Some years after a public inquiry located the worst crimes of Australia's Afghan war in the hands of junior patrol commanders, a long-buried military report now asks a harder question of the people above them. Its quiet verdict is that officers who knew, or heard enough to wonder, did not act, and that a warrior culture left unchecked let a few men turn their own paperwork into a way of hiding killings. For a nation that wanted its war to have a clear line of blame, the document reopens the question of how far responsibility climbs when a command structure stops working.
Australian SAS Officers Knew of 'Throwdowns' on Dead Afghans and Failed to Act, Report Finds
The Brereton Inquiry found credible information that Australian special forces murdered 39 Afghan civilians and prisoners, the context for the planted weapons.
Officers knew about throwdowns and did not take effective action
Mark
Brereton already found 39 killings. What does this report add?
Mimi
It moves the question up the chain. Brereton put the crimes at patrol commander level. This report says some officers knew about throwdowns and didn't act.
Mark
What exactly were throwdowns?
Mimi
Weapons planted on dead Afghan civilians so they could be portrayed as combatants.
Luke
Worth noting this is only the executive summary. We haven't seen the full report or the evidence behind each finding.
Mark
It also talks about culture. Is that an explanation or an excuse?
Mimi
The report says culture didn't cause the misconduct but enabled it by a few. It cites an inverted chain of command, secrecy, and alcohol allowed when others were banned from it.
Luke
And it doesn't name which officers knew, or how many. "Some" is the only quantity we have.
Mark
What about the language in the battlefield reports?
Mimi
The phrase "manoeuvring to a position of tactical advantage" was used so routinely it lost meaning, and it helped justify engagements.
Luke
Hammond agreed with the findings, but agreeing isn't action. Nothing in the reporting says any officer faces consequences.
Mark
Which is Shoebridge's point.
Mimi
Yes, and Hastie's, in a different register: commission means moral accountability.
El Pulso
- A suppressed military report says some SAS officers knew soldiers were planting weapons on dead Afghan civilians and did nothing effective.
- Defence resisted releasing the document for years, despite freedom of information requests and a Senate push to force disclosure.
- The findings land on the heels of the Brereton Inquiry, which found credible evidence of 39 murders yet largely cleared officers above patrol commanders.
- Admiral Mark Hammond has acknowledged 'serious failures' and called the conduct unacceptable, while Senators on both sides press on who is accountable.
- The question of whether leadership will face consequences remains open, and Senate scrutiny is expected to continue.
Some years after a public inquiry located the worst crimes of Australia's Afghan war in the hands of junior patrol commanders, a long-buried military report now asks a harder question of the people above them. Its quiet verdict is that officers who knew, or heard enough to wonder, did not act, and that a warrior culture left unchecked let a few men turn their own paperwork into a way of hiding killings. For a nation that wanted its war to have a clear line of blame, the document reopens the question of how far responsibility climbs when a command structure stops working.
A military report that Australia's defence establishment had kept under wraps for years has now surfaced, and its central finding is hard to soften. Some SAS officers knew that soldiers under their command were planting weapons on dead Afghan civilians to make them look like combatants, and they did not act effectively to stop it. The report, an executive summary of a 2021 investigation by the inspector general of the Australian Defence Force, was commissioned after the Brereton Inquiry. That inquiry had found credible evidence that special forces murdered 39 Afghan civilians and prisoners, but it largely cleared officers, placing the criminal conduct at patrol commander level, where the ranks were corporals and sergeants.
The new report looks upward. It describes a breakdown of command, an uncontrolled warrior ethos, long and grinding deployments that wore down judgment, a secretive regiment in which senior non-commissioned soldiers overshadowed nominal officers, and double standards on alcohol that suggested the rules did not apply to the SAS. Paperwork compounded the problem: reports repeatedly used the phrase about 'manoeuvring to a position of tactical advantage' to justify shooting civilians, until the words became meaningless. Reporting systems meant to catch wrongdoing had become unreliable, giving commanders a false sense of assurance.
At Senate estimates, Admiral Hammond agreed with the findings and called the behaviour unprofessional and contrary to the force's values, and he condemned obstruction of war crimes investigations by legal officers. Greens Senator David Shoebridge warned that the book is thrown at those without rank while leaders who should have known escape consequence. Andrew Hastie, a former SAS captain, said he recognised much of what he read and that commissioned officers are accountable for those beneath them, morally if not directly. Whether that accountability will reach past the report's language is the question that will keep being asked.
A military report that Australia's defence establishment had declined to release for years went online this week, and its central finding is blunt: some SAS officers knew that soldiers under their command were planting weapons on dead Afghan civilians, and did nothing effective to stop it. The practice, known as "throwdowns," was used to portray the dead as combatants.
The document is the executive summary of a 2021 investigation by the inspector general of the Australian Defence Force into the "cultural context" of special operations command. Defence had previously refused to release it, despite freedom of information requests and an attempt to force its disclosure through the Senate.
It follows the Brereton Inquiry, made public in 2020, which found credible information that Australian special forces personnel murdered 39 Afghan civilians and prisoners. That inquiry largely exonerated officers, concluding that the criminal behaviour "was conceived, committed, continued, and concealed at patrol commander level." Patrol commanders in the SAS are not commissioned officers; they are typically corporals or sergeants. The newly released report was commissioned after those findings by Angus Campbell, then defence force chief and himself a former SAS officer. It reaches a different conclusion about the officers above them.
Officers with actual knowledge of misconduct in the field, the report says, including the use of throwdowns to produce fraudulent reporting, or who heard rumours of it, did not take effective action to investigate or address it. It describes a "breakdown of command" and says the failure to enforce rules at every level had a corrosive effect on behaviour, morale and discipline, producing "episodes of potential and actual egregious behaviour."
The summary identifies several causes. SAS officers allowed an "uncontrolled 'warrior' ethos" to develop. A small group of soldiers was repeatedly sent on long, grinding deployments, which the report links to moral injury and impaired decision-making. The regiment was also unusually secretive and insular, and the chain of command was effectively inverted: senior non-commissioned officers dominated the officers who were nominally their superiors, leaving junior officers in a state the report calls "learned helplessness." SAS soldiers were also routinely allowed to drink alcohol in Afghanistan despite orders imposed on others, which the report says signalled that the rules did not apply to them.
The paperwork helped conceal wrongdoing. Soldiers filed reports focused on the rules of engagement, using variants of the phrase "manoeuvring to a position of tactical advantage" to describe civilian "squirters" as direct participants in hostilities, which justified engaging them. The phrase was used so often, the report says, that it lost meaning. Reporting systems meant to catch misconduct had become "depleted and largely unreliable," giving officers "a false level of assurance." The report says the culture of the Special Operations Task Group did not cause misconduct but created an environment in which misconduct by a few could occur.
On Thursday, ADF chief Admiral Mark Hammond was questioned on the report in Senate estimates. He said he agreed with its findings and acknowledged "serious failures" within the SAS and its command structure, calling the behaviour extremely unprofessional and contrary to the force's values and standards. Asked about the finding that legal officers within the defence force obstructed investigations into war crimes allegations, he called the behaviour "completely unacceptable."
Greens Senator David Shoebridge said faith and trust were being eroded by an accountability gap: the book is thrown at those without "gold braid on your shoulders," while leaders who knew, or had data that should have alerted them, have not faced action. Opposition frontbencher Andrew Hastie, a former SAS captain, told ABC radio he "lived a lot of what I read in that report," which has almost 50 findings. Anyone holding a commission, he said, is accountable for those beneath them, if not directly for their actions then morally. Whether that accountability extends beyond the report's language is the question Senate scrutiny is likely to keep pressing.
Citas Notables
I lived a lot of what I read in that report.— Andrew Hastie, opposition frontbencher and former SAS captain
The behaviour you're describing is completely unacceptable.— Admiral Mark Hammond, ADF chief
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