Asia now produces a large share of the world's new medicines, yet much of the value those medicines eventually generate is realised in the United States and Europe, a gap that a Healthcare Asia commentary frames as a question of timing and ownership. Its author argues that many Asian biotechs sell promising assets before Phase II, when much of their future worth and risk is still ahead, and that a company which understands the full chain from trial design to launch can choose more deliberately what to keep. Licensing is not condemned here, since it brings capital and market access, but the pie
Beyond licensing: Asian biotech must understand the full value chain to keep more of the value it creates
Asia is creating the innovation, while commercial value is realised elsewhere.
Mark
Why does this argument matter now?
Mimi
Asia supplies about 43% of the innovative pipeline, yet the US takes 53% of the prescription market and APAC just 11%. The piece says the science is here and the money is landing elsewhere.
Mark
So the advice is: don't license?
Mimi
No. The author says licensing is often right. The point is to choose it deliberately, not out of lack of capital or understanding.
Luke
Keep in mind this is an opinion piece. The 30 to 40% licensor share comes from one fairness analysis, and the author says it isn't a universal formula.
Mark
What about the Phase III cost argument?
Mimi
Historical pivotal trial costs run a median US$19m, oncology about US$45.4m. The author argues another US$50m or US$100m can be small against milestone value.
Luke
But those are old numbers, and the author admits modern Phase III programs can cost substantially more. No evidence is offered that Asian firms would actually capture that value.
Mark
And the deal examples?
Mimi
Novartis with PTC and BMS with BioNTech show how late-stage assets can command big upfronts.
Luke
The author says they aren't comparable, and the Novartis figures in the text don't reconcile. They're illustrations, not proof.
Mark
What's the practical takeaway?
Mimi
Keep selected regional rights, plan for global registration from Phase II, and understand the whole chain even if you outsource the work.
O Pulso
- Asia produces roughly 43% of the global innovative drug pipeline, yet the US takes about 53% of prescription medicine revenue while APAC takes only 11%.
- Many Asian biotechs hand over promising assets before Phase II, trading away future upside at the moment their risk is still unresolved.
- Phase II licensing deals carry far smaller upfront sums than company acquisitions, leaving licensors with a fraction of risk-adjusted value.
- Management teams are urged to map the whole value chain, weighing whether to retain Asian rights, partner for the West, or build global commercial capacity.
- The path forward runs through global thinking begun in Phase II, with registration evidence, manufacturing, and multiregional trials designed early.
Asia now produces a large share of the world's new medicines, yet much of the value those medicines eventually generate is realised in the United States and Europe, a gap that a Healthcare Asia commentary frames as a question of timing and ownership. Its author argues that many Asian biotechs sell promising assets before Phase II, when much of their future worth and risk is still ahead, and that a company which understands the full chain from trial design to launch can choose more deliberately what to keep. Licensing is not condemned here, since it brings capital and market access, but the piece asks whether it is a chosen step or a retreat made for lack of resources. The argument rests on the shifting arithmetic of uncertainty: as an asset proves itself, its value becomes both larger and more negotiable.
Asia is producing a growing share of the world's new medicines, but a good portion of the money those medicines eventually earn lands in the United States and Europe. A commentary in Healthcare Asia Magazine argues that Asian biotech companies often sell their assets too early, frequently before Phase II, and that a deeper understanding of the whole value chain could help them decide what to keep.
The author does not condemn licensing. It brings capital, development capability, and global access, and is often the right move. The real question is whether a company licenses because that is the best moment to realise value, or because it lacks the resources and full-chain understanding to go further. Figures cited include Phase II licensing deals that carry modest upfront payments compared with company acquisitions, and benchmarks suggesting licensors often capture only a minority of risk-adjusted value. The author stresses these are illustrations, not a universal formula.
Late-stage development is expensive, but weighed against the value it can unlock, another large investment may be small next to a major clinical or regulatory milestone. The author therefore urges management to see the whole chain, noting regional strengths across China, South Korea, Japan, Singapore, and India, and to consider options between licensing everything and building a full US commercial organisation. If the West is the goal, global planning must start in Phase II.
The conclusion is that some assets should be licensed early, others partnered after proof of concept, and a few developed globally and sold directly. The aim is genuine strategic choice, so that Asian companies keep more of the value they already create.
Asia produces a large share of the world's new medicines, and a good deal of the money they eventually earn lands somewhere else. That is the starting point of a commentary in Healthcare Asia Magazine, which argues that Asian biotech companies often sell their assets too early and would do better to understand the whole value chain before deciding what to keep.
The figures behind the argument are large. McKinsey estimates that Asia accounts for roughly 43% of the global innovative drug pipeline and about 40% of global out-licensing activity. IQVIA put global biopharma licensing value at approximately US$232b in 2025. Chinese-originated assets made up about US$105b of that in aggregate potential value, and 40% of the assets big pharma licensed had a Chinese licensor. Yet the global prescription medicine market, at US$1.7t in 2025, was split very unevenly: the US took 53%, Europe 24%, and APAC 11%. Innovation, the author says, is happening in Asia while commercial value is still realised elsewhere. Many Asian assets, the piece notes, are licensed before Phase II.
The author does not condemn licensing. It brings capital, development capability, and global market access, and is often the right call. The question is whether a company licenses because that is the best moment to realise value, or because it lacks the capital and the full-chain understanding to go further.
The economics are laid out in some detail. A Nature Biopharma Dealmakers analysis of 2,942 licensing transactions found an average Phase II upfront payment of US$61.4m, with a typical total Phase II deal size of about five times the upfront. More than 60% of milestone payments were scheduled after approval. In oncology, Phase II licensing values averaged about US$822m, with US$158m upfront, compared with US$2.027b for Phase II company acquisitions, of which US$1.783b was upfront. A 2026 independent fairness analysis filed with the US SEC cited a Phase II oncology benchmark in which licensors typically captured around 30 to 40% of risk-adjusted net present value. The licensee kept the rest for taking on remaining development, regulatory, and commercial risk and cost. The author stresses this is not a universal 70:30 formula, only an illustration that licensing at Phase II hands over part of future value along with future risk and investment.
Two deals are offered as context. In 2024, Novartis agreed to pay PTC Therapeutics an upfront sum for PTC518, a Phase II Huntington's disease asset. In 2025, BioNTech's BNT327, moving into global Phase III oncology studies, drew US$1.5b upfront from Bristol Myers Squibb in a partnership worth up to US$11.1b. The author cautions that the deals are not directly comparable, and that market size, competition, intellectual property, clinical data, and strategic fit all matter. The point is narrower: as clinical, regulatory, and commercial uncertainty falls, more of an asset's value becomes visible and negotiable. (The source text gives the Novartis upfront as US$11b against a potential value of $2.9b, figures that do not reconcile, so they should be treated with caution.)
Late-stage development is costly, but the piece weighs that against value retained. A JAMA Internal Medicine analysis of pivotal trials behind FDA approvals estimated a median direct cost of US$19m. Oncology trials averaged about US$45.4m, and trials with more than 1,000 patients about US$77.2m. These are historical numbers, and the author acknowledges that today's global Phase III programs can cost substantially more. Still, for the right asset, another US$50m, US$100m, or more may be small next to the value realised after a major clinical or regulatory milestone.
The author is not urging Asian biotechs to build everything themselves. Management needs a 360-degree view of the value chain before deciding what to own and what to partner. Regional strengths are sketched: China and South Korea have scaled discovery and development, Japan has global commercialisation experience, Singapore is a biomedical R&D and regional hub, and India pairs cost-efficient manufacturing with a growing innovation base. Asia's own markets should also be seen as customers, though pricing, reimbursement, and access differ widely. Retaining selected Asian rights while partnering for the US or Europe is one option short of licensing everything or building a US commercial organisation.
If the US and Europe are targets, the author says, global thinking must begin in Phase II, with trial design, CMC, manufacturing, and the evidence package built around eventual registration, possibly through multiregional development. After approval come questions about who prescribes, what payers require, what competition looks like at launch, and whether a regional partner makes more sense. CROs, CDMOs, and other specialists can carry out much of the work, but management's grasp of how the pieces fit cannot be outsourced.
The conclusion is framed as the author's view: some assets should be licensed early, others partnered after proof of concept, and a few developed globally and sold directly. The goal is genuine strategic choice, so Asian companies keep more of the value they already create.
Citações Notáveis
The objective is not to avoid licensing. It is to have a genuine strategic choice.— Commentary author, Healthcare Asia Magazine
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