We will never negotiate about our defensive capabilities
In Islamabad on a Tuesday in late June 2026, Iranian President Pezeshkian drew a boundary that speaks to something older than any single negotiation: the conviction that survival cannot be bargained away. Iran's missile programme, forged in the fires of the Iran-Iraq war and hardened by decades of regional pressure, has been explicitly excluded from the newly reached US-Iran memorandum — and Tehran insists it will remain so forever. The United States, under President Trump, has quietly accepted this reality, softening demands it once called essential. What remains is not resolution but deferral — a fault line papered over, waiting for the next tremor.
- Iran's President Pezeshkian declared in unambiguous terms that his country's missiles were never part of the 14-point US agreement and never will be, invoking Gaza as proof of what happens to nations that cannot defend themselves.
- The tension is sharpest where it is least spoken: Israel views Iran's arsenal as an existential threat, and Western powers have long sought restrictions that Tehran now refuses to even discuss.
- Trump's reversal — from insisting on missile curbs to saying at the G7 that 'missiles aren't the problem' — caught observers off guard and marked a significant retreat from what had been a core American demand.
- Pakistan's Prime Minister Sharif stood beside Pezeshkian and amplified the argument, calling out what he sees as a global double standard that permits some nations their arsenals while demanding others disarm.
- The memorandum does move other pieces — Hormuz, financial restrictions, nuclear technical talks — but the missile question has not been resolved so much as quietly set aside, its pressure still building beneath the surface.
Standing before reporters in Islamabad, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian delivered a declaration with no softening edges: Iran's missile programme was not part of the 14-point memorandum just reached with the United States, and it would never be subject to negotiation under any circumstances. To explain why, he reached for a comparison that cuts to the heart of Iran's strategic worldview — without its missiles, he said, Iran would have been treated as Gaza has been treated, with no mercy shown to the old or the young.
The memorandum itself, released publicly by a senior US official, bears out his claim. It addresses the Strait of Hormuz, financial restrictions on Tehran, and a framework for future nuclear technical discussions. Iran's only weapons-related commitment is to refrain from developing nuclear arms. Its conventional military capabilities — the missiles, the defence infrastructure built over four decades — are untouched and unmentioned.
This outcome represents a quiet but significant American retreat. Trump had previously insisted that ballistic missile restrictions be part of any deal. By the time of the G7 summit in France, that position had dissolved. 'Missiles aren't the problem,' he said — and even suggested it would be unfair to deny Iran weapons that other nations possess freely.
Iran's missile programme was born of necessity during the 1980s Iran-Iraq war, when its air defences proved inadequate and ballistic missiles became the compensating instrument. The arsenal has grown in range and sophistication ever since, and Israel — roughly 1,500 kilometres away — has long identified it as a primary threat. Previous American efforts to link missile restrictions to nuclear negotiations consistently failed.
Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, standing alongside Pezeshkian, reinforced the position and challenged what he called an intolerable double standard in how the international community treats different nations' arsenals. What the moment revealed is a hardened consensus between Tehran and Islamabad — and a wider fault line that the current agreement has deferred rather than resolved. The missile question remains alive, its tensions intact, waiting for the next chapter of a diplomacy that has never been simple.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stood before reporters in Islamabad on Tuesday and drew a line that will not be crossed. His country's missile programme, he said flatly, is not part of the 14-point agreement just reached with the United States, and it will never be. The statement was unambiguous: "Iran's missiles were not in the MoU and will never be."
The backdrop to this declaration is a region where the balance of power hinges on weapons. Pezeshkian framed Iran's missile arsenal not as an instrument of aggression but as the only thing standing between his nation and the fate he sees unfolding in Gaza. "If the missiles we have for our defence did not exist," he said, "Israel and the United States would have ploughed Iran just like Gaza, showing no mercy to either the old or the young." It is a stark comparison, and it reveals how Iran views its defensive posture: not as optional, not as negotiable, but as existential.
The 14-point memorandum itself, released publicly last week by a senior US administration official, makes no mention of restrictions on Iran's missile capabilities or broader defence systems. The agreement does address other matters: reopening the Strait of Hormuz, easing certain financial restrictions on Tehran, and establishing a framework for future technical discussions about Iran's nuclear programme. The only weapons-related commitment Iran made was to refrain from procuring or developing nuclear weapons. Everything else—the missiles, the defence infrastructure—remains outside the scope of negotiation.
This represents a significant shift from the American position just months earlier. President Donald Trump had previously insisted that curbing Iran's ballistic missile programme be part of any deal. But during recent negotiations, his stance softened noticeably. At last week's G7 summit in France, Trump said simply: "missiles aren't the problem." He went further, suggesting that if other nations possess such weapons, it would be unfair to deny them to Iran. The reversal caught many observers by surprise, signalling that the United States had deprioritized what had once been a core demand.
Iran's missile programme has deep roots. During the 1980s Iran-Iraq war, when the country's air defences proved inadequate, Tehran began developing ballistic missiles to compensate. Over the decades, the arsenal has grown in both range and sophistication. Israel, situated roughly 1,500 kilometres away, has long regarded this capability as a primary security threat. Before the current conflict, the United States had consistently tried to fold Iran's missile development and its support for regional armed groups into broader nuclear negotiations. Those efforts failed.
Pezeshkian's language on Tuesday left no room for future compromise. "We will never negotiate with anyone, under any circumstances, ever, about our defensive capabilities," he said. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, standing alongside him, echoed the sentiment. He pointed out that the preliminary agreement makes no mention of ballistic missiles and rejected what he called a double standard: some nations are permitted such weapons while others are not. "There cannot be double standards," Sharif said. "You cannot digest this duplicity."
What emerges from these statements is a hardened position on both sides. Iran has secured an agreement that leaves its military capabilities untouched. The United States, under Trump, has accepted this reality. But the underlying tension remains unresolved. Israel continues to view Iran's missiles as a threat. Western powers have historically sought restrictions. And Iran, having watched what it sees as the destruction of Gaza, is determined never to be in a position where it cannot defend itself. The missile question, far from being settled, has simply been deferred—a fault line that will likely resurface as regional diplomacy continues.
Citações Notáveis
If the missiles we have for our defence did not exist, Israel and the United States would have ploughed Iran just like Gaza, showing no mercy to either the old or the young.— Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian
There cannot be double standards that some countries can have ballistic missiles and Iran shouldn't have. You cannot digest this duplicity.— Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why did Pezeshkian invoke Gaza specifically when talking about missiles? It seems like an unusual comparison to make in a diplomatic setting.
Because it's not diplomatic language at all—it's a warning. He's saying: this is what happens when you don't have the means to defend yourself. Gaza is the cautionary tale. For Iran, the missiles aren't abstract military hardware. They're the thing that keeps the country from being overrun.
But Trump just said missiles aren't the problem. Doesn't that suggest the US is no longer interested in restricting them?
It does, which is the surprising part. Trump reversed course from his earlier position. But saying "missiles aren't the problem" and actually accepting Iran's arsenal as permanent are two different things. The real question is whether this softening holds, or whether it's just negotiating theatre.
What about Israel? They're only 1,500 kilometres away. How are they reacting to this?
The article doesn't say, but you can infer: Israel sees Iran's missiles as the primary threat to its security. An agreement that leaves those missiles untouched and unregulated is, from Israel's perspective, a failure. That tension is still there, unresolved.
So the missiles were never actually on the table in these negotiations?
Correct. They were explicitly excluded from the 14-point agreement. The only weapons issue that made it into the deal was Iran's commitment not to develop nuclear weapons. Everything else—the missiles, the defence systems—was off-limits from the start.
What does this tell us about the balance of power in these talks?
That Iran held firm on what it considers non-negotiable, and the US accepted it. Whether that's strength or pragmatism depends on your perspective. But it's clear: Iran walked away with its military capabilities intact and acknowledged.