a ludicrous delusion that the US would sacrifice San Francisco for Sydney
In a Melbourne hearing room, former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans placed his country's $368 billion Aukus submarine commitment before the oldest question in alliance politics: whether a great power will truly sacrifice its own cities for another nation's survival. His testimony — calling extended nuclear deterrence a 'ludicrous delusion' — joined a chorus of expert voices warning that Australia may be purchasing strategic dependence rather than strategic security, at a cost measured not only in dollars but in radioactive legacies stretching across geological time.
- Gareth Evans, one of Australia's most experienced diplomatic minds, has declared Aukus among the worst strategic decisions the country has ever made, arguing the submarines would serve American interests far more than Australian ones.
- Nuclear weapons expert Tilman Ruff warned the deal elevates Australia's status as a nuclear target while generating hundreds of kilograms of weapons-grade radioactive waste with no viable disposal solution for hundreds of thousands of years.
- The program's timeline is already under pressure — US submarine construction is behind schedule, British industrial capacity is strained, and the government's total cost estimate has been called 'wholly speculative.'
- An independent inquiry, led by former Labor minister Peter Garrett and retired defense chief Chris Barrie, is gathering public testimony across Australia ahead of an October report, even as the Labor government defends Aukus as essential to regional sovereignty.
- The debate has surfaced a fracture within Labor itself, with some MPs voicing doubts ahead of the party's national conference — revealing that the political consensus behind Aukus is less settled than its defenders suggest.
On Thursday, Gareth Evans — foreign minister across eight years of the Hawke and Keating governments — told an independent public inquiry that the Aukus agreement ranked among the worst strategic decisions Australia had ever made. The $368 billion nuclear submarine partnership with the US and UK rested, he argued, on a foundational illusion: that America would risk San Francisco to defend Sydney. He called this belief a 'ludicrous delusion,' contending that the Virginia-class submarines Australia expects from 2032 would function as extensions of the American fleet, tasked with serving US strategic objectives against China rather than guaranteeing Australian security.
The delivery timeline, Evans warned, was optimistic to the point of fantasy. American submarine construction was already behind schedule, British industrial capacity was under severe stress, and the second phase — submarines designed by the UK and built in Australia — required what he called heroic levels of optimism. The government's overall price tag, he said, remained wholly speculative.
A second witness brought a different but equally grave concern. Tilman Ruff, co-founder of the Nobel Peace Prize-winning International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, warned that Aukus would raise Australia's priority as a nuclear target while generating hundreds of kilograms of weapons-grade radioactive waste requiring secure storage for hundreds of thousands of years — a problem no country has solved. He noted that under current law, the Commonwealth could designate virtually any location as defense land and impose waste storage there, a prospect he described as a profound threat to democratic governance.
The inquiry — backed by trade unions and the Australian Peace and Security Forum, and led by commissioners including Peter Garrett and retired defense chief Chris Barrie — will hold hearings across the country before reporting in October. Foreign Minister Penny Wong defended the program as essential to Australian sovereignty in a contested region, even as some Labor MPs voiced doubts ahead of the party's national conference. What the hearing made plain was a fundamental disagreement: whether Aukus represents a necessary hedge against an uncertain world, or an enormous transfer of resources and strategic autonomy in service of a protection that may never come.
In a Melbourne hearing room on Thursday, Gareth Evans, who spent eight years as Australia's foreign affairs minister during the Hawke and Keating governments, delivered a stark assessment of one of his country's most consequential military commitments. The Aukus agreement—a $368 billion nuclear submarine partnership with the United States and United Kingdom—was, he told an independent public inquiry, among the worst strategic decisions Australia had ever made. His testimony cut to the heart of a calculation that has animated Australian defense thinking for decades: the assumption that America would risk its own cities to protect Sydney.
Evans was unsparing. He called the belief that the US would sacrifice San Francisco for Sydney, or Miami for Melbourne, a "ludicrous delusion." The submarines Australia expects to receive from America starting in 2032—three Virginia-class vessels—would function, he argued, not as independent Australian assets but as extensions of the American fleet, embedded into US military command. Their real purpose, in his view, was to serve American interests: finding and destroying Chinese submarines that posed a threat to the US mainland. Trump, Evans suggested, had approved the deal not out of commitment to Australian security but to advance his own strategic objectives against China.
The timeline itself, Evans warned, was optimistic to the point of fantasy. US submarine construction was already behind schedule, and the American fleet faced chronic shortages. The second phase of Aukus—submarines designed by the UK and built in Australia—required what he called "heroic levels of optimism" about British capacity. Reports from Britain painted a picture of a defense industrial base under severe stress, with submarine schedules slipping and costs climbing. Australia had committed $4.5 billion over a decade to help accelerate production, yet the government's overall price tag for the entire program remained, in Evans's judgment, "wholly speculative."
Another witness that day offered a different but equally troubling concern. Tilman Ruff, co-founder of the Nobel Peace Prize-winning International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, warned that Aukus would make Australia a higher-priority target in any regional conflict, including for nuclear attack. The submarines would run on weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium—fuel that created a radioactive waste problem with no solution. Hundreds of kilograms of high-level radioactive material would need to be stored securely for hundreds of thousands of years, perhaps longer. No country had solved this problem. Ruff pointed to Australia's poor historical record of attempting to impose radioactive waste facilities on unwilling communities. Under current law, the Commonwealth could declare virtually any location in Australia as defense land and impose waste storage there, a prospect he called a "profound concern" for democracy and governance.
The inquiry itself—not a parliamentary process but an independent examination backed by trade unions and the Australian Peace and Security Forum—was led by commissioners including former Labor minister Peter Garrett and retired defense chief Chris Barrie. It would hold public hearings across the country before reporting in October. The government, meanwhile, was pushing back hard. Foreign Minister Penny Wong acknowledged the project's ambition and challenges but insisted the submarine capability was essential to assure Australian sovereignty in an increasingly contested region. Labor was defending Aukus before its national conference in Adelaide the following month, even as some of its own MPs voiced doubts.
What emerged from Thursday's hearing was a fundamental disagreement about Australia's strategic future. One side saw Aukus as a dangerous illusion—a massive commitment of resources and strategic autonomy in service of American interests, with no guarantee of American protection when it mattered most. The other saw it as a necessary hedge against an uncertain world, a capability Australia could not afford to forgo. The inquiry would spend the coming months testing which view held weight.
Notable Quotes
The notion that extended nuclear deterrence justifies our prostration is, and always has been, a ludicrous delusion.— Gareth Evans, former foreign affairs minister
This submarine capability is central to assuring Australian sovereignty in a much more contested world.— Penny Wong, current foreign minister
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
When Evans says the US would only defend Australia if American assets on Australian soil were threatened, what does he think actually happens if China attacks?
He's arguing that Australia would be on its own. The nuclear umbrella—the idea that America extends its deterrent to protect us—only works if America believes its own survival is at stake. In a conflict over Taiwan or the South China Sea, that's not necessarily true. We'd have expensive submarines but no guarantee of the ally we're counting on.
But doesn't having nuclear submarines change the calculation? Doesn't it make us more credible, more capable?
Evans would say it makes us more useful to America, not more secure. The submarines become part of the American fleet. We're not gaining independence; we're deepening dependence. And we're paying $368 billion for the privilege.
What about the radioactive waste problem Ruff described? Is that a real constraint on the deal?
It's a genuine unresolved issue. No country has figured out how to safely store weapons-grade uranium waste for geological timescales. Australia has no plan. And because the government can declare land as defense property, communities could have this material imposed on them without much recourse.
The government says this capability is essential for sovereignty. How do Evans and the inquiry respond to that?
They'd argue you can't have sovereignty if you're dependent on another power's willingness to defend you—especially when that power has shown it acts in its own interests first. Sovereignty means being able to protect yourself. These submarines don't do that.
So what's the alternative? Does Evans propose one?
The inquiry is still gathering evidence. But the underlying question is whether Australia should be investing this heavily in a capability that only works if America decides to use it, or whether there are other ways to build genuine strategic autonomy in the region.