Iraqi operative accused of orchestrating European terror campaign against Jewish targets

Mohammad Baqer Saad Dawood al-Saadi stood in a Manhattan courtroom on a Monday morning, shackled and wearing beige prison overalls, his appearance disheveled after months in custody. The 32-year-old Iraqi pleaded not guilty to terrorism charges, then turned to address the judge and prosecutors directly. "I'm a prisoner of war. I'm not a threat," he said, his voice carrying a different grievance. "Children and women are being killed by your rockets." Then he was led away, facing the prospect of life imprisonment.

What brought al-Saadi to that courtroom was an operation of stunning scope and coordination—one that would reshape how Western security services think about modern terrorism. Between early March and the end of April 2026, eighteen attacks struck Jewish targets across Europe. A bomb detonated outside a synagogue in Liège, Belgium. Attacks followed on synagogues in Rotterdam and a Jewish school in Amsterdam, where another device targeted a Bank of New York Mellon branch. In London, three people captured on CCTV set fire to four ambulances belonging to a Jewish charity in north London. Most of the targets were schools or places of worship, with the UK bearing particular weight. No one died, but the campaign flooded Jewish communities already experiencing heightened hostility with a new, coordinated terror.

The attacks came with a signature. Within hours—sometimes minutes—a previously unknown organization called Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia, or HAYI, claimed responsibility on Telegram and other platforms. Media outlets speculated about a new militant Islamist network, invoking comparisons to Islamic State or al-Qaida. Court documents and investigative work revealed the truth: HAYI was one man. Al-Saadi ran the entire campaign from an office in Baghdad, orchestrating attacks across a continent through social media and a network of expendable operatives.

Al-Saadi's path to this role began years earlier. Recruited into a Shia militia in his early 20s—a force created by Tehran after the 2003 US invasion—he rose through connections and ambition. He was deployed to Syria when Iran sent militia forces to prop up Bashar al-Assad's regime. He fought against Islamic State in Iraq alongside his comrades. Social media posts suggested his activities included assassination, abduction, and weapons sourcing. But what distinguished him was access: he had excellent connections with senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps officials, particularly with Qassem Soleimani, the almost legendary founder of the IRGC's Quds Force, which handles overseas operations. According to one investigator, al-Saadi was present when Soleimani was killed by a US drone strike in Iraq in 2020 and cradled his dying mentor's body. Enemies dismissed him as Soleimani's "brat," but the relationship gave him standing.

Over subsequent years, al-Saadi became a figure of contradictions—simultaneously operating in shadow networks and broadcasting his life online. He posted selfies from Paris and Malaysia. His Iraqi government service passport showed a trip to Spain in August 2023. He received a twelve-month Italian visa granting access to the entire Schengen zone, though it was later cancelled after he claimed to have been refused entry to Italy. Images placed him at an official Iranian government stand at a major arms fair in Moscow, possibly in 2024. He managed Telegram channels pumping out propaganda for Iran-backed militia. He was deeply active on his own social media accounts, usually under his own name. "He's in his 30s, in the Middle East, and so he's living his life online," said Phillip Smyth, an independent analyst specializing in Iraqi Shia militia. "But you can operate in and out of the shadows and that can be very effective."

When war between the US, Israel, and Iran erupted, al-Saadi traveled to Tehran in late January and met Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader at that time. Whether he received explicit instructions or was kept deliberately at arm's length to provide Iran with plausible deniability remains unclear. Both scenarios fit Iran's historical pattern of using proxies to execute strategic tasks overseas that its own security services prefer not to undertake directly. On March 7, trigger messages appeared on Telegram and Snapchat channels associated with Iran-backed militia in Iraq. They called on "Shadow Soldiers" and gave what appeared to be coded instructions to terrorist networks in Europe. Fifty-two hours later, the first bomb exploded.

The operatives who carried out the attacks were largely disposable. Dozens faced lengthy prison sentences across the UK, France, and Belgium. Many were minors, often with histories of low-level criminal involvement—drug couriers or petty offenders. They were recruited on social media, offered as little as 300 euros for tasks that seemed straightforward if illegal. Some appear to have had little understanding of what they were actually targeting or the consequences of capture. A lawyer representing a 17-year-old arrested for firebombing a car on the edge of a Jewish neighborhood in Antwerp said her client and an alleged accomplice believed the attack was connected to crime and drugs. "Whoever gave them the job knew they would be arrested within 15 minutes," the lawyer said. "They are being used. They are completely replaceable. It is just a way of destabilising a community."

Al-Saadi's operation unraveled in late April. On April 29, he was detained in a hotel in Istanbul by Turkish security services. Just before disappearing into an underground prison, he managed to post a short video calling on his family to "remain steadfast." Two weeks later, he was flown to the United States, where authorities revealed he had been seeking help with attacks on Jewish communities in America and had discussed targeting Ivanka Trump. His primary contact in the US, whom he believed to be a Mexican drug cartel member, was an FBI agent. There have been no new attacks since his arrest. Analysts believe Tehran will view the operation as a strategic success despite its exposure, and will be deeply concerned about what their detained operative might reveal under interrogation.