Since the United States and Israel struck Iran in February, the American military presence across the Middle East has been battered, with most of its bases damaged and many of them built decades ago for a different kind of threat. Two analysts at Bloomberg Economics argue that the war, however costly, may force a reckoning that Washington could never impose on itself: a smaller, more scattered footprint, and Gulf states learning to stand on more of their own feet. The question they leave hanging is whether a power that has long defined its role in the region by its bases can accept being one p
America Will Have Less Influence in the Middle East. Is That So Bad?
At least 21 US service members have been killed and almost 900 wounded, while thousands of Iranians, including numerous civilians, have been killed; countries across the Middle East have suffered casualties.
Less American influence in return for a safer, more sustainable presence
Mark
What is the core argument here?
Mimi
That the Iran war damaged American bases so badly that rebuilding them as they were makes little sense. The authors want smaller, dispersed outposts and accept less influence in return.
Mark
Why not just rebuild?
Mimi
They say it would be astronomically expensive, with hardened shelters and underground facilities added. And Iran's missiles and drones can now hit those sites accurately.
Luke
Worth remembering this is an opinion piece. The damage to nearly all bases and the 81 aircraft are presented as fact, but the piece gives no sourcing for them in the text we have.
Mark
And the Gulf states?
Mimi
They already doubted Washington, and the war deepened it. Saudi Arabia's economy has contracted almost 2 percent, per Bloomberg Economics, and the Mecca Pact ties Saudi, Turkish and Pakistani defense together.
Luke
The authors call the pact nascent, and I'd hold them to that. It's a sign of direction, not proof of a working alternative to the U.S.
Mark
What's the catch in their plan?
Mimi
It needs Gulf consent for access and new bases, yet the plan itself may frustrate those same capitals.
Luke
Right, and the piece doesn't say how Gulf governments would respond. That part is prediction, not reporting.
Le Pouls
- Nearly every major American base in the region has been hit, and Iranian missiles and drones have downed at least 81 aircraft, exposing installations that were never built to withstand this kind of attack.
- With at least 21 U.S. service members dead and almost 900 wounded, the human price of the war is pressing hard on the case for rethinking where American forces sit.
- Gulf capitals, their economies squeezed by a conflict on their doorstep, are quietly hedging, with the Mecca Pact signaling a push toward security arrangements that do not run through Washington.
- The proposed fix is a dispersed model of small outposts farther from Iran, backed by access agreements, but it risks frustrating the very partners whose doors must stay open.
Since the United States and Israel struck Iran in February, the American military presence across the Middle East has been battered, with most of its bases damaged and many of them built decades ago for a different kind of threat. Two analysts at Bloomberg Economics argue that the war, however costly, may force a reckoning that Washington could never impose on itself: a smaller, more scattered footprint, and Gulf states learning to stand on more of their own feet. The question they leave hanging is whether a power that has long defined its role in the region by its bases can accept being one partner among several without losing the access it still needs.
Since the United States and Israel attacked Iran in February, nearly every American base in the Middle East has been damaged. Many were built more than half a century ago, and upgrades have not been enough to shield them from what Iran can now launch. Becca Wasser and Dina Esfandiary, who lead defense and Middle East work at Bloomberg Economics, argue that this damage could finally force a reset that Washington has long failed to make on its own.
Their view is that America will not walk away from the region when the fighting ends, but it must reshape its presence. That likely means fewer troops and less equipment, and a willingness to be seen by Persian Gulf states as one security partner among several. The human toll weighs heavily in their case: at least 81 aircraft damaged, at least 21 U.S. service members killed, almost 900 wounded, and thousands of Iranians dead, many of them civilians.
The authors suggest a smaller, conditional presence built on agreements over bases, airspace and launch rights. Small outposts farther from Iran, in places such as western Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel, could host rotating personnel. Gulf partners might be asked to cover much of the cost, as they have before. Yet that plan depends on allies growing wary, as their economies strain under a war that threatens their own territory, and the Mecca Pact is an early sign they are looking elsewhere for security.
The authors do not pretend the trade is painless. A dispersed posture still demands new infrastructure, and it may irritate Gulf capitals that could close their doors the next time America asks. For them, accepting less influence in exchange for a safer and more sustainable presence may still be worth it, and the answer will depend on whether those partners keep access open.
Since the United States and Israel attacked Iran in February, nearly all American bases and military installations in the Middle East have been damaged. Many of those bases were built more than half a century ago. Upgrades have helped, but the facilities are outmoded, and their air defenses are not sufficient against what Iran can now throw at them. That is the starting point for an opinion essay by Becca Wasser, defense lead at Bloomberg Economics, and Dina Esfandiary, its Middle East geoeconomics lead. They argue the war could force a reset the U.S. has long failed to achieve on its own.
The authors say that when the war ends, Washington will not leave the region, whatever further damage Tehran inflicts. But they argue it must reshape its presence. That likely means fewer troops and less equipment, and an acceptance that Persian Gulf states may come to see America as one security partner among several.
The human and material toll is part of their case. Iranian missiles and drones have damaged at least 81 aircraft. At least 21 U.S. service members have been killed and almost 900 wounded. Thousands of Iranians have died, including numerous civilians, and countries across the Middle East have suffered military and civilian casualties. Iran has expanded its medium- and longer-range missile capacity and developed drones of the kind that have wreaked havoc from Ukraine to the Gulf. Given its ability to strike accurately, the authors say, it will make little sense to keep large numbers of troops and aircraft at major bases within Iran's reach.
They set this against the Trump administration's record. As a candidate, Donald Trump criticized U.S. involvement in overseas conflict, and his administration's 2025 National Security Strategy described the Iran threat as diminished. Yet he went to war, which the authors say entrenched the Islamic republic's leadership and prompted retaliation by Tehran with conflicting objectives. In their view, the strategy has been unclear and the war exposed its contradictions.
Rebuilding the old footprint, they say, would be astronomically expensive, and it would also require new hardened aircraft shelters and underground communication facilities. Their alternative is a smaller, conditional presence backed by agreements governing use of bases, airspace and launch rights on partners' territory. It could take the form of distributed basing: smaller outposts farther from Iran, in places like western Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel, with modest numbers of personnel rotating through. Washington might ask Gulf states to pay much of the cost, as they have before. The U.S. still needs to project power, especially if a postwar Iran rebuilds its military.
That plan depends on partners who are growing wary. Gulf doubts about American commitment predate the war but have deepened, since their main security guarantor started a prolonged conflict that threatens their territory, stability and economies. Bloomberg Economics has found that Saudi Arabia's economy has contracted by almost 2 percent, and the authors expect the squeeze to tighten the longer the fighting lasts. The result is a faster push to diversify partnerships. No one yet matches American guarantees or political weight, but Gulf-centered alliances and ties to other powers could eventually take priority. The Mecca Pact, signed this summer to enshrine Saudi, Turkish and Pakistani defense cooperation, is cited as an early, nascent step toward an independent regional security architecture.
The authors acknowledge the costs. A dispersed posture requires new infrastructure, which sits awkwardly with the goal of spending less on the region. Changing where and how U.S. forces operate may frustrate Gulf capitals, which could close their doors the next time America asks for access. They also note that the plan raises the importance of the U.S. presence in Europe for power projection, even as Washington tries to downsize there. Their conclusion is that less influence, in exchange for a safer, more sustainable presence and a region with more control of its own security, may be a trade worth making. Whether Gulf partners keep access open will be the test.
Citations marquantes
The United States cannot scale back its presence and keep all its influence in the Middle East, but a smaller, more agile presence may be worth the trade-offs.— Becca Wasser and Dina Esfandiary, Bloomberg Economics (paraphrased)
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