Albania's Anti-Corruption Crackdown: Prosecuting Symptoms, Not Causes

40% of surveyed Albanians reported paying bribes to public officials; widespread corruption pressure affects citizens' interactions with state institutions.
More effective at punishing corruption after it happens, less capable of preventing it
Experts argue Albania's prosecutions address symptoms rather than root causes of systemic corruption.
Mark

So the intelligence chief gets arrested while she's at a conference abroad. That's dramatic. But what does it actually tell us about whether corruption is getting better or worse?

Mimi

It tells us that the institutions now have the power to move against senior officials in ways they didn't before. That's real. But the arrest itself doesn't answer whether corruption is actually declining—it just shows enforcement is working.

Luke

Right, and we should be careful about that distinction. More prosecutions could mean more corruption is being caught, or it could mean the same amount of corruption is finally being prosecuted. The source doesn't give us data on actual corruption levels over time.

Mark

The survey says 52 percent of Albanians experienced corruption pressure. That's a lot. Is that number going up or down?

Mimi

It's from 2023, so it's recent. But you're right—we don't know if it's improving. The European Commission report says corruption remains widespread, which suggests the prosecutions haven't yet changed how citizens experience the state.

Luke

And that's the real gap the reporting identifies. They're getting better at punishment after the fact, but the preventive mechanisms—audits, asset declarations, conflict-of-interest rules—those aren't working. You can arrest people and still have a broken system.

Mark

So why haven't those preventive mechanisms worked?

Mimi

The political scientist points to concentration of power. One party has governed since 2013 with a parliamentary majority. That weakens the checks and balances that would normally constrain the executive.

Luke

But that's an argument, not a fact. We don't have evidence in the source that shows how those preventive mechanisms failed or why. We know they're ineffective, but the mechanism of failure isn't detailed.

Mark

Does EU pressure help or hurt?

Mimi

It seems to help. The EU shifted from just demanding laws to demanding results. That creates ongoing pressure for institutions to be genuinely independent. But it's also external pressure—it doesn't address the internal political concentration Krasniqi describes.

Luke

And Albania still ranks below all EU member states on the Corruption Perceptions Index, even after improving from 33 to 39 points since 2012. So the trajectory is positive, but the absolute position is still weak.

  • Albania's intelligence chief was arrested mid-conference in Baku, the latest in a cascade of prosecutions reaching a former president, a former prime minister, and the sitting mayor of the capital.
  • The arrests signal a genuine rupture — institutions built after 2016 are now doing what once seemed impossible, dismantling the culture of impunity that shielded the powerful for generations.
  • Yet the machinery of prevention — audits, asset declarations, conflict-of-interest rules — remains largely broken, meaning corruption is caught after damage is done rather than stopped at the source.
  • On the ground, 52 percent of Albanians report experiencing corruption pressure and 40 percent say they have paid bribes, revealing a daily reality that high-profile trials have not yet touched.
  • A decade of single-party dominance has concentrated power in ways that critics say hollow out the checks meant to constrain the executive, breeding informal networks that formal prosecutions alone cannot dismantle.
  • EU accession benchmarks are pushing Albania toward measurable results, but observers warn the true test is not whether officials face trial — it is whether ordinary citizens feel freer, safer, and less dependent on the goodwill of the state.

In a country where powerful officials once operated beyond the reach of the law, Albania is now prosecuting its own intelligence chief, former presidents, and prime ministers — a transformation born from a decade of deliberate institutional reform. The specialized anti-corruption body SPAK has shattered the myth of untouchability, yet experts remind us that punishing wrongdoing after the fact is not the same as preventing it. With four in ten Albanians still reporting they have paid bribes, the deeper question is whether a society can be healed by prosecution alone, or whether justice must also learn to arrive before the harm is done.

On September 22, while attending an intelligence conference in Baku, Albania's State Intelligence Service chief Vlora Hyseni received word that a specialized court had ordered her arrest on suspicion of helping someone evade investigation and leaking confidential information. She turned herself in the same day and has remained under house arrest, dismissed from her post, as the case proceeds.

Hyseni's arrest is the most recent episode in a remarkable sequence. A former president has spent nearly two years in detention. A former prime minister is on trial. The mayor of Tirana has been imprisoned since early 2025. What these cases share is a common allegation: the abuse of public power by people who, not long ago, appeared beyond accountability.

This shift traces back to Albania's sweeping justice reform of 2016, which created new institutions — most notably SPAK, a specialized anti-corruption structure — designed to investigate high-level wrongdoing with genuine independence and international backing. The results were slow to materialize, but they have arrived. Civil society lawyer Dorian Matlija credits SPAK with breaking 'the myth of the untouchability of senior officials,' a change he describes as significant and real.

Experts are careful, however, to distinguish between punishment and prevention. Albania has grown capable of prosecuting corruption after it occurs; it has not grown capable of stopping it beforehand. The European Commission's 2025 report acknowledged SPAK's tangible progress while noting that preventive mechanisms — audits, conflict-of-interest rules, asset declarations — continue to have limited impact. The system, in other words, catches the crime after the damage is done.

That gap is visible in how citizens live. A 2023 survey found that 52 percent of Albanians had experienced corruption pressure from public officials, and 40 percent reported paying a bribe. High-profile arrests have not yet changed the texture of daily life for ordinary people navigating state institutions.

Political scientist Afrim Krasniqi locates the problem in the structure of power itself. Since 2013, Prime Minister Edi Rama's Socialist Party has governed with an outright parliamentary majority, a prolonged dominance that Krasniqi argues has eroded the checks meant to constrain the executive and fostered informal networks of influence operating outside formal institutions. Rama, for his part, has consistently framed each investigation as a matter between the individual and the justice system.

Albania's anti-corruption push is also entangled with its EU membership bid. The country has cleared interim rule-of-law benchmarks and moved into a phase focused on lasting results. Its Corruption Perceptions Index score has risen from 33 in 2012 to 39 in 2025, though it still trails every current EU member. For Matlija, European pressure for genuine institutional effectiveness is a constructive force. For Krasniqi, the real measure of progress is simpler and harder: whether Albanians themselves feel more secure, more prosperous, and less at the mercy of the state.

On September 22, Vlora Hyseni was attending an international intelligence conference in Baku when Albania's Special Court ordered her arrest. The head of the State Intelligence Service was suspected of two crimes: helping someone evade investigation and leaking confidential information. She turned herself in that same day and has remained under house arrest ever since, dismissed from her post as the investigation unfolds.

Hyseni's case is the latest in a striking sequence of prosecutions that have reached into the highest levels of Albania's government in ways that seemed unimaginable just a decade ago. A former president has spent nearly two years in detention. A former prime minister stands trial. The mayor of Tirana has been locked up since early 2025. Two former deputy prime ministers have faced criminal proceedings. Investigations have spread into senior officials across agencies that control vast portions of public spending and state infrastructure. Each case is distinct, but they share a common thread: allegations of abuse of public power by people who once seemed untouchable.

This transformation did not happen by accident. For years, high-level corruption in Albania was synonymous with impunity—powerful people broke the law and faced no consequences. When the country launched a sweeping justice reform in 2016, one of its central promises was that this would change. The reform created new institutions designed specifically to investigate corruption and organized crime, most notably SPAK, a specialized anti-corruption structure. Building these institutions took time, and the results were slow to arrive. But they have arrived. "What has changed significantly is the institutional reaction," says Dorian Matlija, a lawyer and director of the civil society organization Res Publica. "Today, SPAK is a specialized structure with greater independence, stronger capacities and international support, as well as the willingness to undertake investigations that have broken the myth of the untouchability of senior officials."

Yet experts caution that more prosecutions do not necessarily mean less corruption. They point to a critical distinction: Albania has become skilled at punishing corruption after it happens, but far less capable of stopping it before it starts. The institutions meant to prevent wrongdoing—administrative controls, audits, conflict-of-interest rules, asset declarations—have largely failed to function as intended. The European Commission's 2025 report on Albania acknowledged that SPAK has made "tangible progress" in building a track record, but also noted that corruption remains widespread and that "the institutional framework for prevention of corruption continued to have a limited impact." In other words, the system catches the crime after the damage is done.

The gap between prosecution and prevention shows up starkly in how ordinary Albanians experience their government. A 2023 survey by SELDI, an anti-corruption coalition, found that 52 percent of respondents reported experiencing corruption pressure from public officials. Forty percent said they had paid a bribe. These numbers suggest that the wave of high-profile arrests has not yet translated into a meaningful change in how citizens interact with the state.

Political scientist Afrim Krasniqi argues the problem runs deeper than institutional design. Since 2013, Prime Minister Edi Rama's Socialist Party has governed Albania and currently holds an outright parliamentary majority. This prolonged dominance, Krasniqi contends, has eroded the checks and balances meant to constrain executive power. "We have a deformed system," he said. "The head of the executive controls the executive, parliament and institutions." This concentration of power, he argues, has fostered informal networks of influence—people outside state institutions who shape legislation, political decisions, and the use of public assets. When asked about the Hyseni case, Rama responded by framing it as an individual matter between her and the justice system, a position he has maintained consistently as investigations have reached his senior officials.

Albania's anti-corruption efforts have been partly driven by its pursuit of European Union membership. In May, the EU confirmed that the country had met interim benchmarks for the rule of law and moved into a phase focused on implementation and lasting results. Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index shows Albania improving from 33 points in 2012 to 39 in 2025, though it still ranks below all current EU member states. For Matlija, the EU's shift toward demanding concrete results rather than just laws has created pressure on Albanian institutions to be genuinely effective and independent. For Krasniqi, however, the real measure of European integration should not be formal progress through the accession process, but whether Albania itself changes—whether citizens feel greater security, prosperity, and independence from the state, not merely whether officials face trial.

What has changed significantly is the institutional reaction. Today, SPAK is a specialized structure with greater independence, stronger capacities and international support, as well as the willingness to undertake investigations that have broken the myth of the untouchability of senior officials.
— Dorian Matlija, director of Res Publica
We are becoming more effective at punishing corruption after it has occurred, but much less capable of preventing it.
— Dorian Matlija
Quer a matéria completa? Leia o original em Deutsche Welle ↗
Fale Conosco FAQ