China doesn't have this problem. America has been reactive.
When the agencies of a great power fail to speak to one another, rivals fill the silence. The Energy Security Pacts Act, introduced this week by Senators Coons and Ricketts with bipartisan support, seeks to remedy a structural flaw in how the United States promotes energy development abroad — not by adding new resources, but by requiring that existing ones work in concert. At stake is more than bureaucratic efficiency: in places like the Philippines, where American military bases depend on a grid partially controlled by Chinese interests, the cost of coordination failure has become a matter of strategic consequence.
- American agencies — State, the Export-Import Bank, the Development Finance Corporation, the Millennium Challenge Corporation — each pursue energy goals abroad in isolation, leaving gaps that Chinese firms have learned to exploit with speed and coherence.
- The Philippines illustrates the danger most sharply: US technical advisors prepare the ground for American energy investment, but financing agencies aren't looped in, and Chinese companies claim the contracts — on a grid that now powers nine US military installations.
- The bill proposes a binding fix, mandating upfront interagency coordination before any investment begins, replacing the current 'hope someone follows through' model with a structured, decade-long Energy Security Pact framework.
- Each pact would move in two phases — first, grant funding to build infrastructure and reform regulation; then, private sector expertise and concessional financing to expand electricity capacity and drive economic growth in partner nations.
- Paired with the DOMINANCE Act introduced earlier this year, the legislation marks the most serious congressional attempt yet to make American energy diplomacy coherent, competitive, and consequential in strategic markets worldwide.
Congress is moving to address a problem that sounds procedural but carries genuine geopolitical weight: the American agencies tasked with promoting energy security abroad do not coordinate with one another, and the silence between them is proving costly.
Senators Chris Coons of Delaware and Pete Ricketts of Nebraska introduced the Energy Security Pacts Act this week with bipartisan support. The bill's central insight is simple but long overlooked — the United States possesses the tools to help allied nations build reliable electricity grids and attract investment, but those tools are scattered across agencies that operate on separate tracks, leaving openings that China has learned to exploit.
The Philippines offers a stark illustration. The State Department sends technical advisors to strengthen the country's power infrastructure, creating conditions that should draw American energy companies. But the Export-Import Bank, which finances such deals, operates independently of State's work. Chinese firms move in instead — and today, nine American military bases on Philippine soil depend on a national grid partially owned by Chinese interests. A similar dynamic plays out in Côte d'Ivoire, where the Millennium Challenge Corporation has rehabilitated the electricity grid without any mechanism for the Development Finance Corporation to build on that foundation and bring American businesses into the market.
The Energy Security Pacts Act would flip this sequence. Rather than allowing agencies to proceed independently and hope others follow, the bill mandates upfront coordination before any investment begins. A formal pact, negotiated with a strategic partner country and spanning a decade, would move through two phases: first, American grant funding to build public infrastructure and reform the regulatory environment; then, private sector expertise and concessional financing to expand electricity capacity and generate economic growth.
What distinguishes the approach is its binding character. Coordination would be required from the outset — not left to chance or goodwill. The bill arrives alongside the DOMINANCE Act, introduced in January by Representatives Young Kim and Ami Bera, which pursues a similar logic in strategic energy markets. Together, the two measures represent the most serious congressional effort yet to make America's global energy engagement coherent — not through grand declarations, but through the unglamorous discipline of ensuring its own institutions work together.
Congress is moving to fix a problem that sounds bureaucratic but carries real geopolitical weight: American agencies tasked with promoting energy security abroad don't talk to each other, and the silence is costly.
Senators Chris Coons of Delaware and Pete Ricketts of Nebraska introduced the Energy Security Pacts Act this week with bipartisan backing. The bill's central insight is straightforward but overlooked: the United States has the tools to help allied nations build reliable electricity grids and attract investment, but those tools sit in different agencies that operate independently, leaving gaps that China has learned to exploit.
Consider what happens now. The State Department sends technical advisors to countries like the Philippines to strengthen their power infrastructure, creating conditions that should attract American energy companies. But the Export-Import Bank, which finances those deals, isn't coordinated with State's work. The result: Chinese firms move in instead. The Philippines hosts nine American military bases, all of them dependent on a national grid partially owned by China—a vulnerability that illustrates what's at stake when coordination fails. Or take Côte d'Ivoire, where the Millennium Challenge Corporation has rehabilitated the electricity grid to support regional growth. The International Development Finance Corporation has no mandate to leverage that work and bring American businesses into the market. Each agency does its job in isolation. The opportunities slip away.
The fragmentation isn't accidental; it's structural. Multiple American institutions exist to promote energy security—the State Department, the Export-Import Bank, the Development Finance Corporation, the Millennium Challenge Corporation—but they operate on separate tracks with separate mandates and no requirement to align. The result is what the bill's architects call a "hoped-for follow-on attention" model: the United States invests, then hopes someone else picks up the thread. It rarely works that way.
The Energy Security Pacts Act flips the sequence. Rather than letting agencies stumble forward independently, the bill requires upfront coordination and planning before any investment begins. An Energy Security Pact would be negotiated with a strategic partner country and would unfold over a decade. The first phase brings American grant funding to build public infrastructure and reform the regulatory environment—the foundation work that makes private investment possible. The second phase deploys American private sector expertise and concessional financing to expand that electricity capacity and use it to grow industries and create jobs. The coordination happens at the start, not as an afterthought.
What makes this approach different is the binding structure. Rather than hoping the Export-Import Bank notices what State has done in the Philippines, the bill makes coordination mandatory. Rather than leaving it to chance whether the Development Finance Corporation capitalizes on the Millennium Challenge Corporation's work in Côte d'Ivoire, the bill creates a framework that requires them to work together from the beginning.
The bill arrives alongside complementary legislation. Representatives Young Kim of California and Ami Bera of California introduced the DOMINANCE Act in January, which takes a similar approach to energy competition in strategic markets. Together, the two bills represent the most serious congressional effort yet to reorganize how America competes for influence in global energy markets—not through rhetoric or sanctions, but through the unglamorous work of making sure the right hand knows what the left hand is doing.
Notable Quotes
Global energy security demands US agency collaboration and a robust assistance-to-deal pipeline that does not depend on ad hoc agency relationships.— Energy for Growth Hub analysis of the bill's approach
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why does it matter if American agencies don't coordinate? Isn't energy investment just energy investment?
Because China is watching the gaps. When State Department advisors build the foundation for investment in the Philippines and then no American bank shows up to finance the next step, a Chinese company fills that space. That's not just a lost deal—it's lost influence in a country that hosts nine American military bases.
So this bill just tells agencies to talk to each other?
It's more binding than that. It requires them to plan together before any money moves. An Energy Security Pact is negotiated upfront with a partner country, with all the American agencies at the table from day one. That's different from the current model, where State does its work, then hopes the Export-Import Bank notices and acts.
What does a ten-year pact actually look like?
Grant funding first—that's American money building the public infrastructure and fixing the regulatory rules that block investment. Then private sector expertise and concessional financing move in to expand capacity and use that electricity to grow industries. It's a pipeline, not scattered efforts.
Why hasn't this happened already?
Because the agencies have separate mandates and separate budgets. There's no mechanism forcing them to align. The bill creates that mechanism. It's not revolutionary—it's just making coordination mandatory instead of optional.
And this works against China how?
China doesn't have this problem. When China invests in energy infrastructure abroad, it's coordinated from the start. America has been reactive, filling gaps after the fact. This bill tries to make America proactive—to be there from the beginning with a complete strategy.