Canada Must Accelerate Digital Trade Pact Membership to Shape Global Rules

What starts small can become global and enormously influential.
The authors argue that DEPA, despite its modest origins, could reshape how the world governs digital commerce.
Mark

So DEPA is basically a trade agreement for the digital economy. Why does it matter that Canada joins now rather than later?

Mimi

Because the rules are still being written. Right now, the conversation about how data flows, how intellectual property gets protected, how algorithms are regulated—that's still being shaped. If Canada waits, the major powers will have already decided.

Luke

But who actually has power in DEPA? Is it really a forum where smaller countries get heard, or does it just feel that way?

Mimi

That's the point—it was launched by Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore, not by the US or EU or China. So structurally, it's designed to give smaller economies a seat at the table before the big players dominate.

Mark

And Canada's already agreed to most of this stuff through the CPTPP, so joining is not a huge lift?

Mimi

Exactly. The provisions are already in Canadian law. It's more about being part of the conversation going forward.

Luke

The article mentions that most digital regulation is happening outside trade negotiations. So even if Canada joins DEPA, won't the real power still be elsewhere—in regulatory agencies, in national laws?

Mimi

That's true, and that's why the authors say Canada should push for something broader. DEPA is important, but there needs to be a forum that brings together trade rules and regulatory standards and technical standards all in one place.

Mark

So the risk is that Canada ends up with trade commitments that conflict with its own regulations?

Mimi

Or vice versa—regulations that undermine the benefits of the trade deal. Right now those conversations are happening in silos.

Luke

Has Canada actually been consulted on what DEPA should look like, or is it just asking to join something already mostly finished?

Mimi

Consultations started in early 2021, but they stalled. That's why the urgency—if Canada doesn't move now, it could end up in the same position it was in with the CPTPP, joining after the key decisions were made.

Mark

And if DEPA becomes the template for a WTO-level agreement, Canada would want to have shaped that template?

Mimi

Exactly. This is about positioning for the next decade of digital trade rules.

  • China's interest in joining DEPA has sharpened the urgency — once major powers set the terms, smaller nations lose their window to influence the framework.
  • Canada signaled interest in DEPA over a year before this moment, yet the file stalled, leaving the country on the sidelines of a conversation it helped make possible through the CPTPP.
  • The real friction is not technical but political: unresolved questions about data ownership, algorithmic power, and who captures the wealth of the digital economy remain deeply contested.
  • Because most digital regulation is being written outside trade forums entirely, the risk grows that trade commitments and domestic policy will pull against each other rather than reinforce one another.
  • Canada's existing CPTPP obligations already mirror most DEPA provisions, making accession unusually straightforward — the barrier is political will, not policy distance.
  • Early membership could position Canada to influence a potential WTO-level digital trade agreement; delay risks repeating the costly mistake of arriving after the foundational decisions have already been made.

In the early 2020s, as global commerce migrated irreversibly into digital space, a quiet agreement born among three smaller nations — Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore — offered something rare: a chance to write the rules of digital trade before the great powers claimed that privilege for themselves. Canada, already aligned with most of the agreement's provisions through existing Pacific commitments, found itself at a crossroads familiar to latecomers in history — close enough to act, but not yet acting. The deeper question was not whether Canada belonged in this conversation, but whether it would arrive in time to help shape it.

Three years before this moment, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore quietly launched the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement — a framework designed to govern something traditional trade deals had largely ignored: commerce that happens entirely online, data moving across borders, and the trust infrastructure that makes digital systems function. By early 2022, the agreement was drawing serious attention, with major economies including China signaling interest. Canada had expressed its own interest more than a year earlier, but the file had gone nowhere. The case for moving faster had become urgent.

What made DEPA significant was not its origins but its ambition. The old trade frameworks, even those with digital chapters added on, were built for an economy of physical goods. DEPA was designed from the ground up for an economy where value flows from data and intangible assets. It addressed seamless digital trade, trusted cross-border data flows, and confidence in digital systems themselves — going further than any bilateral digital agreement had managed.

The harder problem was never technical. The scaffolding of e-commerce — domain names, electronic signatures, the legal architecture of online commerce — had been solved decades ago. What remained unsettled was how to divide the wealth that digital technologies generate. Data ownership, intellectual property, algorithmic bias, privacy, and national security had no agreed answers, and until now that conversation had been dominated by the largest states and the biggest corporations. Smaller countries had barely been heard.

This was precisely why DEPA's origins mattered. It was not launched by the United States, the European Union, or China — the three powers most likely to write rules in their own interest. It came from three modest economies, making it a rare opportunity for smaller nations to shape the framework before the major players locked in their preferences. If DEPA became the template for a broader digital trade agreement, possibly at the WTO level, early membership was not a luxury but a necessity.

Canada's position was unusually favorable. Most of DEPA's provisions were already in force domestically through the CPTPP, making accession relatively straightforward. Canada had also learned a painful lesson from joining the CPTPP late, after the major decisions had been made by others. Repeating that mistake in the digital domain — where the stakes were arguably higher — was a risk the country could not afford. Consultations had begun in early 2021 and stalled. Accelerating them was overdue.

There was a broader structural argument as well. Most digital regulation was being written not in trade negotiations but in technical and regulatory forums with no connection to trade agreements — yet those regulations could reshape the balance of benefits in trade deals, just as trade commitments could constrain domestic policy. The world needed a forum capable of bringing trade rules, regulatory standards, and technical frameworks into alignment. DEPA could become that forum, or at least the seed from which one grew. The window for Canada to help shape that future was open, but not indefinitely.

Three years ago, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore launched an agreement that barely registered on the international radar. The Digital Economy Partnership Agreement was designed to tackle a problem that traditional trade deals had largely ignored: how to govern commerce that happens entirely online, how to move data across borders safely, and how to build systems people could actually trust. By early 2022, the agreement was beginning to attract serious attention. Countries were lining up to join—including China. Canada had signaled interest more than a year earlier, but the file had stalled. The case for moving faster had just become urgent.

The DEPA addresses something fundamental about how the world economy actually works now. A growing share of global commerce either happens digitally or depends on digital platforms to function. The old trade frameworks, even the ones with digital chapters bolted on, were not built for an economy where value flows from data and intangible assets rather than from shipping physical goods. DEPA was designed from the ground up to handle three things: making digital trade seamless from end to end, enabling data to move across borders in trusted ways, and building confidence in the digital systems themselves. It went well beyond what bilateral digital economy agreements between individual countries had managed to achieve.

The real difficulty was not technical. The internet's foundational architecture—domain names, electronic signatures, the legal and technical scaffolding that made e-commerce possible—had been worked out decades ago. The trillion-dollar e-commerce system that emerged from the World Wide Web's launch in 1990 proved that the world could solve those problems. What remained unsolved, and what made the conversation genuinely hard, was how to divide the wealth that digital technologies generate. Questions about data ownership, intellectual property capture, algorithmic bias, privacy, competition, and national security had no settled answers. And until now, that conversation had been dominated by the largest states and the biggest multinational corporations. Smaller countries had barely been heard.

This was where DEPA's origins mattered. It was not launched by the United States, the European Union, or China—the three powers most likely to write rules in their own interest. It came from three countries with relatively modest economies. That made it something rare: a chance for smaller nations to help shape the framework before the major players locked in their preferences. If DEPA eventually became the template for a much larger digital trade agreement, possibly even at the WTO level, then getting in early was not a luxury. It was essential.

Canada's position was particularly strong. The country had already committed to most of DEPA's provisions through the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the CPTPP. Joining would mean agreeing to rules already in force domestically. More importantly, Canada had learned a hard lesson from joining the CPTPP late in the process, after the major issues had already been settled by others. The same mistake could not be repeated. Consultations for DEPA membership had begun in early 2021 but had gone nowhere. Accelerating them was not just advisable—it was overdue.

There was another layer to consider. Most of the actual regulation of the digital economy was happening outside trade negotiations entirely. Standards, laws, and policies were being written in regulatory forums that had nothing to do with trade agreements. But those regulations could reshape the balance of benefits in trade deals, just as trade commitments could constrain what governments could do in other areas. The world needed a new kind of forum that could bring all that work together—trade rules, regulatory standards, technical standards, and policy frameworks—and make sure they reinforced each other rather than pulling in different directions. DEPA could be that forum, or it could be the seed from which such a forum grew.

The skeptics might point out that DEPA was created by three small economies and wonder why Canada should rush to join something so modest in origin. But those three countries had also helped create what became the CPTPP. What starts small can become global and enormously influential. Canada had the chance to be part of that from the beginning, to help shape the rules that would govern digital commerce for decades. The window for that kind of influence was closing. It was time to move.

DEPA presents a precious opportunity to catalyze a community that can weigh in on the framing of rules that will meet the needs of countries not among the major—and self-interested—jurisdictions, namely the United States, the European Union and China.
— Robert Fay and Dan Ciuriak, Centre for International Governance Innovation
Contattaci Domande frequenti