Belgium blocks fresh EU push to unlock €185bn in frozen Russian assets for Ukraine

Brussels is holding roughly €210 billion in Russian sovereign assets frozen since Moscow's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. About €185 billion of that sits in Euroclear, a securities depository based in Belgium, which means one country bears an outsized share of the legal and financial risk if Russia sues for compensation or demands the money back. That concentration has become the hinge on which Europe's debate over Ukraine funding turns.

Belgium's defence minister, Theo Francken, made clear on Flemish television that his government considers the matter settled. The idea of transferring frozen Russian assets to finance Ukraine's defence is not open for discussion, he said. Prime Minister Bart De Wever will not budge. The timing of Francken's declaration was pointed: four EU nations—Poland, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden—had just formally asked the European Union to reopen the file. They argue that the current financial package falls short of what Kyiv needs, and that Russia shows no sign of ending its war.

Last year, the European Commission proposed converting the immobilized funds into a loan of up to €165 billion for Ukraine, to be repaid only after Moscow paid war reparations. Belgium blocked it. The government demanded ironclad guarantees that other member states would share the burden if Russia sued successfully or demanded compensation. No such guarantee materialized. The proposal collapsed and was replaced by a more conventional €90 billion loan financed through EU borrowing and backed by the common budget, meant to cover Ukraine's needs through 2027. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has since urged the EU to front-load the money to help close an estimated €23.5 billion funding gap as Ukraine prepares for another difficult winter.

The four foreign ministers who signed the latest letter to EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas and Irish Foreign Minister Helen McEntee contend that €90 billion is not enough. They want the issue placed on the agenda of an informal foreign ministers' meeting in Ireland on September 1 and 2, and they have asked Commission experts to explore new options that would allow further use of the immobilized assets while ensuring no single member state carries a disproportionate share of the risk. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski has framed the choice in strategic terms: Russia will not recover the money until it pays reparations, so the resources are better spent now on stopping the aggression and defending Ukraine than held in reserve for eventual reconstruction after the fighting ends.

Belgium's opposition has generated visible irritation among the strongest advocates of asset use, particularly the Baltic states. Francken singled them out, warning that repeatedly raising the issue and attempting to corner Belgium was unwise. He noted that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia continue to receive substantial Belgian support in other domains. Yet there are fissures within the Belgian government itself. Maxime Prévot, the foreign minister, indicated during a recent visit to Kyiv that he would be open to revisiting the assets question provided legal responsibility is fairly distributed across the Union. The Swedish-led letter echoes that caveat, insisting any new mechanism must avoid placing an outsized burden on any one capital.

The December 2024 European Council summit illustrated how sharply the issue divides the Union. Germany and the Commission had pressed hard for a reparations loan structure underpinned by the frozen funds. De Wever's government demanded unlimited guarantees against Russian legal retaliation—a condition other leaders judged excessive. The resulting compromise required Ukraine to meet reform benchmarks before full disbursement of the €90 billion facility. Convincing every capital to accelerate payments without prior reforms remains a steep climb.

Euroclear's central role continues to shape the politics. As the primary custodian of the bulk of the assets, Belgium faces the most immediate prospect of litigation or reciprocal measures from Moscow. Officials in other capitals recognize the exposure yet argue that collective European solidarity should dilute the risk. The four-country initiative effectively asks the Commission to design technical solutions that achieve precisely that balance—new legal and financial architectures that keep the assets immobilized while channeling their value, or the income they generate, toward Ukraine without concentrating liability in one jurisdiction.

Whether the gathering in Ireland produces movement remains uncertain. Belgium has not altered its fundamental position, and Francken's television appearance suggests the government intends to maintain that stance. Yet officials close to the discussion note that negotiations over the EU's next multiannual financial framework for 2028–2034, which must include sustained support for Ukraine, could create fresh political space. The more funding that can be drawn from Russian assets, the argument runs, the less pressure will fall on European taxpayers.