Collymore: England should stick with Mings over returning Maguire vs Czech Republic

Harry Maguire was on the verge of returning to action for England at Euro 2020, and the timing of his availability for the match against Czech Republic on Tuesday at Wembley raised a straightforward question: should Gareth Southgate bring him straight back into the starting lineup, or stick with the defender who had been performing well in his absence?

Stan Collymore made the case for continuity. Tyrone Mings, paired with John Stones, had not conceded a goal across England's opening two tournament matches and the two warm-up friendlies beforehand. More than that, Mings had been England's most consistent performer in those four games—a player who showed up, did his job, and did it well. Maguire, by contrast, had been sidelined for six weeks. Coming back from that kind of layoff in the middle of summer, facing a striker in the form of Patrik Schick who had already scored three goals in two games, presented a particular vulnerability. A player returning from injury, Collymore reasoned, would tire noticeably as a match wore on, especially in warm conditions. That fatigue could be exploited.

The columnist acknowledged what Southgate might be thinking. The England manager had a track record of trusting experience in big moments, and Maguire represented exactly that—a reliable, solid Manchester United defender who had proven himself at the highest level. A back four of Kyle Walker, Maguire, Stones, and Kieran Trippier, with Jordan Henderson anchoring in front, would be the safe choice. All of them were dependable, rarely let their team down, and carried the weight of proven pedigree. For a pragmatist like Southgate, that kind of experience could feel like the right call when the stakes were high.

But Collymore pushed back against the logic of simply restoring the familiar. He noted that some Liverpool supporters had been making noise about bringing Henderson into the midfield to add composure and control. It was a fair question, he conceded. Yet his counterargument was sharper: England's problem wasn't defense. The team wasn't leaking goals. The real issue was the opposite—a shortage of attacking ideas, a failure to create the kinds of chances that could break open a match. Bringing back Maguire or Henderson, he suggested, would be treating symptoms rather than addressing the disease.

Instead, Collymore laid out a different vision. He wanted to see England play a 4-1-4-1 formation with Kalvin Phillips as the holding midfielder, flanked by Jadon Sancho, Mason Mount, Phil Foden, and Jack Grealish in a line ahead of him, with Harry Kane leading the line. The conventional wisdom held that players like Henderson, Declan Rice, or Phillips were the only ones capable of controlling the tempo and keeping possession. Collymore rejected that. Foden, he argued, was every bit as capable of manipulating the ball and maintaining shape as any of those midfielders. Both Foden and Mount could operate as orthodox midfielders, dropping back to defend when needed, while simultaneously adding the kind of creative spark that England had been missing. Sancho and Grealish on the wings would stretch the field further.

The final piece was Kane himself. Southgate would need to instruct his captain to operate within the width of the penalty box and play like the 30-goal-a-season striker he was, rather than the hybrid number nine-and-a-half or number ten he had become at Tottenham. If that shift happened, if Kane could find the net once, the goals would follow. Then, Collymore suggested, England could start thinking seriously about the knockout stages. Without that kind of attacking transformation, he concluded, the tournament's later rounds would remain out of reach.