CDU's Volkmann: Ukraine aid is strategic investment, not charity

Johannes Volkmann, 29, sits in the Bundestag as one of Germany's youngest parliamentarians and carries a name that carries weight in his country's postwar history—he is the grandson of former Chancellor Helmut Kohl. But his political identity is his own. He has made Ukraine his signature cause, first as head of the Lahn-Dill district council in Hesse, where he established a municipal partnership with Brovary, a city near Kyiv, to send supplies to civilians in need. Now, as a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and part of United4Ukraine, an international network of lawmakers committed to supporting the country, he continues to press the case for sustained German backing.

When Volkmann returned from Ukraine recently—a year after his previous visit—he found the situation grimmer. Airstrikes had intensified. The threat to ordinary people had grown. Yet he also witnessed something that moved him: Ukrainians determined to hold their ground. "Ukraine is demonstrating that freedom and democracy can defend themselves and fight back," he said. This matters because Germany, as Europe's largest bilateral donor to Ukraine, carries outsized influence in the continent's response. But that support faces growing domestic opposition. Parties on the far right, and their voters, have begun to frame aid to Ukraine as wasteful spending—money that should stay home.

Volkmann's answer to this argument is blunt: Ukraine's defense is Europe's defense. "Every euro we invest in Ukraine today is a good investment in our own security," he said. The logic is straightforward. Russian imperialism threatens not just Ukraine's borders but those of NATO members in the Baltic states and Poland. Beyond that, Ukraine has become a provider of security knowledge itself. Ukrainian forces have accumulated battlefield experience with modern drones, advanced tactics, and technologies that European armies are now learning from. The relationship is no longer one-directional charity; it is mutual strategic interest.

The political threat to this consensus is real. The Alternative for Germany, the AfD, currently leads in polling and has called for an end to German military support for Ukraine. Many Ukrainians watch this rise with alarm, wondering what a German government that includes the AfD would mean for their country's survival. Volkmann understands the fear. He is clear that his own party, the CDU/CSU, will not cooperate with the AfD—and Ukraine policy is a central reason why. The Bundestag was elected to serve until 2029, which provides some continuity, but the trajectory is unsettling.

There is also a harder calculation beneath the security argument. If Russia's invasion succeeds and millions of Ukrainians flee their homeland, they will not accept Russian rule. They will come to Europe. The financial and social burden of absorbing that displacement would dwarf the cost of supporting Ukraine's defense now. "That would place a much greater financial burden on us than supporting Ukrainians today in their defense of their homeland," Volkmann said. It is a pragmatic frame: help Ukraine fight, or prepare to absorb the consequences.

On the question of whether Russia poses a genuine military threat to NATO, Volkmann points to a different danger. Russia's attacks on Europe are not primarily about military conquest but about political objectives—fracturing EU and NATO cohesion. The Kremlin might use nuclear threats to test whether NATO's Article 5 solidarity clause actually means anything, perhaps by occupying parts of the Baltic region. This is why deterrence matters. "We can only protect peace through our own strength; weakness will be seen as an invitation to attack." It is a doctrine as old as the Cold War, and Volkmann believes it remains the only language Moscow understands.

Germany's own history with Ukraine policy haunts this conversation. At the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, Germany opposed granting Ukraine a Membership Action Plan—a step toward eventual NATO accession. The German government believed that economic interdependence, particularly through gas pipelines like Nord Stream, would create mutual dependencies that would prevent violence. It was wrong. "The hypothesis put forward by the German government at the time has turned out to have been wrong," Volkmann acknowledged. Germany also failed to listen to its eastern neighbors, Poland and the Baltic states, who understood Russia far better because they had lived under its shadow. That was a mistake born of Western complacency.

On the question of Ukraine's path to the European Union, Volkmann is more cautious. Chancellor Friedrich Merz has ruled out accelerated admission. Volkmann agrees that rushing the process would serve neither Ukraine nor the EU. The bloc requires 35 negotiating chapters to be completed; Ukraine is not ready in all of them. But he is also clear that the goal is not to hold Ukraine back indefinitely. "Once certain milestones are met, the process of European integration will move forward." Ukraine is fighting to be a European country, and that aspiration deserves support—just not at the cost of compromising the EU's foundational standards. The path forward exists; it simply cannot be rushed.

Corruption within Ukraine's government, including in President Zelenskyy's circle, worries Volkmann deeply. Such scandals threaten international support. But he argues that exposing corruption is better than hiding it. Investigations must be thorough, consequences real, and compromises forbidden. Ukrainian civil society, journalists, and opposition figures must keep watch. European and Ukrainian funds must be accounted for. This is not a reason to withdraw support; it is a reason to demand accountability.

As for peace negotiations with Russia, Volkmann sees no opening. The Kremlin insists on Ukraine's surrender—its maximum demands amount to capitulation. Some German political forces, including the AfD and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance, have called for talks with Moscow. But there is no sign the Kremlin wants peace. "Such a desire for peace will only emerge when Putin recognizes the futility of his efforts for military conquest." That recognition will come only through sustained military, financial, and civil support for Ukraine, and through a clear message that Europe will not abandon the country in 2027 or 2028. "We stand with Ukraine—today and tomorrow," Volkmann said. The statement is simple. Whether Germany's political landscape will allow it to remain true is the question that hangs over everything.