It was terror, killing for intimidation and pleasure
Na véspera de Natal, dez meses após o início da invasão russa, um ataque atingiu o centro de Kherson — uma cidade sem instalações militares, apenas com pessoas vivendo o seu dia. Cinco morreram, trinta e cinco ficaram feridos, e o presidente Zelensky nomeou o que muitos já sentiam: aquilo não era guerra segundo qualquer regra reconhecível, era terror. O ataque insere-se numa longa tradição de violência dirigida não aos exércitos, mas à vontade dos povos de resistir.
- Um ataque russo no centro de Kherson na manhã de Natal matou cinco civis e feriu trinta e cinco, dezasseis deles em estado crítico — sem qualquer alvo militar nas proximidades.
- O presidente Zelensky reagiu em horas, classificando o bombardeamento como um ato deliberado de terror destinado a intimidar e quebrar a população civil, não a alcançar objetivos militares.
- O ataque coincidiu com o décimo aniversário da invasão em grande escala, sublinhando que a guerra entrou numa fase de desgaste sistemático contra infraestruturas e zonas habitadas.
- Mais de catorze milhões de ucranianos foram deslocados desde fevereiro, e 17,7 milhões necessitam agora de ajuda humanitária — números que a ONU considera a pior crise de refugiados na Europa desde a Segunda Guerra Mundial.
- As sanções internacionais e o envio de armas continuam, mas para quem foi retirado dos escombros em Kherson nessa manhã de feriado, as respostas políticas distantes chegam tarde demais.
Na véspera de Natal, dez meses depois do início da invasão, um ataque russo varreu o centro de Kherson. Cinco pessoas morreram e trinta e cinco ficaram feridas — dezasseis em estado crítico, segundo Kyrylo Tymoshenko, vice-chefe do gabinete presidencial ucraniano. O bairro atingido era civil: sem depósitos de armas, sem instalações estratégicas. Apenas uma cidade num dia de feriado.
O presidente Zelensky respondeu horas depois, no Telegram, traçando uma distinção precisa: aquilo não era uma operação militar. Era terror — um ataque calculado para matar pelo medo, para dobrar a vontade de pessoas comuns através do horror. A data não era acidental: o dia 24 de dezembro marcava exatamente dez meses desde o início da invasão em grande escala, a 24 de fevereiro.
Nesses trezentos dias, mais de catorze milhões de ucranianos tinham sido deslocados — seis milhões e meio dentro do próprio país, quase oito milhões refugiados na Europa. A ONU classificou-o como a pior crise de refugiados no continente desde o fim da Segunda Guerra Mundial. No final de dezembro, 17,7 milhões de ucranianos necessitavam de alguma forma de assistência humanitária, sendo que 9,3 milhões precisavam de ajuda com alimentos e abrigo.
O ataque a Kherson confirmava um padrão que tinha definido a segunda fase da guerra: bombardeamentos sobre zonas civis e infraestruturas, uma estratégia de desgaste dirigida não à capacidade militar ucraniana, mas à disposição de um povo inteiro para continuar a resistir. Ao entrar no décimo primeiro mês, essa estratégia não mostrava sinais de mudança.
On Christmas Eve, ten months into the war, a Russian strike tore through the center of Kherson, killing at least five people and leaving thirty-five others wounded. Among the injured, sixteen were in critical condition, according to Kyrylo Tymoshenko, the deputy chief of the Ukrainian president's office. The attack landed on a Saturday morning in a civilian neighborhood—no military targets, no weapons depots, no strategic installations. Just a city center on a holiday.
President Volodymyr Zelensky responded within hours, posting on Telegram that what had happened was not war by any recognizable rules. It was terror. He described it as killing for intimidation and pleasure, a deliberate strike on ordinary people going about their lives on the eve of Christmas. The distinction Zelensky drew was precise: this was not a military operation. It was an act designed to break the will of civilians through fear.
The timing was not accidental. December 24th marked ten months since Russia launched its full-scale invasion on February 24th. In those three hundred days, the conflict had already displaced more than fourteen million Ukrainians—six and a half million internally displaced within their own country, and more than seven point eight million who had fled across borders into Europe. The United Nations, which tracks such things, called it the worst refugee crisis Europe had seen since the end of World War II.
The humanitarian toll had grown staggering. As of late December, seventeen point seven million Ukrainians needed some form of humanitarian assistance. Nine point three million of them required help with food and shelter—the most basic needs. These were not abstract statistics. They represented families separated, homes destroyed, livelihoods erased. They represented people like those in Kherson's city center on Christmas Eve, going about an ordinary morning that turned catastrophic.
Russia's stated justification for the invasion—that it needed to "denazify" Ukraine and disarm it for Russian security—had been rejected by most of the world. The international community had responded by sending weapons to Ukraine and imposing waves of political and economic sanctions on Russia. But on the ground in Kherson, those distant policy responses meant little to the people being carried out of rubble on a holiday morning.
The attack underscored a pattern that had defined the war's second phase: strikes on civilian areas, on infrastructure, on places where people lived rather than fought. It was a strategy of attrition aimed not just at military capacity but at the ability and willingness of ordinary Ukrainians to endure. As the war entered its eleventh month, that strategy showed no signs of changing.
Notable Quotes
This is not a war according to the rules. It is terror, it is killing for intimidation and pleasure.— President Volodymyr Zelensky, on the Kherson attack
As a result of Russian terror, so far 35 people have been wounded, 16 of them in serious condition.— Kyrylo Tymoshenko, deputy chief of the Ukrainian president's office
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why does Zelensky specifically call this terror rather than just another military strike?
Because the target wasn't military. It was a city center on Christmas Eve. There's a difference between hitting a weapons factory and hitting people buying bread. Zelensky is saying Russia knows the difference and chose this anyway.
Do we know if this was a deliberate targeting of civilians, or could it have been a stray missile?
The source doesn't say. But Zelensky's point stands either way—whether intentional or reckless, the result is the same. Thirty-five people wounded, five dead, in a place with no military value. That's the fact that matters.
The numbers about displacement are staggering. Fourteen million people. Does that change how we should understand this single attack?
It contextualizes it. This isn't an isolated incident. It's one strike in a ten-month pattern of strikes on civilian areas. Fourteen million displaced means the war has already broken the country's ability to function normally. This attack in Kherson is just the latest wound on a body already hemorrhaging.
Why mention Christmas Eve specifically? Is that just timing, or does it matter?
It matters because it's deliberate. Striking a city center on a holiday when civilians are out, when people's guard is down—that's not accident. That's choice. Zelensky's saying Russia is choosing when and where to maximize civilian harm.
What comes next for Kherson?
The city will keep being struck. It's been under Russian control and Ukrainian control multiple times. The pattern suggests this won't be the last attack. The real question is whether Ukraine can sustain this—whether those seventeen million people needing aid can hold on long enough for something to change.