Cuban dance teacher coordinated Russian sabotage network across EU in 2024

At least nine people arrested and convicted; Luis Alfonso Murillo Diosa sentenced to six years in prison for attempted sabotage after being recruited under false pretenses.
In heaven, I am the chief.
A salsa song playing in the background as Romagoza taught a dance class in April 2026, months after being placed on an international wanted list.
Mark

So this Romagoza—he's a dance teacher. How does a dance teacher become a Russian intelligence operative?

Mimi

That's the thing. We don't know exactly when or how he came to work for Russian intelligence. The leaked financial data show he was in money trouble in 2023, borrowing from multiple lenders. A few months later, he's recruiting people for sabotage. The timing suggests desperation, but the actual recruitment moment is still a gap in what we know.

Luke

Right. And that matters because it changes how we think about him. Is he a true believer? A coerced asset? Someone who saw an opportunity to make money? The reporting can't answer that, and we shouldn't pretend it can.

Mark

What about the people he recruited? Were they all as naive as Murillo?

Mimi

Murillo thought he was getting to Ukraine to fight. But others in the network—we know at least nine were caught—the reporting doesn't give us individual details on most of them. Some may have known exactly what they were doing. Some may have been as confused as Murillo.

Luke

And that's important to flag. The narrative of "vulnerable people being exploited" is true for Murillo, but we're generalizing from one detailed case to a dozen others we don't actually know much about. The expert quote about vulnerable people is solid, but it's not confirmed for everyone in the network.

Mark

Why hasn't he been arrested?

Mimi

He's believed to still be in Russia. In April 2026, he posted a video of himself teaching at the dance studio. He's also continued joining Facebook groups for Latin Americans looking for work in Poland—so either he's still recruiting, or he's very confident about his safety.

Luke

Or both. The fact that he's openly teaching and posting videos while on an international wanted list tells you something about how much protection he has. But we don't know if that's because he's genuinely untouchable, or because European authorities haven't been able to locate him precisely, or some combination.

Mark

What's the larger pattern here?

Mimi

Russia lost a lot of its intelligence infrastructure in Europe after 2022. Instead of rebuilding it the traditional way, they're using what researchers call "disposable agents"—people with no prior intelligence ties, hired online, often not knowing who they really work for. It's cheaper, it's faster, and if they get caught, there's no obvious connection to Moscow.

Luke

Though I'd note: the pattern is confirmed for 2024, but we don't actually know if it's continuing at the same scale. The reporting mentions arrests in August—presumably 2025 or 2026—but we don't have a clear picture of whether this is still Romagoza's network or a separate operation using the same model.

  • A network of arson attacks struck Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, and Lithuania in 2024, targeting supply chains feeding Ukraine's war effort — coordinated entirely through social media by someone thousands of miles away.
  • Russia's expulsion of suspected spy-diplomats after 2022 created an operational vacuum that the Kremlin filled by recruiting economically desperate strangers online, people who often didn't know who was truly employing them or why.
  • Men like Luis Alfonso Murillo Diosa — a Colombian veteran scraping by on farm work and odd jobs — were lured with promises of easy European money, then handed satellite images and instructions to commit arson before being left to face justice alone.
  • At least nine recruits have been arrested across Europe, with sentences reaching eight years, while the alleged coordinator Oemis Romagoza Durruthy remains untouched in Russia, shielded by geography and citizenship.
  • As of April 2026, Romagoza was still posting in Facebook groups targeting Latin Americans seeking work in Poland — the recruitment pipeline apparently still open, the campaign apparently still running.

From a dance studio in northern Russia, a Cuban instructor appears to have woven a quiet web of sabotage across four European nations, recruiting economically desperate Latin Americans to set fire to the infrastructure sustaining Ukraine. The operation illuminates a deliberate shift in modern espionage: when diplomats are expelled and official channels close, intelligence services turn to the anonymous and the vulnerable, people who can be found, used, and discarded without leaving a visible thread back to the state. At least nine lives have been upended by prison sentences, while the man at the center of it all reportedly continues teaching salsa and posting job listings on Facebook.

In early 2024, an online figure calling himself 'Dios' began advertising photography work in Poland through Telegram and Facebook groups popular among Spanish speakers — $1,500 per operation, no questions asked. Behind the alias was what investigators believe to be a coordinated sabotage campaign run on behalf of Russian military intelligence, targeting infrastructure linked to Ukraine's defense across four EU countries.

One of those drawn in was Luis Alfonso Murillo Diosa, a 34-year-old Colombian army veteran who had spent years cycling through low-wage work. Searching a Facebook group for Latin Americans interested in fighting for Ukraine, he was privately approached by Dios, who offered something more appealing: special missions in Europe, all expenses covered. Murillo never met his recruiter. Dios booked his flights, arranged his housing, and sent him satellite images of a recycling facility and oil well in Romania with instructions to photograph them and set them alight. Murillo was arrested before he could act. He claimed he never intended to commit arson and didn't know who he was working for. In 2025, he was sentenced to six years in prison.

Murillo's story reflects a deliberate strategic shift. After EU governments expelled scores of Russian diplomats following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia's traditional espionage infrastructure was hollowed out. The response was to recruit 'disposable agents' — people found online, often economically desperate, sometimes unaware of their true employer. If caught, they leave no clean trail back to Moscow. In 2024 alone, such agents burned a shopping center in Poland, set fire to an Ikea in Lithuania, and directed an explosive drone toward a Ukrainian freight plane in Germany.

The man Lithuanian prosecutors placed on an international wanted list is Oemis Romagoza Durruthy, a Cuban national who has lived in Russia for at least seven years. He teaches Latin dance at a studio in Petrozavodsk, married a Russian woman in 2022, and appears to have faced financial difficulties in 2023. Shortly after, the alias Dios began appearing in the same Facebook groups Romagoza had joined — groups for Latin Americans seeking work in Poland or looking to join the fight in Ukraine.

At least nine of his alleged recruits have been arrested. Two are already serving sentences of six to eight years. Romagoza himself remains in Russia, beyond the reach of European courts. In April 2026, his dance studio posted a video of him leading a salsa class, his reflection moving in the mirror. Around the same time, he joined at least two more Facebook groups for Latin Americans looking for work in Poland.

In the spring of 2024, a man using the online alias "Dios"—Spanish for "God"—began posting job advertisements across Telegram and Facebook groups frequented by Spanish speakers. The listings were simple and direct: work as a photographer in Poland, $1,500 per operation plus bonuses, no questions asked. What followed was a coordinated campaign of arson attacks across four European Union countries, orchestrated remotely by someone operating from inside Russia on behalf of the country's military intelligence service.

Luis Alfonso Murillo Diosa was exactly the kind of person Dios was hunting for. The 34-year-old Colombian had spent six years in his country's army before drifting through a series of low-wage jobs—barista work, bodyguard stints, helping manage his family's struggling coffee farm in the mountainous region around Caicedo. In early 2024, looking for a way to earn real money, he joined a Facebook group for Latin Americans interested in fighting for Ukraine, where foreign soldiers could make several thousand euros monthly. That's where Dios found him. In a private message, Dios introduced himself as part of a "special group" and offered Murillo something better than Ukraine: special missions in Europe, with all expenses covered. Murillo agreed without ever meeting his recruiter in person.

Dios handled everything remotely—booking flights, arranging housing, organizing ground transport. When Murillo arrived in Bucharest in July 2024, Dios sent him a satellite image showing a recycling facility and an oil well, with instructions to photograph and film the locations before setting them on fire. Murillo was arrested while taking photos near the recycling facility one night. He later told investigators he had never intended to commit arson and didn't know who he was actually working for. In 2025, he was sentenced to six years in prison for attempted sabotage.

Murillo was one of at least a dozen people Dios recruited across Europe. These operatives are known in intelligence circles as "disposable agents"—people hired online, often with no prior connection to any intelligence service, sometimes unaware of who is actually employing them or what the true purpose of their work is. Russia has increasingly relied on this model since 2022, when EU governments expelled scores of Russian diplomats suspected of espionage and disinformation following the invasion of Ukraine. That expulsion created a gap in Russia's operational capacity, and the Kremlin found a way to fill it: recruit desperate people from anywhere, give them money, and let them do the work. If they get caught, there's no obvious trail back to Moscow. If they succeed, Russia gets to demonstrate its reach.

In 2024 alone, disposable agents burned down a shopping center in Poland, set fire to an Ikea store in Lithuania, and delivered incendiary packages to logistics hubs across multiple countries. German authorities said throwaway agents steered a drone carrying explosives toward a Ukrainian freight plane in Leipzig in August. Over four months in 2024, Dios instructed his network to target two construction-supply businesses in Poland, a bus garage in the Czech Republic, a recycling facility in Romania, and equipment destined for Ukraine at a Lithuanian manufacturing company. Only Lithuanian prosecutors publicly attributed the attacks to Russia's GRU, the military intelligence service, and they placed a Cuban man living in Russia on an international wanted list.

That man is Oemis Romagoza Durruthy. Born in Camaguey, Cuba's third-largest city, Romagoza has lived in Russia for at least seven years. He works as a Latin dance instructor in Petrozavodsk, a city in northern Russia, and is listed as a contact person for a local dance studio called Made in Cuba. Videos of his classes show him teaching salsa, bachata, and kizomba to groups of students. In 2022, he married a Russian woman and obtained Russian citizenship. Wedding photos show the couple posing beside a grand piano, later pictures show them with their two children. Leaked financial data suggest Romagoza faced money troubles in 2023, when he borrowed from several credit lenders and listed a supermarket chain as his employer. A few months later, he joined Facebook groups for Latin Americans seeking work in Poland or looking to fight in Ukraine. Around the same time, Dios began posting his job advertisements.

It remains unclear whether Romagoza continued recruiting or directing attacks after September 2024, but Russia's sabotage campaign across Europe has not slowed. In August alone, Estonia arrested two suspects for arson targeting a company supplying unmanned military vehicles to Ukraine, and Poland reported fires at two facilities manufacturing drone and helicopter components. At least nine of the people Romagoza recruited have been arrested. Two are serving sentences of six to eight years. Others await trial. European authorities are still searching for Romagoza, who may still be in Russia. In April 2026, the Made in Cuba dance studio posted a video of him teaching a salsa class, facing the mirror as a group of women followed his steps. In the background, a Cuban salsa tune played: "Because that is what I am. In heaven, I am the chief." Around the same time, Romagoza joined at least two more Facebook groups for Latin Americans looking for work in Poland.

It's often vulnerable people who are being targeted—vulnerable people who need money and are willing to travel for money and are willing to not ask many questions about the purpose of what they're carrying out.
— Daniela Richterova, associate professor in Intelligence Studies at King's College London
Russia doesn't have to be particularly careful about covering its tracks, because there is no downside to being detected. And, of course, it boosts the idea that Russia wants to project that it is omnipotent, that it can cause damage wherever.
— Keir Giles, conflict researcher
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