China's Foreign Minister Visits Cambodia Amid Concerns Over Military Projects

Wang Yi stepped off the plane in Phnom Penh on a Sunday in late April, the latest in a series of high-level visits that underscores just how tightly China has woven itself into Cambodia's political and economic fabric. The Chinese Foreign Minister was there for three days, the final stop on a regional tour that had already taken him through Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. His purpose was straightforward: to reaffirm the bond between Beijing and what amounts to its closest ally in Southeast Asia.

But the timing of his arrival carried weight. Two major infrastructure projects funded by Chinese money were drawing scrutiny from Washington and neighboring capitals—a massive canal project and a naval facility on the Gulf of Thailand—both raising questions about whether they served purposes beyond the economic development Cambodia's government claimed. Wang's visit was a show of solidarity at a moment when that solidarity was being tested by international skepticism.

The depth of China's grip on Cambodia is difficult to overstate. More than forty percent of Cambodia's ten billion dollars in foreign debt belongs to Beijing. Chinese money has built airports and roads, funded hotels and casinos, reshaped the country's physical landscape. Prime Minister Hun Manet, who took office last year after his father Hun Sen stepped down following thirty-eight years in power, had already signaled he would not break from the pro-Beijing orientation that defined his father's tenure. Wang had visited just eight months earlier, days after Hun Sen announced his succession plan. Now he was back, meeting not only with the new prime minister but also with Hun Sen himself, now serving as president of the Senate, and with King Norodom Sihamoni.

The Funan Techo Canal was the more visible of the two projects drawing concern. At one point seven billion dollars and stretching one hundred eighty kilometers across four southern provinces, it would connect Phnom Penh to the Gulf of Thailand. Vietnam worried aloud about the implications. Scholars there speculated that a waterway one hundred meters wide and five point four meters deep could provide a convenient corridor for Chinese military forces to move southward, positioning them closer to Vietnam's own coast. The history between Vietnam and China was not one that invited trust—Beijing had invaded in nineteen seventy-nine, and the two nations remained locked in disputes over maritime territory in the South China Sea. Hun Manet, speaking to officials and villagers in Takeo province, dismissed these concerns and pledged to move forward. The project, he insisted, would benefit Cambodia enormously.

The United States had also raised its voice. A spokesperson from the American Embassy in Phnom Penh told Voice of America that transparency would serve everyone—the Cambodian people, neighboring countries, and the broader region—particularly given the potential implications for water management, agriculture, and regional security. The message was diplomatic but clear: Washington wanted to know what was really happening.

The second project was harder to pin down but perhaps more strategically significant. The Ream Naval Base sat on the Gulf of Thailand, adjacent to the South China Sea, where China had asserted claims to nearly the entire waterway. In twenty nineteen, the Wall Street Journal had reported on an early draft agreement that would have given China thirty years of use, permission to station military personnel, store weapons, and berth warships. Hun Sen had denied this repeatedly, citing Cambodia's constitution, which prohibits foreign military bases. He said visiting ships from all nations were welcome. Yet in December, two Chinese naval vessels became the first ships to dock at a new pier at the base, arriving during an official visit by China's top defense official. The symbolism was difficult to miss.

Wang Yi's three-day visit was, in one sense, routine diplomacy between close partners. In another sense, it was a statement: China was not backing away from its investments in Cambodia, not retreating from its strategic positioning in Southeast Asia, not yielding to Western pressure for restraint or transparency. Hun Manet had shown every indication he would follow his father's path. The question now was whether the international community would accept that choice, or whether the pressure on these two projects would only intensify.