Bidenomics nos Trópicos'. O livro mapeia as lacunas crônicas do Brasil em saúde, educação, infraestrutura e inovação, sugerindo que um governo disposto a agir com a mesma ousadia poderia fechá-las. Mas suas seções mais honestas enfrentam os obstáculos reais.
Manoel Pires advertiu que confundir alívio fiscal temporário com expansão permanente seria um erro grave: a dívida pública já supera 80% do PIB. Rodrigo Orair estimou que uma reforma tributária progressiva poderia gerar até 153 bilhões de reais, mas Barbosa reconheceu que o sistema tributário brasileiro é muito mais complexo e politicamente resistente do que o americano — como ficou evidente quando a própria proposta de reforma do governo encontrou forte oposição no Congresso.
O livro tem uma lacuna significativa: trata com generosidade o desenvolvimentismo do regime militar dos anos 1970, mas ignora completamente os anos Dilma, quando erros de política econômica ajudaram a mergulhar o Brasil em sua pior recessão. Os autores depositam fé considerável na capacidade do Estado brasileiro de executar um programa à la Biden — mas oferecem pouco para convencer quem duvida que essa fé seja merecida. A pergunta que paira sobre o projeto inteiro não é se o dinheiro poderia existir em teoria, mas se há competência institucional e vontade política para gastá-lo com acerto.
When Joe Biden took office and began rolling out his trillion-dollar economic agenda, Brazilian economists who had spent five years in the wilderness suddenly saw daylight. The developmentalists—a school of thought that had fallen from favor when Dilma Rousseff's government ended in 2016—recognized in Biden's plans something they had been arguing for all along: that the state could and should lead the way in coordinating investment, building infrastructure, and narrowing inequality.
Biden's approach came in three waves. In March, Congress approved the first installment, a $1.9 trillion package aimed at helping families and small businesses recover from the pandemic's economic wreckage. The second piece, still being fought over, would commit $2 trillion to infrastructure and new technologies over the next decade. The third pillar, also contested, would spend $1.8 trillion on social programs and tax credits for families, paid for by raising taxes on corporations and high earners. What struck the Brazilian economists was not just the scale but the philosophy: instead of cutting taxes on capital and hoping prosperity would trickle down—the dominant American approach since the 1980s—Biden was taxing the wealthy to fund public goods and revive American industrial capacity to compete with China.
André Roncaglia, a professor at the Federal University of São Paulo, and Nelson Barbosa, an economist at the Getulio Vargas Foundation and former minister under Dilma, saw in Biden's victory a vindication of ideas they had long held. They assembled twenty colleagues from research institutions across Brazil to write a book called "Bidenomics in the Tropics," examining whether and how Brazil could pursue a similar strategy. The collection reads partly as a wish list: chapters on the country's chronic shortfalls in health, education, and infrastructure; on the struggles of Brazilian industry to stay competitive and reach the technological frontier; on the inadequacy of federal funding for research and innovation. The implication was clear—if only Brazil had a government willing to act as boldly as Biden, these gaps could be closed.
But the book's most valuable sections grapple with the obstacles that would actually stand in the way. Manoel Pires, an economist at the Brazilian Institute of Economics, acknowledged that there might be room to finance an ambitious investment plan by tapping the excess savings that accumulated during the pandemic, by restructuring the tax system, and by cutting inefficient programs. Yet he warned against confusing temporary fiscal relief with permanent expansion. Brazil's public debt already exceeds 80 percent of GDP, swollen by pandemic spending. The economic environment is too uncertain, he argued, to commit to long-term plans. "Even in countries that moved ahead with fiscal expansion," Pires said, "there are no packages that throw all the cost onto public debt."
Rodrigo Orair, from the Institute of Applied Economic Research, calculated that a reform raising corporate and income taxes on the wealthy and creating a new wealth tax could generate up to 153 billion reais—about 1.8 percent of GDP. But Nelson Barbosa noted in the book that Brazil's tax system is far more complex than America's, and the political obstacles are steeper. The government's own tax reform proposal this year ran into fierce congressional resistance.
What the collection does not adequately address is Brazil's actual track record with state-led industrial policy. One chapter treats the military government of Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979) quite generously, crediting its ambitious infrastructure and industrial programs with sustaining high growth rates and achieving strong productivity gains—a thesis other scholars dispute. The comparisons end in 2006, when Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva won reelection and began his most expansionary phase. They skip over the Dilma years entirely, when policy mistakes helped push Brazil into its worst recession on record, from which it has never fully recovered.
The book's authors are skeptical of conventional economic thinking and critical of the governments that followed Dilma. They seem to place considerable faith in the Brazilian state's capacity to execute a Biden-style program and make the right choices. But they offer little to convince those who doubt whether that faith is warranted. The question hanging over the entire project is not whether the money could theoretically be found, but whether the political will and institutional competence exist to spend it well.
Notable Quotes
Even in countries that moved ahead with fiscal expansion, there are no packages that throw all the cost onto public debt. You cannot confuse temporary relief from a more favorable economic situation with permanent possibilities for fiscal expansion.— Manoel Pires, economist at the Brazilian Institute of Economics
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why did Biden's spending plans excite Brazilian economists so much? It seems like just another government stimulus.
Because it represented a philosophical break. For forty years, the American consensus was that you cut taxes on the wealthy and capital, and growth would follow. Biden said no—tax the rich, fund public goods, rebuild industry. For developmentalists in Brazil, who'd been sidelined since 2016, this felt like vindication.
So they think Brazil should copy the model?
They think it's worth examining seriously. The book maps out where Brazil has real gaps—infrastructure, education, health, research funding. If you had the political will and the money, you could address them.
But there's a catch.
Several. Brazil's public debt is already over 80 percent of GDP. The tax system is a maze, and Congress fights any reform. And there's the historical question nobody wants to answer directly: the last time Brazil tried state-led industrial policy aggressively, under Dilma, it didn't end well.
So it's not really about the money?
It's partly about money. An economist calculated you could raise 153 billion reais through tax reform. But it's mostly about whether the state can actually execute the plan competently, and whether politicians will stick with it long enough for it to work.
What's the real obstacle?
Trust. The authors believe the state can do this. But they don't make a convincing case to skeptics. And given Brazil's recent history, skepticism is not unreasonable.