Cambodia Defends Maritime Conciliation, Urges Thailand to Implement Border Agreements

Over 20,000 Cambodian civilians remain displaced and unable to return home due to continued military occupation and obstruction.
Rebuilding trust is not merely desirable; it is essential
Cambodia's foreign minister on the damage the conflict inflicted on bilateral relations and what both countries must do to move forward.
Mark

Why did Cambodia choose to go to the UN conciliation process instead of just negotiating directly with Thailand?

Mimi

Thailand had terminated the 2001 maritime agreement in May, which was the only bilateral framework they had for addressing sea disputes. Once that was gone, Cambodia saw the UNCLOS process as the only formal mechanism available to them.

Luke

But we should note that Thailand says it's participating in good faith. The disagreement is really about whether this formal process helps or hurts the chance of rebuilding trust.

Mark

What about those 20,000 displaced people? How long have they been unable to go home?

Mimi

The source doesn't specify exactly when they were displaced, only that they remain unable to return because of what Cambodia describes as military occupation and obstruction of the territory.

Luke

Right—and that's Cambodia's characterization. We don't have Thailand's account of what's happening in that territory or why they say people can't return. That's a significant gap.

Mark

Both countries mentioned online scams. Is that actually a real problem between them, or just diplomatic window dressing?

Mimi

Sokhonn called it one of Cambodia's highest national priorities and hosted an international conference on it that week. Anutin raised it too. It seems to be a genuine shared concern, even if the countries disagree on almost everything else.

Luke

It's one of the few concrete areas where they're actually cooperating. But we don't have numbers on the scale of the problem or details on what the conference produced.

Mark

So what happens next? Do these conciliation meetings actually lead anywhere?

Mimi

The first meeting was in Singapore earlier in September. Both countries say they're committed to the process, but they have very different visions of what should happen—Cambodia wants land demarcation, Thailand wants border security cooperation.

Luke

The source doesn't tell us what the conciliation commission's timeline is, what its actual powers are, or what either side would consider a successful outcome. That's crucial information we're missing.

  • Over 20,000 Cambodian civilians remain displaced from their homes, unable to return due to what Cambodia describes as continued military occupation of contested territory.
  • Cultural heritage sites have been damaged and unexploded ordnance now litters the landscape — physical wounds that will outlast any ceasefire and deepen the erosion of bilateral trust.
  • Thailand terminated the only bilateral maritime legal framework in May 2025, prompting Cambodia to initiate formal UNCLOS conciliation proceedings — a move Bangkok views as bypassing genuine dialogue.
  • Cambodia is pressing for implementation of three existing agreements and the resumption of joint land-boundary demarcation, arguing the problem is not the absence of commitments but the failure to honor them.
  • Both nations have found narrow common ground on combating transnational online scam networks, offering a fragile but real opening for practical cooperation amid the broader standoff.

At the United Nations General Assembly in late September 2026, Cambodia and Thailand brought their unresolved border dispute before the world's most visible diplomatic stage — each nation offering a different account of how peace is best pursued between neighbors. Cambodia's foreign minister spoke of damaged temples, landmine-strewn earth, and more than twenty thousand people unable to return home, while Thailand's prime minister questioned whether formal legal proceedings could substitute for the harder, quieter work of direct dialogue. The exchange reveals a truth as old as borders themselves: that the line between two countries is never merely geographic, but is drawn and redrawn through trust, law, and the willingness to sit across a table.

On September 26, 2026, Cambodia's Foreign Minister Prak Sokhonn addressed the United Nations General Assembly in the shadow of a recent conflict with Thailand — one that had left temples damaged, ground contaminated with unexploded ordnance, and more than 20,000 civilians unable to return home. His speech was a measured but pointed response to remarks made the previous day by Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul, who had criticized Cambodia for pursuing formal legal proceedings rather than giving bilateral dialogue what he called a genuine chance.

Sokhonn called for the implementation of three existing agreements between the two countries, including a joint statement from December 2025 in which both sides had committed to renouncing force, respecting international boundaries, and working toward normalized relations. From Cambodia's perspective, the agreements were not the problem — the failure to honor them was. He urged the resumption of joint boundary demarcation work and demanded that activities aimed at consolidating territorial claims be halted, while calling for displaced civilians to be allowed to return.

On the maritime question, Sokhonn explained that Cambodia had turned to UNCLOS conciliation only after Thailand terminated the 2001 bilateral maritime memorandum of understanding in May — removing the only shared legal framework for resolving sea disputes. The first meeting of the conciliation commission, held in Singapore, was framed by Cambodia as a bridge-building opportunity rather than an adversarial maneuver.

Thailand, for its part, maintained it was participating in the UNCLOS process in good faith but preferred direct cooperation on border security, demining, and transnational crime. It was on that last point — online scam networks operating across shared borders — that both nations found something resembling agreement, with each side identifying the issue as a genuine priority requiring stronger international coordination.

The deeper disagreement, however, remained intact: Cambodia seeking formal demarcation and compliance with ceasefire commitments, Thailand pressing for bilateral security cooperation over legal process. Both governments acknowledged that trust had been broken. How to rebuild it was another matter entirely.

At the United Nations General Assembly on September 26, Cambodia's foreign minister Prak Sokhonn stood to address a wound that had opened between two neighbors. The recent conflict, he told the assembly, had done more than create a military standoff. It had damaged temples and heritage sites. It had left the ground itself dangerous—unexploded ordnance scattered across the landscape, a threat that would outlast any ceasefire. Most immediately, it had fractured the trust that holds any two countries together.

Sokhonn's speech was a response, though he did not say so directly. The day before, Thailand's Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul had taken the same podium and criticized Cambodia for abandoning bilateral talks in favor of a formal legal process. Cambodia, Anutin said, had not given dialogue "a genuine chance." Instead, it had filed for compulsory conciliation under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea—a move that, in Anutin's view, bypassed the kind of direct negotiation that neighbors should pursue.

Cambodia's position was different. Sokhonn called for the implementation of three existing agreements: the Kuala Lumpur Joint Declaration, the Fuxian Consensus, and a joint statement signed on December 27, 2025. Under that last agreement, both countries had committed to renounce force, respect international boundaries, reduce tensions, and work toward normal relations. The problem, from Cambodia's perspective, was not that these agreements existed—it was that they were not being honored. Sokhonn specifically urged the resumption of joint boundary demarcation work, the kind of technical, methodical process that could establish where one country ends and the other begins, according to international law.

The human cost of the dispute was concrete and immediate. More than 20,000 Cambodian civilians remained unable to return to their homes. Sokhonn attributed this to continued military occupation and obstruction of the territory Cambodia claimed. He called for these people to be allowed home and for any activities that might consolidate territorial claims—what diplomats call creating a "fait accompli"—to stop.

On the maritime question specifically, Sokhonn explained Cambodia's choice to pursue conciliation. Thailand had terminated the 2001 memorandum of understanding on maritime issues in May, removing what had been the only bilateral legal framework designed to address disputes at sea. With that framework gone, Cambodia had initiated the UNCLOS conciliation process. Sokhonn framed the first meeting of the conciliation commission, held in Singapore earlier that month, as an opportunity to bridge differences and rebuild trust.

Thailand's position, as Anutin had outlined, was that it was participating in the UNCLOS proceedings in good faith but preferred a different approach to resolving the broader dispute. Anutin had called for concrete cooperation on border security, online scams, and demining—practical matters that both countries faced. He emphasized that Thailand had never sought conflict and that peace required earnest work from both sides.

On one issue, at least, the two countries found common ground. Sokhonn identified online scams as a major national priority for Cambodia, noting that criminal networks operated across borders and required stronger international cooperation. He pointed to a conference Cambodia had hosted that week with international partners to address the problem. Anutin had raised the same concern, suggesting that border security and transnational crime were areas where bilateral cooperation might actually advance.

But the fundamental disagreement remained. Cambodia was calling for renewed land-border demarcation and compliance with ceasefire commitments, while pursuing maritime conciliation through the formal UNCLOS process. Thailand was questioning that choice and pressing instead for bilateral security cooperation along the shared border. Both countries agreed that trust had been damaged and that it needed to be rebuilt. They disagreed sharply on how.

Rebuilding trust is therefore not merely desirable; it is essential to the future of our bilateral relations and to our shared interest in lasting peace and good-neighbourly relations.
— Prak Sokhonn, Cambodian Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the UN General Assembly
Thailand has never sought conflict. Peace required both countries to work together in earnest.
— Anutin Charnvirakul, Thai Prime Minister, at the UN General Assembly
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