Messages through friendly countries is not negotiation, Iran's minister said
Less than a month into a war that began on February 28, the United States and Iran find themselves in the uncomfortable space between conflict and negotiation — a space that Pakistan has quietly agreed to hold open. Through a fifteen-point American proposal relayed by Islamabad, two adversaries are exchanging messages neither is fully willing to call diplomacy, each calculating how much the other can endure. History has long known this moment: the pause before one side admits that the cost of continuing outweighs the cost of conceding.
- A war less than a month old has already produced a shadow diplomacy, with Pakistan publicly confirming it is ferrying messages between Washington and Tehran as both sides avoid the word 'negotiation.'
- Iran's public denial of formal talks sits uneasily beside its foreign minister's admission that messages are flowing — a careful linguistic performance designed to preserve dignity while keeping a door ajar.
- Witkoff's optimism is built on a stark premise: that Operation Midnight Hammer proved American military will, and that Iran's negotiators fundamentally misread it, leaving Tehran with no good path forward except more destruction.
- The fifteen-point American proposal now sits in deliberation in Tehran, its fate uncertain — Iran's state media claimed rejection, yet the back-channel remains open, and the next move has been implicitly handed to Iran.
On Thursday, Trump envoy Steve Witkoff entered a White House cabinet meeting carrying what he described as encouraging signals from an unlikely source: Iran. The war had begun just weeks earlier, on February 28, and the United States had already presented a fifteen-point proposal through Pakistan. The response, Witkoff told the room, was "strong and positive."
His confidence was rooted in a specific strategic read — that Iran had miscalculated American resolve. The previous June, the US had launched Operation Midnight Hammer, a sustained air and naval campaign that severely degraded Iran's enriched uranium stockpiles. Witkoff saw the strike as proof that Iranian negotiators had been wrong to believe Washington could not sustain a military campaign. Before the war began, he recalled, Iranian officials had told him directly that the US could not win militarily. Midnight Hammer, he argued, had answered that claim.
From Tehran, the picture was harder to read. Iranian officials publicly denied any formal negotiations were underway, and state television reported the American proposal had been rejected outright. Yet Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi offered a more careful account: messages were indeed moving through intermediaries, he said, but that was not the same as negotiation. The distinction was deliberate — a way of staying in the conversation without appearing to yield.
Pakistan's role moved from background to foreground when Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar confirmed publicly that Islamabad was relaying communications between the two sides and that Iran was actively deliberating the fifteen-point plan. The statement was brief and bureaucratic, but it revealed that Pakistan had positioned itself at the center of a conflict with regional consequences far beyond its borders.
Witkoff's wager remained simple: that military pressure and the absence of good alternatives would eventually bring Tehran to terms. Whether Iran's deliberations reflected a genuine shift in that calculus, or merely another round of careful message-sending, was the question neither side had yet answered.
Steve Witkoff, the Trump administration's chief envoy for Middle Eastern affairs, walked into a cabinet meeting at the White House on Thursday with what he believed was momentum. Iran, he told the president and his team, was showing signs of genuine interest in ending the war that had begun less than a month earlier, on February 28. The United States had presented a fifteen-point proposal through Pakistan, and the signals coming back, Witkoff said, were "strong and positive."
The envoy's confidence rested on a specific calculation: that Iran had nowhere else to go. "If we can convince Iran that this is the inflection point, with no good alternatives for them, other than more death and destruction," Witkoff said, reading carefully from prepared notes, "then if a deal happens, it will be great for the country of Iran." He was betting that Tehran would recognize it had miscalculated the American capacity and will to wage war. The previous June, the United States had launched Operation Midnight Hammer, a sustained air and naval campaign that had significantly degraded Iran's enriched uranium stockpiles. Trump had claimed it obliterated the nuclear program entirely. Witkoff saw that strike as proof of American resolve—and as evidence that Iran's negotiating team had fundamentally misread American intentions.
But the picture from Tehran was murkier. Iranian officials had publicly denied that any formal negotiations with the United States were underway since the fighting began. On Wednesday, Iran's state television reported that Tehran had rejected the American proposal outright. Yet within hours, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi offered a more nuanced account. No direct dialogue had occurred, he said, but messages had been flowing through intermediaries. He drew a careful distinction: "Messages being conveyed through our friendly countries and us responding by stating our positions or issuing the necessary warnings is not called negotiation or dialogue." It was a parsing of language that suggested something was happening, even if Iran wanted to avoid calling it what it was.
Pakistan's role in this shadow diplomacy became explicit on Thursday when Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar confirmed publicly what had been operating in the background. "US-Iran indirect talks are taking place through messages being relayed by Pakistan," he posted on social media. "The United States has shared 15 points, being deliberated upon by Iran." The statement was matter-of-fact, almost bureaucratic in tone, but it amounted to an acknowledgment that Islamabad had positioned itself as the crucial intermediary in a conflict that threatened the entire region.
Witkoff's account of how the war had begun offered context for his current optimism. In the weeks before the fighting started, he and Jared Kushner, Trump's son-in-law, had led negotiations with Iranian officials. The talks had stalled when Iran's team refused American demands. Witkoff believed then, and stated now, that Tehran had been stalling for time, convinced that the United States could not sustain a military campaign. "They would not give up diplomatically, but we could not win militarily," Witkoff recalled the Iranian negotiators saying. That statement, he argued, revealed the fundamental miscalculation at the heart of Iran's strategy. The success of Midnight Hammer had proven otherwise.
What remained unclear was whether Iran's current deliberations over the fifteen-point plan represented a genuine shift in that calculation, or simply another round of messaging through back channels. Araghchi's careful language suggested Tehran was keeping its options open while avoiding the appearance of capitulation. Witkoff's confidence, meanwhile, rested on the belief that time and military pressure would eventually force Iran's hand. The next move, he implied, belonged to Tehran.
Citas Notables
Messages being conveyed through our friendly countries and us responding by stating our positions or issuing the necessary warnings is not called negotiation or dialogue— Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi
US-Iran indirect talks are taking place through messages being relayed by Pakistan. The United States has shared 15 points, being deliberated upon by Iran— Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why does Witkoff keep emphasizing that Iran miscalculated?
Because it's the foundation of his entire argument. If Iran made a strategic error in reading American resolve, then they're now in a position where accepting terms becomes rational rather than shameful.
But Iran is denying these are real negotiations. Doesn't that undermine what Witkoff is saying?
Not necessarily. Araghchi's distinction between "messages" and "negotiations" is actually quite clever. It lets Iran engage without admitting it's negotiating, which saves face domestically while keeping channels open.
Why is Pakistan the middleman here?
Geography and trust. Pakistan sits between the two powers, has relationships with both, and has less at stake in the outcome than, say, a Gulf state would. It's neutral enough to be credible.
What does Witkoff mean by "inflection point"?
He's saying this is the moment where Iran's calculation flips. Before, they thought they could outlast America. Now, after Midnight Hammer, they're supposed to realize they can't. He's betting they'll accept the deal because the alternative—continued war—looks worse.
Is there any indication Iran actually believes that?
Not really. They're deliberating, which is something. But their public statements suggest they're still skeptical. The fact that they're responding at all through Pakistan is the only concrete sign that something is shifting.